Collapse of the Afghan Army: An Overview

 As the Taliban rolled into the outskirts of Kabul it was evident that the Afghan army was crumbling, in many cases without a shot being fired. The collapse was disheartening to many, so much so that President Biden chided that if Afghans were not willing to fight for their own country how could they expect US soldiers to die for them. Indeed one would have expected that 20 years of training and billions of dollars on equipment and training costs surely the end result would or could have been a better fighting force. 

However, a summary dismissal of the Afghan army performance ignores the many factors that led to such a sorry state of affairs. The end result of a surrender ignores the gradual erosion of the will to fight that commenced 20 odd months before the recent 'victory' of the Taliban. While such a debacle warrants a full and deeper analysis it might be worth one's while to summarise the factors that led to the Afghan army's meek dissolution.

Structure of the Afghan Armed Forces.

The Afghan army was basically rebuilt after the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, even though at that point the Taliban controlled army was not a cohesive military as the Taliban preferred, and perhaps still prefer, to consider their idealised Taliban militia fighters as the mainstay of military might. Since 2001 the US and its NATO allies poured money and equipment and personnel to train and build a new army.  The 200,000 strong military that emerged was composed of a good proportion of the ethnic minorities of Hazara, Tajiks and Uzbeks, mixed with progressive Pushtuns. While pains were taken to avoid units to be raised along tribal and ethnic fault lines a good measure of former military commanders or warlords we inducted into the army to reduce the ability of former warlords to have private armies.

However, this also was the basic catalyst for nepotism and resulted in a military force which was very top heavy with officers and that too in senior ranks disproportionately more than soldiers under their command. There are some suggestions that in 2019 there were as many as 1000 senior officers with ranks above brigadier. Of the 200,000 inducted soldiers it is estimated that about 21,000 were the commando soldiers composed of seven battalions and represented the only effective fighting force in the Afghan army. It is estimated that these battalions were engaged in 80% of the fighting against the Taliban. Within these units, by and large, morale was high and over the two odd decades they had won the respect of their American and NATO supporters. Today it is estimated that as Kabul fell to the Taliban these former commandos moved into the Panjshir valley and joined forces with the Northern Alliance (also now referred to as the Norther Resistance Front).

Operational Pattern of the Afghan Army.

Since 2001 the role of the Afghan army in battling the Taliban progressed over various phases. From an initial force that 'made up the numbers' for US forces, who did the bulk of the fighting, the Afghan army, and mainly its commando battalions, were carrying out independent operations against the Taliban. In all operations of the Afghan army air support, remote battlefield intelligence (drones, satellites etc) all came from US and NATO forces. Since 2015 the Afghan airforce and air wing of the Army was slowly being rebuilt but at the time of the Taliban take over still relied on operational support, (target selection and guidance), maintenance and engineering solely on US forces or their civilian contractors. 

Typical missions carried out by the Afghan commando units would be soldiers being ferried into a battle zone by helicopter, closely overseen by satellite and drone surveillance and when threats emerged then US or NATO planes would be called in to neutralise such threats. These missions were largely successful when it came to direct combat with the Taliban, but once the mission was over the countryside was conceded back to the Taliban as local and district administration of the Karzai and then the Ghani governments was ineffective and in many cases corrupt. 

Afghan army operations were heavily if not entirely reliant on the combat operational support that the US and NATO forces provided them and on the ability to maintain the equipment provided to them. One major failing of the US planners was that they did not consider the educational and technical weakness of the average solider of the Afghan army and thus giving them equipment that required a relatively well developed technical ability to operate and maintain the equipment created inherit weaknesses in the fighting force. This problem got more acute after 2014 when President Obama first announced an intention to withdraw and substantial cuts in aid and operational support personnel occurred. 

It would seem that no strategic thinking went into planning and developing an Afghan Army which could function independently. US officials, especially the skeptics, would argue that the Afghan soldier never had the tools and skills to function as an independent military force. This is an over simplification as numerous military forces exist in the region who function independently and effectively. If forward thinking had been applied then an effective military force could have been created from the beginning with the objective that in a decade or so it should be able to operate independently. 

Ineffective Political Governance.

After the ouster of the Taliban in 2001 the government that was assembled was based on the support of the waring factions that had been fighting the Taliban prior to 2001. This was in principle the Northern Alliance and warlords from Uzbek and Tajik ethnic minorities. Like minded Pushtuns also assembled around the Karzai government but by and large the administration at provincial and district levels was based off existing tribal hierarchies. These local administrative set ups had largely remained unchanged during the Taliban time and even before. During times of strife these tribal loyalties were not only negotiable but also at time dual in nature owing their loyalties to both the Kabul government and the Taliban as the situation so demanded. 

However, years of civil war had taught these local administrations that relying on funding from a central government was not feasible and hence tribal chiefs and war lords developed their own funding from road blocks, taxing the local businesses and in some cases from the narco trade. In the 20 years that the US was trying to rebuild Afghanistan not one attempt was made to overhaul the corrupt administrative system which was expected to deliver security and basic necessities to the population. While on paper massive funding, to the tune of $144 billion, was made available to the government in Kabul, the actual funds that saw their way into the 34 provinces and 421 districts of Afghanistan were negligible. 

While a number of aid agencies were operating in the provinces in the areas of health care and social welfare their operations were not large enough to fill the void from lack of governmental services. In addition the funding that Kabul was allocating was being pilfered and only nominal progress was being shown on the ground to get further funds released. In many instances police and local officials were not paid their salaries on time and from 2015 onwards delays of nine months in salaries were common. 

While the Kabul government concentrated on security in Kabul itself, after 2015 it developed a policy to concentrate only on the major provincial centres leaving much of the countryside not administered from Kabul. The Taliban, on the other hand, had developed an effective policy to at least provide security in these far flung districts even if they did not have the means to provide health care and other amenities. Most Afghans in the rural areas were tired of decades of war and insecurity and with the Taliban offering security and no extortion and bribes at checkpoints they controlled they were winning the hearts of the rural population of the country. 

In contrast the US and its allied government in Kabul was seen more as an occupying force and in every sense the US policy makers were making the same mistakes they made in Vietnam. Corruption was so rampant that it infected the Afghan army too. It was normal for military commanders to sell fuel and ammunition on the black market and in some cases even military equipment ended up with warlords and eventually Taliban hands. While in time a deeper analysis will be done of the US debacle in Afghanistan it still remains a puzzle as to why the IUS and its allies did not take any measures to stop the corruption of the Karzai and Ghani governments? 

US policy short comings.

Apart from the fact that the US decision to invade Afghanistan (and Iraq) was faulted, (you don't invade a whole country to capture one man), polices and actions post invasion were ill thought and poorly executed. If the aim was to build a modern and progressive Afghanistan than working with the very war lords who had subjugated the Afghan people was hardly a solution for the long term. Military objectives were primary to US policy makers and political and social reform remained a step child of US policy in Afghanistan. Mediocre advisers who were either Afghans or supposed experts on the country sang from a hymn page which had no connection with the ground realities of the country. 

From 2014 US policy on Afghanistan was seeking not only disengagement from a war they knew they were not going to win but was also marked by an endless search for an exit strategy. President Obama after initially increasing the troops on the ground eventually began to talk of ending the war and a withdrawal of US troops. However, Obama fell short of specifying a timeline or a more detailed policy. His successor Donald Trump pushed ahead with a withdrawal and held meetings with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, to arrive at what is termed as the Doha Agreement. Under the agreement the US agreed with the Taliban that troops would be reduced from 13,000 to 2,500, which was promptly done, and that by May 1, 2020 all US troops would leave Afghan soil. 

What was bizarre about these talks and the subsequent agreement was that the existing government in Kabul were excluded from the talks. In addition no framework or conditions other than a Taliban undertaking not to attack US and NATO troops was mentioned in the agreement. Most importantly no political settlement or indication of the future government of Afghanistan was mentioned in the agreement. In essence this was a 'cut and run' deal done by the outgoing Trump administration in haste and perhaps partially to leave the Biden administration a 'hot potato' to handle. The Biden policy was to continue with the Trump-Taliban deal, however to extend the exist date from May 2020 to August 31st 2021 but did not push the Taliban for working towards a comprehensive peace deal with the government in Kabul. 

The Doha agreement was to have a major impact on the morale of the Afghan army. Those elements of the Afghan commando battalions who had been at the forefront of the fighting against the Taliban felt like 'a dagger had been put through their heart' when they heard of the agreement. This was all the more telling considering that through all of 2019, when the agreement was being negotiated in Doha, Taliban attacks on Afghan security forces were at their highest peak (8,204 attacks). In contrast attacks on US and NATO forces were waning and it was clear to the Afghan army that they were on their own. 

The Biden administration is being slammed for a sharp and hasty pull out from Afghanistan where in fairness both Biden and Trump should carry that burden. One would indeed have expected that Biden could have, at the time of extending the withdrawal date, encouraged and insisted on the Taliban and the Ghani government sorting out a peace deal. The Taliban it was said was willing to speak to the government in Kabul provided Ghani resigned and his successor held such talks. Biden could have renegotiated various aspects of the Doha Agreement to ensure that Taliban were also to implement steps essential for an inclusive government. 

Perhaps the gravest damage to the morale of the Afghan army was the absence of any representation of the Kabul government in the Doha talks. These were signals to the rank and file that the US was willing to abandon them for the sake of securing a safe withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Taliban were better organised to exploit this gapping weakness of the Doha talks by sending messages into the many districts that the US was 'abandoning the Ghani government and its establishment'. This explains why the Taliban was able to take over many of the districts of Afghanistan without a bullet being fired as it pitched to local tribal chiefs that they would be better served with a Taliban government. 

Compromised Operational Readiness.

Due to massive corruption in the senior ranks of the Afghan armed forces and the ministry of defence in Kabul the Afghan army was in a pathetic state of operational readiness. While some of commando units were organised enough to fight even their resolve was being tested each month with no salaries, shortages of ammunition and most importantly the lack of any air support. When the US announced their pull out in Feb 2020, the many contractors hired to maintain and support Afghan army equipment including its small air force, also left Afghanistan. The Afghan army's fighting units suddenly found that they were not trained to fight without air support and with out over the horizon intelligence gathering they were in a sense fighting blind. 

On the ground the morale of these few fighting units was further eroded when they saw Taliban forces using American weapons and in many cases driving US Humvees and armoured vehicles. The Taliban tactics of hit and run had been effective through out the many years of them fighting US and NATO forces, and while the Afghan commandos were also picking  selective fights they lacked the air power to decisively defeat the Taliban in such encounters. As the tide turned in 2019 and most of 2020 the Ghani government insisted on holding on to small rural districts rather than withdraw to strategic highways and town centers. This depleted the effectiveness of the Afghan commandos who knew that most of the 180,000 plus Afghan army was just numbers of paper. 

In conclusion it was would be wrong to say that the Afghan army was not prepared to fight for their country. They had been built and trained by the US in a manner which required a broad based change in the mind set of military and political leadership. The US policy makers ignored that a military cannot function in a political and administrative vacuum. History has taught us that one cannot have military solutions to what are essentially political issues. The combination of all the elements mentioned above indicate that there was a systemic failure in Afghanistan and this principally rests upon the planning and direction of that plan from day one. Most damaging to the military's will to fight were the depth and extent of the  corruption in the country and the narrow self interest of the United States in negotiating their own withdrawal with little regard for the future of Afghanistan. The battle with the Taliban was being lost since a decade ago as the effort to win the hearts of the people in the countryside was failing. 

Afghanistan Abandoned.

 As chaotic scenes of Afghanistan's fall to Taliban emerge we see a return of the Kalashnikov culture while the United States attempts to sugar coat what is essentially its defeat. Two decades ago few could have imagined that the ousted Taliban would ever return to power. In October 2001 US and its allies embarked on a war in Afghanistan with the ostensible reason to fight terrorism and rid the country of the Taliban who sheltered Al Qadea. In the two decades since then the US embarked on what it called 'nation building' with the aim to modernise Afghanistan and rebuild its armed forces as an eventual deterrent to the resurgence of the Taliban. 

Hamad Karazi was installed as the President who remained in power till 2014, winning re-election in controversial elections which were allegedly fraudulent. He was succeeded by Ashraf Ghani, who fled Kabul leaving it to the Taliban and thus bringing to the fore the current crisis. There is no denying that Afghans feel abandoned by the allies who not only propped these two Presidents over the past two decades but also promised a stronger country that could eventually stand on its own feet. 

There are many aspects to this debacle and is a text book case of how not to conduct such foreign adventures. The fall of Kabul is a failure of the United States and its allies as much as it is the failure of progressive Afghans and most of all the two governments of Karazai and Ghani. If the American current stance is that the purpose of their presence was to hold Al Qadea responsible for the attack on the US, then one has to ask when that was achieved ten years ago why was their presence still so overwhelming in the country? The usual answer is that US priorities were to help the Afghan government rebuild itself. However, it was well know that corruption was so rampant that all the money that poured into the country ended up lining the pockets of a highly corrupt group of people.

It would be wise to examine the implications of the current events and what led to this situation from the perspective of different actors and stakeholders. 

The United States of America.

Irrespective of how Washington paints the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fall of Kabul, the imagery vividly reminds us of the fall of Saigon in April 1975.

There are indeed distinctive differences between the political imperatives in 1975 as compared to 2021, yet many, even within the US, will see the withdrawal as abandoning allies. In so far as US involvement in Vietnam was to fight communism, their presence in Afghanistan was to fight Jihadism as professed by both the Taliban and Al Qadea. In 2001 the Taliban government in Kabul were hesitant to hand over Osama bin Laden which then led to a US invasion of the country. In a fragmented and divided Afghanistan forging an effective central government was a challenge well beyond the comprehension of American policy makers. $143 billion were poured into the Afghan government, of which $88 billion went towards arming and training a new Afghan army. 

American's were aware of the rampant corruption in Kabul and did little to create a governance to ensure that these funds were used effectively. Analysts suggest that as much as 35% of these funds went into private coffers and at no time were the people in Kabul held accountable. Much like the 1970's American policy makers were ignorant to the fact that one cannot find military solutions to what are essentially political problems. 

While the Taliban were defeated in 2001, they did not surrender but simply dissolved into the general population. Their fighters for most of the time were either farmers or ordinary citizens to then emerge from time to time to carry out attacks and then dissolve back into the population. The US and the newly formed Afghan army may well have controlled the major cities and strategic points in the country, yet there was a general feeling that large tracts of the countryside were the domain of the Taliban. 

Successive US administrations talked of leaving Afghanistan but the ground realities indicated that the Taliban threat was always nascent and ever present. When the administration of President Trump began to negotiate with the Taliban the writing on the wall was clear. More importantly, for the Taliban these negotiations gave them a legitimacy that they had lacked for most of the past twenty years. US allies in Kabul were largely ignored in this rapprochement with the Taliban and political watchers felt that perhaps a comprehensive agreement for a 'new Afghan' administration was bring forged with the Taliban. Events have since shown this was not the case and as President Biden plugged the plug announcing a full pullout Ashraf Ghani and his government were pretty much on their own. 

While the Taliban have been emphasising that they are not the same as 20 years ago, talking of forgiveness and women's rights it is obvious they seek, principally from Washington, a recognition of their government which is vital to them. Interestingly Western commentators are wary of believing that we have a Taliban 2.0, (a new version) and are talking of 'holding them accountable to their word'. While this may well be the need one wonders why they commentators do not hold Ashraf Ghani and Hama Karazai accountable for the billions of dollars that were stolen from the aid and assistance provided to the Afghan government over the past twenty years?

US and Afghanistan's neighbours will be keen to see the Taliban keep their word on not letting foreign fighters make the country a base for operations. Somehow it seems there is a veiled message that if the Taliban are not recognised and supported then all bets are off. Indeed remnants of Al Qadea and ISIS will be keen to view Afghan territory as a possible friendly soil to plant their seeds in. If in the future Afghanistan were to become a hub for terrorist activity it will pose some unique challenges for the US. Unlike 2001 when there were numerous anti-Taliban factions, namely the Northern Alliance, to ally with the US, given their withdrawal in 2021, will be hard pressed to find allies within Afghanistan who would trust them. 

The Taliban.

As we are flooded with images of the Taliban having taken Kabul, there is a postscript that the Taliban likes to attach that his is a 'new' Taliban unlike that from twenty years ago. Their initial messages  are of guaranteeing the rights of women (under their definition of the Sharia law) and seeking to form an inclusive government all designed to show this new face of the Taliban. They are keen to gain legitimacy more so from the international community and one could give them the benefit of the doubt in so far as they may well have changed from the Taliban of old. 

The Taliban are aware that in the past two decades the dynamics of Afghan society, mostly within the cities has changed. The role of women as a potent and effective force within society has been visible. While the Taliban will try and roll back some of these social changes it is more than likely that their acceptance of women to work is influenced by a realisation that some of the freedoms of the past two decades cannot simply be bottled up again. 

However, the Taliban are not a monolithic organisation with an effective internal structure of command and control. While they have tried to portray an image of a unified central leadership in reality across the 35 plus provinces of Afghanistan there will be local commanders with their own agenda of leadership. Further, the emphasis that the Taliban have placed on following Sharia law, while simplistic in rhetoric, means that interpretations of Sharia law may well vary amongst local leaders. 

In addition if there is a fall out between the international community, especially the leading Western nations, and the Taliban over their acceptance within the international community of nations then the Taliban may well abandon this new image they have been pushing forward. Already the news that Afghanistans reserves of nearly $10 billion will not be made available to the Taliban till clarity of the form of the new government has emerged sows the seeds of such conflicts. 

Internally the Taliban have to contend with the minorities who do not confirm to the Taliban shade of ideology like the Hazara (many of whom are Shia muslims) or the Uzbeks and Tajiks. Two decades ago when the Taliban were in power these minorities bore the brunt of Taliban angst and anger with the extent of persecution reaching executions. Further these minorities were also the rank and file of the North Alliance that fiercely opposed Taliban rule. For the current leadership of the Taliban the biggest challenge will be how they will show inclusiveness with regards to these minorities. 

For the Taliban foreign relations will be vital in the current climate. Unlike 1996 when they formed their first government this time they are more dependent on foreign aid and assistance. Also in 1996 there was no backdrop of an attack on US by Al Qadea thus their actions within Afghanistan were not of much consequence to Washington. The task of building the economy of the country cannot be done in isolation and while Washington may not be as generous in dishing out money the Americans do understand that an   impoverished Afghanistan will be the hotbed for anti American groups to operate from. 

In a regional context the Taliban will have to ensure that groups such as the Tehrik i Taliban Pakistan, (TTP) who have been carrying out attacks within Pakistan are reined in. While the Pakistan Taliban are an entirely different group they will draw inspiration of the Afghan Taliban's success to test their ability within Pakistan. The Taliban, while formed in Kandahar, were at a crucial time of its history supported by Pakistan and while they may not be controlled by Pakistan they certainly are conscious of ensuring good relations with Pakistan. 

Establishing credibility will be a major issue for the Taliban as they have been making promises which are dramatically different from their previous stated position on women's rights and treatment of its opponents. Additionally they have stated that they wish to form an inclusive government and it will most certainly be a challenge in bringing in groups who have opposed the Taliban. It is highly unlikely that such a government will uphold a true power sharing mechanism and Taliban will most certainly hold key positions in such a government. For the moment the Taliban are holding all the cards and it remains to be seen what will be the trade offs for them to gain international legitimacy. 

The Afghan Public.

Afghan society is unbearably complex where segmentation follows religious, tribal, ethnic and urban considerations. While the country is predominantly Sunni Muslim (90%) there are around 10% Shia Muslims, many of whom are well educated and occupy important positions in government and society. Pushtuns make up 42% of the population from whose ranks the Taliban are formed. Tajiks (who speak Dari a language very closely assimilated to Persian) are 27%, Hazaras and Uzbeks are 9% each and then there are other smaller ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Hazaras have suffered the worst under Taliban rule and it is reported that in July 2021 the Taliban carried out some executions of Hazaras. 

The ethnic minorities, mainly the Tajik and Hazara have been the bulk of the forces that have opposed the Taliban. There is no denying that these ethnic minorities view Taliban promises of forgiveness and inclusiveness with great suspicion. On the  flip side a majority of the Pushtun population welcome the Taliban not necessarily for ideological reasons but for the fact that the Taliban seemingly can bring the security situation under control. In general for a population that has seen war and strife for over four decades they see safety and security is paramount concern. The US and its Afghan allies failed in many respects to provide the security and peace which in the end determines the success of an administrations efforts to govern. 

The Taliban must also be aware that in Afghanistan the younger generation has not only grown in the past twenty years but is also nurtured in the free social structure of the past two decades. This generation within cities like Kabul have been brought up with images of Taliban's brutal rule of the mid 1990's and thus form the bulk of the public opinion that feels the Taliban in 2021 cannot be trusted. It is not surprising that the majority of Afghans who worked with the US and its allies will feel vulnerable and fear reprisals from the Taliban.

In the more far flung regions of the country while there may not be feverish support for the Taliban take over it would be fair to say the people there have lost the will to resist. There are reports that in areas like Panjshir former Afghan army soldiers are organising a resistance. It would seem in the absence of US and NATO forces willing to continue the fight in Afghanistan such resistance will not be meaningful. At best it would position the Tajik and Uzbek leaders to negotiate a better participation in any coalition government.  

More importantly for Afghanistan it remains to be seen how the Taliban will deal with the major tribes and the ethnic minorities. While there is a the Loye Jirga (an assembly of all tribal leaders) the Taliban have in the past ignored the Jirga when it felt they were not siding with them. Yet at the micro level Taliban commanders in various districts of the country know that they cannot ignore the tribal chiefs and thus the jirga and its many tribal chiefs may well have some sway in the direction of Afghan society. The Taliban creed on social norms, as they see being religiously correct, have some commonality with traditional Pushtun tribal social norms regarding women and explains why for tribal Afghans (in rural areas) their dictums on 'burqa' are not seen as restrictive. 

This clearly does not gel well with the younger emerging educated women in cities like Kabul. If anything good came from the past 20 years of US and NATO involvement in Afghanistan it is the sense of empowerment they created amongst the younger generation. This is a key factor in the way the Taliban have portrayed themselves as a 'different' Taliban to the one from 1996. In the months ahead actions of the Taliban will determine how inclusive will they actually be in wake of a total pull out of foreign forces. The challenge of bringing trust back to a society that remembers Taliban actions of 20 years ago and from the recent past will be enormous for the Taliban leadership. The Taliban has, essentially, always been a movement and not a cohesive well administered body. While at the moment there seems some cohesiveness between the political leadership and local commanders within the Taliban, this will be put to test in the months and years ahead. 

Afghanistans Neighbours. 

There is a common misconception that Pakistan created the Taliban. The reality is that the Taliban were initially a home grown movement with the aim to creating law and order in two districts of Kandahar. As their popularity grew in Kandahar, Saudi, US and Pakistan intelligence agencies saw in them the potential of being the only group that could end the civil war in Afghanistan. US weapons, Saudi money and Pakistan logistic support backed the group as they swept across the country in 1995-96. 

In 2021 Pakistani intelligence agencies influence on the Taliban is peripheral and limited to issues of Pakistan's security and ensuring that relations are cordial enough for Pakistan not to close its borders to a landlocked Afghanistan. The emergence of a Taliban faction composed of mainly Pakistani militants operating out of Afghanistan but with an agenda to attack Pakistan changed the security perspective for Islamabad. While the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is not in any way related to the Afghan Taliban there is no doubt that Pakistan's main aim is to eliminate this group. This would also explain the fencing of the border with Afghanistan and high level border patrols being installed on the Pakistan side of the border.

A large measure of Pakistans efforts in Afghanistan are to counter India's activities within Afghanistan. Many in Pakistan intelligence agencies are aware of India's support to anti Pakistan groups based in Afghanistan. India's closer ties with the fallen government of Ashraf Ghani were in part predicated by Delhi's desire to deny Pakistan any influence in Afghanistan. One of the major aims of Pakistan will be to push the new Taliban government to act against all the groups who have been operating against Pakistan interests from within Afghan territory. 

While Pakistan's influence over the Afghan Taliban may be limited in terms of internal affairs, there is no denying that it remains the only neighbour who could have some leverage over Kabul on regional matters. Even though the Taliban have taken pains to emphasise that Afghanistan will not host any group that operates against other countries, many splinter groups of ISIS, and Al Qadea will attempt to operate from Afghan soil. This is largely because the Taliban administration may not have the resources to commit to anti terrorist intelligence gathering. Pakistan has lost close to 40,000 military and civilian souls to the US sponsored war on terror and therefore will be very keen to help the Taliban create enough intelligence infrastructure to prevent a resurgence of both the TTP and the ISIL-K. 

It is also very likely that China will build its relations with a Taliban controlled Kabul not because of any affinity with the new forces in Afghanistan but because of realpolitik to protect its interests in the region. In addition China's thirst for minerals may mean it will work hard to get commercial contracts to exploit these mineral resources which are estimated to be over $1 trillion. It would therefore seem that given the China and Pakistan relationship is very close that these two countries could well be very important in the shaping of a new Afghanistan. 

Prospects of Civil War.

It is highly likely that civil and military strife will continue in various parts of Afghanistan given that there are segments within Afghan society that may choose to continue to resist the Taliban. In the north the Panjshir valley, which was the base of Ahmed Shah Masood's Northern Alliance, has already become a rallying base for the former vive President Amrullah Saleh and he has called for armed resistance to the Taliban to continue. It is unsure who, from the international powers, would support such a move, but many hawks in Washington and other Western capitals will not unwelcome the creation of some counter weight to the Taliban. 

Whether the brewing trouble in the Panjshir valley will become a full blown war with the Taliban depends upon how Kabul's new rulers deal with the many tribes of the Hazara, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Political forces within the Taliban would welcome some form of inclusive government if only to blunt any attempt to fuel a movement against the Taliban. Given that many of Talibans military commanders in the field do not completely share the views of its political leadership there is a chance that localised military operations against the ethnic minorities may continue sporadically. 

The Taliban are also conscious of the ISIL-K's presence within the country and they have already carried out a devastating bomb attack on evacuating Afghans killing scores of Afghans and over a dozen US  troops. While this group does not have widespread support its rank and file is composed of former Taliban fighters who are too hardline to accept any of the changes the Taliban professes. It remains to be seen if ISIL K will be able to recruit more Taliban fighters to its cause and if it can become a large enough force to be a serious military threat to the Taliban. 

Final Words.

As Western presence in Afghanistan crumbles to the quick exit we have seen of their military and the government they propped up one has to wonder what this two decade war was all about. If the task of remaining in Afghanistan for twenty years was about nation building then the US and its allies have failed miserably. Yes on the social front progress was achieved and a freer Afghan society was emerging in Kabul. Much has been said about women's rights and fears that Taliban will force women into the burqa and time after time we are reminded of this. However beyond the city of Kabul we must also acknowledge that Afghanistan is a tribal society where for centuries before the Taliban the culture of the Pushtun and Hazara always was steeped in traditions of keeping women covered and subservient to men. All the Taliban did was put a religious spin onto this and thus faced less criticism for their action in much of rural Afghanistan. Over the past sixty odd years this was changing in the rural areas where the strict burqa was being replaced with the chador (a shawl covering the hair). 

The issues of stability to Afghanistan is more than just dealing with the issue of the burqa, and in this respect the West failed to understand that Afghanistan has only been stable when there has been a strong central government. However a strong central government that is not corrupt and is willing to bring progress through the tribal system to the common people. The West knowingly ignored the corruption of the governments that were installed in Kabul and did not realise that the war against the Soviets and the civil war had left no single force capable to unify the country and also be a clean government. This is where the Taliban held the cards with an image of fighting corruption and ensuring security of the people. (after all the movement started to bring security to two districts in Kandahar). 

The only institution that US and its allies could have built as a stable force was the Afghan armed forces. However, the training and development of the Afghan army was shaped to be a support force to whatever the US and NATO did. Corruption was allowed into the military and it is estimated at over 35% of its operational budget was pocketed by corrupt generals and politicians. The lack of morale that followed indicated that even the best of times desertion rates were as high as 20% in the army. Given that the Afghan army needed constant air support for operations and logistic support very little was done to develop the Afghan airforce. Thus when the US decided to pull out Afghan units on the ground were left stranded not only operationally but also for supplies. 

Afghanistan's economic recovery will be a major concern. In addition to the damage of four decades of war there is little confidence in the Taliban leadership to have the capabilities to manage a modern states economic system. The mammoth task of creating an effective governmental administration has fallen on the Taliban who have never really managed their own affairs in a cohesive manner when it comes to economic matters. This will be the main challenge for Afghanistan as may see that while the Taliban may well provide security will they be able to do national building, something the US and its allies failed to do.

Pakistan-USA relations in a 'New' Pakistan.

Relations between Pakistan and USA are steeped in the history of the Cold War, the Russian invasion of Pakistan and recently through the prism of the War on Terror. Imran Khan, the newly elected Prime Minister, has promised a 'New' Pakistan and with it is the implication of a new policy framework for relations with the major powers, and especially USA. There is more than stifled anxiety in Washington over the new Pakistan and the US press, while mixed in its response of Khan's election victory has been quick to say that 'a dangerous Pakistan has suddenly got more dangerous.'

Imran Khan, while no stalwart of foreign policy affairs, is not a fool to take on the might of the US, who may well have sympathizers within the Pakistan military, but he is neither going to be a push over. As much as Islamabad will want to reframe the relationship, Washington will also have to accept that Khan would be open to redefining a relationship along new lines. Khan wants the label of Pakistan being a 'hired gun' to be removed through a new policy of engagement. To the US policy makers the strategic needs of Pakistan are secondary and something that Khan perhaps knows too well. To the US the war on terror is their number one policy objective and they see Pakistan as the destabilizing pawn in their efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan.

From Khan's perspective the wanton usurpation of Pakistan's sovereignty through drone strikes, which have caused large number of civilian casualties, need to stop. In an interview in 2012 Khan, then just a hopeful for leadership, spelled out some of his thoughts on this subject. His main view was the use of Pakistan army as a hired gun within Pakistan had resulted in a degree of alienation of the people from the government within Pakistan. He did not say it but implied that fight the problem of terrorism cooperation was needed and based on proof against the suspects it should be left to Pakistan to deal with the problem. However, it was also felt that the encouragement of the Pakistan Taliban by Afghan elements across the border also needed to be reined in.

The US has always been suspicious of the ties between Pakistan military and some of the suspected terrorist groups. While the policy of the military has been to eradicate the problem of terrorism, especially after the attack on school in Pakistan, there has always been an element within Pakistan, born from the Zia era, who supported the terrorist elements. Since the terrorists turned on the Pakistan population and with the passage of time such elements within the military have either been purged or have no conclusive influence in policy. The US needs to have an open and closer dialogue on this subject with the new government.

Imran Khan has in the past advocated a dialogue with the militant Islamist groups and something that has labelled him as an active supporter of such elements. Khan will need to spell his position on this subject more clearly, while one would agree with him that the fight is not for land but for the minds and hearts of the young generation. He argues that drone strikes drive the mind and hearts of young people into the lap of the militants. On a broad front one cannot not dispute this argument, but by the same token Imran Khan has to frame a clear and cohesive policy on dealing with the militant elements within Pakistan.

Khan, if reports are to be believed, has the support within the military to carry his agenda forward. He can also use this influence within the military to draw up a policy on dealing with militants. It will then arm Pakistan with a stronger moral argument to press Washington to influence Kabul to stop their support for the Taliban elements from Pakistan who are based on Afghan soil. If the US wants stability within Afghanistan then recognizing that Pakistan also has a role, however small, to play in this that strategy.

On the broader front the two countries will need to look at relations through a new perspective. Khan has been on record that he is against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, he wants an economic agenda to be the forefront of his foreign relations as he and his advisors realize that being an economically weak nuclear power is counter productive to the country. The US policy makers have a chance to reset their relations with Pakistan if they are willing to see that aside from the rhetoric from Imran Khan, he sees a mutually respectful relationship with Pakistan is possible.  Washington will need to learn that rather than tell Pakistan what to do, they will need to learn to discuss what needs to be done and then develop a consensus through discussion.

The flip side is that US policy, especially under President Trump, may just decide they can ignore Pakistan's role in the region and draw harder lines in dealing with Islamabad. While one would reason that sane minds within the State department in the US would argue such a policy would hurt US interests in the region, it is a possibility that Trump would ignore them. In such a scenario US policy would gravitate towards India, and Pakistan would continue to rely on its historical ally China. Thus Pakistan could well be the policy battleground between Washington and Beijing.

 In the coming months the roadmap on Pakistan-US relations will become more visible, and no matter how it may have been in the past there will have to be a fresh approach from both sides. Imran Khan would do well to ponder upon this and set out his road map and then leave it for Washington to respond. There will need to be an acceptance within US stakeholders that Imran Khan's priority will be economic development of his country and side by side the reining in of the terror groups because economic development in the backdrop of bomb blasts and domestic violence would erode public confidence in his government.

To move forward stereo types will have to be washed aside, the stakeholders on each side will need to discuss the new format of relations in depth and agree to disagree on some elements and agree to agree on others. Pakistanis also need to accept that the US has high stakes in the future of Pakistan, the trick is to make sure that the vision of that future is not too divergent.