Is Dubai Inc's debt really $170 billion?

The EFG Hermes report that suggested that Dubai Inc, implying all government related enterprises (GRE) and direct government debt could add up to between US$ 130-170 billion opens up a discussion in ones mind. The report suggests that the current known debt of $96.6 billion could be higher on account of the bilateral loans with local banks. It even cites the possibility that EmiratesNBD bank might have an exposure of $24 billion to Dubai Inc. This prompted me to check the balance sheet of the bank and to glean through the information known in the market and reported from time to time. The related party exposure shown at end of September 2009 in the balance sheet shows DH 45 billion (not dollars) due from possibly Dubai Inc as a whole, and there are deposits etc of about Dh 7 billion. I cannot therefore understand how such an assertion can me made. The entire loan book of the bank is US$ 53 billion of which just retail lending is $ 6.56 billion and then there is the trade finance and corporate lending, which when is adjusted to the over all loan book, by reason of deduction can only end up with the Dubai Inc exposure as $12 billion or so.


In addition, the local banks also have have massive deposits from the government entities and this is a major part of their float that comes to them and is a key part of the interest margin that they earn.

At the time of the Dubai World announcement in November 2009 the total debt estimated, which includes obligations to suppliers and contractors, was around $82 billion. Yes new obligations were taken with the Central Bank and the recent Abu Dhabi assistance which would not, in theory change the position of the over all obligation. Assume that of the $25 billion raised from the Central Bank and the Abu Dhabi assistance, about 75% was used to retire debt and the balance kept in reserve for operations or other maturing obligations, then even the net effect would be that the obligations would go up to US$88 billion.

How this can suddenly be considered a having increased to US$130-170 billion is baffling to me. I have always assessed that of the $82 billion about $60 billion is bank loans or bonds issued in the market and the balance $ 22 billion is creditors like consultants, contractors and service providers. A number of these creditors had either agreed or willing to agree to a reduction in their amounts in exchange for a definite payment plan.

I can buy the argument that if all the grandiose plans that were underway in Dubai were to continue at the same pace as they were in the early part of 2008 then indeed one can argue that the debt obligations of Dubai Inc would have mushroomed. Whether they would have been to the extent of $130-170 billion is a moot question. Intersestingly a couple of weeks back EFG Hermes published a report on the UAE banks and had made not any mention of the assertion that is being made today! So what information has come to light that would prompt this sort of assessment?

I am not suggesting that the research analysts at this reputable bank are being malicious but I do feel, very strongly, that issuing blase' statements is not conducive to the functions of a research analyst. After all we are not talking of an increase of say 10% which can be said to have happened in the normal course of business. In effect the suggestion is that the exposure to Dubai Inc is well over 120% more than was known to them or the market a few weeks back. This is where I think there are two options when I read such reports, a. press the delete button, or b. apply some common sense (which could be uncommon these days) and see is there any logic to this sort of thinking.

Clearly I took the second course. However, this asserts my position a few weeks back that it is time that a white paper is issued by Dubai Inc on the debts, the assets and that will clear up the air. This has, willy nilly, become a public matter through the way such reports have emerged in the media. This therefore needs a clear and coherent response from the right circles. I agree that bloggers like me can only speculate on the matter at hand, but we can use logic.

In a nutshell I find the nature of this report on the debt from EFG Hermes to be speculative in nature and I do believe that they owe it to the audience to explain themselves. Simply to assert that this could well be on account of bilateral loans from the banks which might not be reported is a rather serious accusation. I would presume the UAE Central Bank and the Auditors of the banks, all of whom are well reputed professionals, could hardly have sat by quietly eating their homous oblivious to any new lending spree in to Dubai Inc. I am in the consulting business and know for sure that new debt of Dubai Inc or most even well known companies is not on offer these days. Banks have hunkered down and just preserving themselves for the moment (not necessarily the best strategy in my opinion) but nevertheless that is how it is.


Ofcourse when the year end balance sheets come out in a few weeks time we will know for sure what the final verdict is. Till then I will reserve judgment and simply say that this report needs validation, and EFG Hermes may have got this one wrong.

Banking Report: Analyzed

The EFG Hermes report on some of the banks is interesting by all means, while not aimed at a credit assessment but more at stock performance, it nevertheless presents a balanced view. While there are some notable exceptions in the report I have seen, like Mashreq and Union National Bank (my former bank), it does make the point that the current financial woes are not as bad as they sound. The 3rd quarter performance of the banks was better than expected and judging by the analysis the banks that appear as laggards in their analysis are not on account of credit issues but more management style and focus in terms of the economic segmentation they pursue for earnings. While I am a traditionalist who would not rely on inter bank borrowing to fund the loan book, I concede in the ten years I have been out of managing a bank a great deal has changed. While back in the 1990's international banks panicked at the slightest political trouble in the region, the trend since then has been more mature and banks do not cut lines at the slightest of whims as they used to back then. Thus inter bank funding is more stable and can be seen as a factor in funding the loan books of banks, even though I was surprised that some banks from the sub continent got over cautious through the recent Dubai World crisis and while not cutting exposures to the country did have a 'wait and see' policy.

Indeed it was interesting that their analysis of the Dubai Inc (a loose word to describe all the debt of Dubai Government and the GRI's) is spot on in mentioning that while the numbers seem significant, even to GDP, there are two aspects that need consideration, a) the surplus cash flow of the good companies can be used through the parent structure mechanisms to help the weaker ones. and b) there are a number of assets that are eventually available for a sell off or privatization, (though they don't make these two points-that is how I read it). The current restructuring is a major element of this conundrum that needs to be solved and for this I would urge the Dubai World and the government to set a much faster pace to come to a settlement with the banks on this issue.

While the financial press have made a big deal, even today, about the support that has come from Abu Dhabi and hinted about it not being available in all circumstances (see today's FT) they forget that no support can be a carte blanche and has to be discussed on the merits. Interestingly yesterday an Abu Dhabi official spoke to Moody's Investors, as they have reported, and discussed that they have more than twice the reserves of the whole UAE public sector debt (assuming even the GRI's) in just one entity, to which if you add the Central Bank reserves and the other assets held by UAE entities the situation is more than comfortable. This is where I get so frustrated with reporters than they miss the big picture. Abu Dhabi thinks of the country as a whole, and eventually will be there to stitch things up, perhaps at a cost but it will be done.

The analysis of the banks in each of the cases is interesting. It is heartening to note that banks like EmiratesNBD and National Bank of Abu Dhabi still figure out as the strongest and the impact of either one of them of the current situation is minuscule. EmiratesNBD with a captial adequacy of near 20% and a provision of 95.5% of loans actually stands out better than Moody's would have us believe just two weeks back. None of the banks in terms of their capital adequacy numbers or coverage for non performing loans seem to be a problem. It is highly likely that into the mid of 2010 we may find over provisions on most of the balance sheets, which I strongly advise the bankers not to move back into profits. This will offset some of the need for higher provisioning on the general commercial and personal lending portoflios that may have suffered through the slow down.

In the end the macro economic scenario will play an important part. Higher liquidity, small to medium sector finance availability, and better respositioning of the asset-liability mismatch, which plagues all banks in the region, will ensure a stable to better year ahead. Significant in this process will be the following factors:

a. Better GDP performance.
b. Stability on the issue of the debt restructuring.
c. Middle market performance being better, i.e. trading, retail and services.
d. A steady real estate market, which while overburdened with supply will still gradually get over the panic stage.
e. A greater awareness of UAE position as a regional hub for business.

While I am not predicting major new avenues of business income for the banks in the year ahead, i.e. IPOs etc, I do feel that they will protect their market share better, hoping a better corporate and government sector performance will offset a weaker personal debt performance in the year ahead. Banks who manage to address the asset-liability mismatch early into the year will find themselves lighter on their feet and more nimble to take advantage of a recovery.

In terms of safety of the banking system I have the least of worries. No Bank incorporated within the UAE has ever been allowed to go under. (BCCI was not UAE incorporated and interestingly according the Sept 2009 Liquidators report of that failed bank 81% of all creditors have been paid, which must be some sort of a record as normally failed banks struggle to pay off 40-50%). I am positive of this that the UAE cannot and will not let a bank fail, to which is added a better regime of regulatory control and a more mature management in most banks.

How do I see the year ahead for the banks? In a nutshell: stable to better performance, dealing with the recent past bringing cheer with each successful settlement or restructuring and in terms of safety pretty much at the top of the definition of 'prime quality'.