Afghanistan Abandoned.

 As chaotic scenes of Afghanistan's fall to Taliban emerge we see a return of the Kalashnikov culture while the United States attempts to sugar coat what is essentially its defeat. Two decades ago few could have imagined that the ousted Taliban would ever return to power. In October 2001 US and its allies embarked on a war in Afghanistan with the ostensible reason to fight terrorism and rid the country of the Taliban who sheltered Al Qadea. In the two decades since then the US embarked on what it called 'nation building' with the aim to modernise Afghanistan and rebuild its armed forces as an eventual deterrent to the resurgence of the Taliban. 

Hamad Karazi was installed as the President who remained in power till 2014, winning re-election in controversial elections which were allegedly fraudulent. He was succeeded by Ashraf Ghani, who fled Kabul leaving it to the Taliban and thus bringing to the fore the current crisis. There is no denying that Afghans feel abandoned by the allies who not only propped these two Presidents over the past two decades but also promised a stronger country that could eventually stand on its own feet. 

There are many aspects to this debacle and is a text book case of how not to conduct such foreign adventures. The fall of Kabul is a failure of the United States and its allies as much as it is the failure of progressive Afghans and most of all the two governments of Karazai and Ghani. If the American current stance is that the purpose of their presence was to hold Al Qadea responsible for the attack on the US, then one has to ask when that was achieved ten years ago why was their presence still so overwhelming in the country? The usual answer is that US priorities were to help the Afghan government rebuild itself. However, it was well know that corruption was so rampant that all the money that poured into the country ended up lining the pockets of a highly corrupt group of people.

It would be wise to examine the implications of the current events and what led to this situation from the perspective of different actors and stakeholders. 

The United States of America.

Irrespective of how Washington paints the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fall of Kabul, the imagery vividly reminds us of the fall of Saigon in April 1975.

There are indeed distinctive differences between the political imperatives in 1975 as compared to 2021, yet many, even within the US, will see the withdrawal as abandoning allies. In so far as US involvement in Vietnam was to fight communism, their presence in Afghanistan was to fight Jihadism as professed by both the Taliban and Al Qadea. In 2001 the Taliban government in Kabul were hesitant to hand over Osama bin Laden which then led to a US invasion of the country. In a fragmented and divided Afghanistan forging an effective central government was a challenge well beyond the comprehension of American policy makers. $143 billion were poured into the Afghan government, of which $88 billion went towards arming and training a new Afghan army. 

American's were aware of the rampant corruption in Kabul and did little to create a governance to ensure that these funds were used effectively. Analysts suggest that as much as 35% of these funds went into private coffers and at no time were the people in Kabul held accountable. Much like the 1970's American policy makers were ignorant to the fact that one cannot find military solutions to what are essentially political problems. 

While the Taliban were defeated in 2001, they did not surrender but simply dissolved into the general population. Their fighters for most of the time were either farmers or ordinary citizens to then emerge from time to time to carry out attacks and then dissolve back into the population. The US and the newly formed Afghan army may well have controlled the major cities and strategic points in the country, yet there was a general feeling that large tracts of the countryside were the domain of the Taliban. 

Successive US administrations talked of leaving Afghanistan but the ground realities indicated that the Taliban threat was always nascent and ever present. When the administration of President Trump began to negotiate with the Taliban the writing on the wall was clear. More importantly, for the Taliban these negotiations gave them a legitimacy that they had lacked for most of the past twenty years. US allies in Kabul were largely ignored in this rapprochement with the Taliban and political watchers felt that perhaps a comprehensive agreement for a 'new Afghan' administration was bring forged with the Taliban. Events have since shown this was not the case and as President Biden plugged the plug announcing a full pullout Ashraf Ghani and his government were pretty much on their own. 

While the Taliban have been emphasising that they are not the same as 20 years ago, talking of forgiveness and women's rights it is obvious they seek, principally from Washington, a recognition of their government which is vital to them. Interestingly Western commentators are wary of believing that we have a Taliban 2.0, (a new version) and are talking of 'holding them accountable to their word'. While this may well be the need one wonders why they commentators do not hold Ashraf Ghani and Hama Karazai accountable for the billions of dollars that were stolen from the aid and assistance provided to the Afghan government over the past twenty years?

US and Afghanistan's neighbours will be keen to see the Taliban keep their word on not letting foreign fighters make the country a base for operations. Somehow it seems there is a veiled message that if the Taliban are not recognised and supported then all bets are off. Indeed remnants of Al Qadea and ISIS will be keen to view Afghan territory as a possible friendly soil to plant their seeds in. If in the future Afghanistan were to become a hub for terrorist activity it will pose some unique challenges for the US. Unlike 2001 when there were numerous anti-Taliban factions, namely the Northern Alliance, to ally with the US, given their withdrawal in 2021, will be hard pressed to find allies within Afghanistan who would trust them. 

The Taliban.

As we are flooded with images of the Taliban having taken Kabul, there is a postscript that the Taliban likes to attach that his is a 'new' Taliban unlike that from twenty years ago. Their initial messages  are of guaranteeing the rights of women (under their definition of the Sharia law) and seeking to form an inclusive government all designed to show this new face of the Taliban. They are keen to gain legitimacy more so from the international community and one could give them the benefit of the doubt in so far as they may well have changed from the Taliban of old. 

The Taliban are aware that in the past two decades the dynamics of Afghan society, mostly within the cities has changed. The role of women as a potent and effective force within society has been visible. While the Taliban will try and roll back some of these social changes it is more than likely that their acceptance of women to work is influenced by a realisation that some of the freedoms of the past two decades cannot simply be bottled up again. 

However, the Taliban are not a monolithic organisation with an effective internal structure of command and control. While they have tried to portray an image of a unified central leadership in reality across the 35 plus provinces of Afghanistan there will be local commanders with their own agenda of leadership. Further, the emphasis that the Taliban have placed on following Sharia law, while simplistic in rhetoric, means that interpretations of Sharia law may well vary amongst local leaders. 

In addition if there is a fall out between the international community, especially the leading Western nations, and the Taliban over their acceptance within the international community of nations then the Taliban may well abandon this new image they have been pushing forward. Already the news that Afghanistans reserves of nearly $10 billion will not be made available to the Taliban till clarity of the form of the new government has emerged sows the seeds of such conflicts. 

Internally the Taliban have to contend with the minorities who do not confirm to the Taliban shade of ideology like the Hazara (many of whom are Shia muslims) or the Uzbeks and Tajiks. Two decades ago when the Taliban were in power these minorities bore the brunt of Taliban angst and anger with the extent of persecution reaching executions. Further these minorities were also the rank and file of the North Alliance that fiercely opposed Taliban rule. For the current leadership of the Taliban the biggest challenge will be how they will show inclusiveness with regards to these minorities. 

For the Taliban foreign relations will be vital in the current climate. Unlike 1996 when they formed their first government this time they are more dependent on foreign aid and assistance. Also in 1996 there was no backdrop of an attack on US by Al Qadea thus their actions within Afghanistan were not of much consequence to Washington. The task of building the economy of the country cannot be done in isolation and while Washington may not be as generous in dishing out money the Americans do understand that an   impoverished Afghanistan will be the hotbed for anti American groups to operate from. 

In a regional context the Taliban will have to ensure that groups such as the Tehrik i Taliban Pakistan, (TTP) who have been carrying out attacks within Pakistan are reined in. While the Pakistan Taliban are an entirely different group they will draw inspiration of the Afghan Taliban's success to test their ability within Pakistan. The Taliban, while formed in Kandahar, were at a crucial time of its history supported by Pakistan and while they may not be controlled by Pakistan they certainly are conscious of ensuring good relations with Pakistan. 

Establishing credibility will be a major issue for the Taliban as they have been making promises which are dramatically different from their previous stated position on women's rights and treatment of its opponents. Additionally they have stated that they wish to form an inclusive government and it will most certainly be a challenge in bringing in groups who have opposed the Taliban. It is highly unlikely that such a government will uphold a true power sharing mechanism and Taliban will most certainly hold key positions in such a government. For the moment the Taliban are holding all the cards and it remains to be seen what will be the trade offs for them to gain international legitimacy. 

The Afghan Public.

Afghan society is unbearably complex where segmentation follows religious, tribal, ethnic and urban considerations. While the country is predominantly Sunni Muslim (90%) there are around 10% Shia Muslims, many of whom are well educated and occupy important positions in government and society. Pushtuns make up 42% of the population from whose ranks the Taliban are formed. Tajiks (who speak Dari a language very closely assimilated to Persian) are 27%, Hazaras and Uzbeks are 9% each and then there are other smaller ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Hazaras have suffered the worst under Taliban rule and it is reported that in July 2021 the Taliban carried out some executions of Hazaras. 

The ethnic minorities, mainly the Tajik and Hazara have been the bulk of the forces that have opposed the Taliban. There is no denying that these ethnic minorities view Taliban promises of forgiveness and inclusiveness with great suspicion. On the  flip side a majority of the Pushtun population welcome the Taliban not necessarily for ideological reasons but for the fact that the Taliban seemingly can bring the security situation under control. In general for a population that has seen war and strife for over four decades they see safety and security is paramount concern. The US and its Afghan allies failed in many respects to provide the security and peace which in the end determines the success of an administrations efforts to govern. 

The Taliban must also be aware that in Afghanistan the younger generation has not only grown in the past twenty years but is also nurtured in the free social structure of the past two decades. This generation within cities like Kabul have been brought up with images of Taliban's brutal rule of the mid 1990's and thus form the bulk of the public opinion that feels the Taliban in 2021 cannot be trusted. It is not surprising that the majority of Afghans who worked with the US and its allies will feel vulnerable and fear reprisals from the Taliban.

In the more far flung regions of the country while there may not be feverish support for the Taliban take over it would be fair to say the people there have lost the will to resist. There are reports that in areas like Panjshir former Afghan army soldiers are organising a resistance. It would seem in the absence of US and NATO forces willing to continue the fight in Afghanistan such resistance will not be meaningful. At best it would position the Tajik and Uzbek leaders to negotiate a better participation in any coalition government.  

More importantly for Afghanistan it remains to be seen how the Taliban will deal with the major tribes and the ethnic minorities. While there is a the Loye Jirga (an assembly of all tribal leaders) the Taliban have in the past ignored the Jirga when it felt they were not siding with them. Yet at the micro level Taliban commanders in various districts of the country know that they cannot ignore the tribal chiefs and thus the jirga and its many tribal chiefs may well have some sway in the direction of Afghan society. The Taliban creed on social norms, as they see being religiously correct, have some commonality with traditional Pushtun tribal social norms regarding women and explains why for tribal Afghans (in rural areas) their dictums on 'burqa' are not seen as restrictive. 

This clearly does not gel well with the younger emerging educated women in cities like Kabul. If anything good came from the past 20 years of US and NATO involvement in Afghanistan it is the sense of empowerment they created amongst the younger generation. This is a key factor in the way the Taliban have portrayed themselves as a 'different' Taliban to the one from 1996. In the months ahead actions of the Taliban will determine how inclusive will they actually be in wake of a total pull out of foreign forces. The challenge of bringing trust back to a society that remembers Taliban actions of 20 years ago and from the recent past will be enormous for the Taliban leadership. The Taliban has, essentially, always been a movement and not a cohesive well administered body. While at the moment there seems some cohesiveness between the political leadership and local commanders within the Taliban, this will be put to test in the months and years ahead. 

Afghanistans Neighbours. 

There is a common misconception that Pakistan created the Taliban. The reality is that the Taliban were initially a home grown movement with the aim to creating law and order in two districts of Kandahar. As their popularity grew in Kandahar, Saudi, US and Pakistan intelligence agencies saw in them the potential of being the only group that could end the civil war in Afghanistan. US weapons, Saudi money and Pakistan logistic support backed the group as they swept across the country in 1995-96. 

In 2021 Pakistani intelligence agencies influence on the Taliban is peripheral and limited to issues of Pakistan's security and ensuring that relations are cordial enough for Pakistan not to close its borders to a landlocked Afghanistan. The emergence of a Taliban faction composed of mainly Pakistani militants operating out of Afghanistan but with an agenda to attack Pakistan changed the security perspective for Islamabad. While the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is not in any way related to the Afghan Taliban there is no doubt that Pakistan's main aim is to eliminate this group. This would also explain the fencing of the border with Afghanistan and high level border patrols being installed on the Pakistan side of the border.

A large measure of Pakistans efforts in Afghanistan are to counter India's activities within Afghanistan. Many in Pakistan intelligence agencies are aware of India's support to anti Pakistan groups based in Afghanistan. India's closer ties with the fallen government of Ashraf Ghani were in part predicated by Delhi's desire to deny Pakistan any influence in Afghanistan. One of the major aims of Pakistan will be to push the new Taliban government to act against all the groups who have been operating against Pakistan interests from within Afghan territory. 

While Pakistan's influence over the Afghan Taliban may be limited in terms of internal affairs, there is no denying that it remains the only neighbour who could have some leverage over Kabul on regional matters. Even though the Taliban have taken pains to emphasise that Afghanistan will not host any group that operates against other countries, many splinter groups of ISIS, and Al Qadea will attempt to operate from Afghan soil. This is largely because the Taliban administration may not have the resources to commit to anti terrorist intelligence gathering. Pakistan has lost close to 40,000 military and civilian souls to the US sponsored war on terror and therefore will be very keen to help the Taliban create enough intelligence infrastructure to prevent a resurgence of both the TTP and the ISIL-K. 

It is also very likely that China will build its relations with a Taliban controlled Kabul not because of any affinity with the new forces in Afghanistan but because of realpolitik to protect its interests in the region. In addition China's thirst for minerals may mean it will work hard to get commercial contracts to exploit these mineral resources which are estimated to be over $1 trillion. It would therefore seem that given the China and Pakistan relationship is very close that these two countries could well be very important in the shaping of a new Afghanistan. 

Prospects of Civil War.

It is highly likely that civil and military strife will continue in various parts of Afghanistan given that there are segments within Afghan society that may choose to continue to resist the Taliban. In the north the Panjshir valley, which was the base of Ahmed Shah Masood's Northern Alliance, has already become a rallying base for the former vive President Amrullah Saleh and he has called for armed resistance to the Taliban to continue. It is unsure who, from the international powers, would support such a move, but many hawks in Washington and other Western capitals will not unwelcome the creation of some counter weight to the Taliban. 

Whether the brewing trouble in the Panjshir valley will become a full blown war with the Taliban depends upon how Kabul's new rulers deal with the many tribes of the Hazara, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Political forces within the Taliban would welcome some form of inclusive government if only to blunt any attempt to fuel a movement against the Taliban. Given that many of Talibans military commanders in the field do not completely share the views of its political leadership there is a chance that localised military operations against the ethnic minorities may continue sporadically. 

The Taliban are also conscious of the ISIL-K's presence within the country and they have already carried out a devastating bomb attack on evacuating Afghans killing scores of Afghans and over a dozen US  troops. While this group does not have widespread support its rank and file is composed of former Taliban fighters who are too hardline to accept any of the changes the Taliban professes. It remains to be seen if ISIL K will be able to recruit more Taliban fighters to its cause and if it can become a large enough force to be a serious military threat to the Taliban. 

Final Words.

As Western presence in Afghanistan crumbles to the quick exit we have seen of their military and the government they propped up one has to wonder what this two decade war was all about. If the task of remaining in Afghanistan for twenty years was about nation building then the US and its allies have failed miserably. Yes on the social front progress was achieved and a freer Afghan society was emerging in Kabul. Much has been said about women's rights and fears that Taliban will force women into the burqa and time after time we are reminded of this. However beyond the city of Kabul we must also acknowledge that Afghanistan is a tribal society where for centuries before the Taliban the culture of the Pushtun and Hazara always was steeped in traditions of keeping women covered and subservient to men. All the Taliban did was put a religious spin onto this and thus faced less criticism for their action in much of rural Afghanistan. Over the past sixty odd years this was changing in the rural areas where the strict burqa was being replaced with the chador (a shawl covering the hair). 

The issues of stability to Afghanistan is more than just dealing with the issue of the burqa, and in this respect the West failed to understand that Afghanistan has only been stable when there has been a strong central government. However a strong central government that is not corrupt and is willing to bring progress through the tribal system to the common people. The West knowingly ignored the corruption of the governments that were installed in Kabul and did not realise that the war against the Soviets and the civil war had left no single force capable to unify the country and also be a clean government. This is where the Taliban held the cards with an image of fighting corruption and ensuring security of the people. (after all the movement started to bring security to two districts in Kandahar). 

The only institution that US and its allies could have built as a stable force was the Afghan armed forces. However, the training and development of the Afghan army was shaped to be a support force to whatever the US and NATO did. Corruption was allowed into the military and it is estimated at over 35% of its operational budget was pocketed by corrupt generals and politicians. The lack of morale that followed indicated that even the best of times desertion rates were as high as 20% in the army. Given that the Afghan army needed constant air support for operations and logistic support very little was done to develop the Afghan airforce. Thus when the US decided to pull out Afghan units on the ground were left stranded not only operationally but also for supplies. 

Afghanistan's economic recovery will be a major concern. In addition to the damage of four decades of war there is little confidence in the Taliban leadership to have the capabilities to manage a modern states economic system. The mammoth task of creating an effective governmental administration has fallen on the Taliban who have never really managed their own affairs in a cohesive manner when it comes to economic matters. This will be the main challenge for Afghanistan as may see that while the Taliban may well provide security will they be able to do national building, something the US and its allies failed to do.