The EFG Hermes report that suggested that Dubai Inc, implying all government related enterprises (GRE) and direct government debt could add up to between US$ 130-170 billion opens up a discussion in ones mind. The report suggests that the current known debt of $96.6 billion could be higher on account of the bilateral loans with local banks. It even cites the possibility that EmiratesNBD bank might have an exposure of $24 billion to Dubai Inc. This prompted me to check the balance sheet of the bank and to glean through the information known in the market and reported from time to time. The related party exposure shown at end of September 2009 in the balance sheet shows DH 45 billion (not dollars) due from possibly Dubai Inc as a whole, and there are deposits etc of about Dh 7 billion. I cannot therefore understand how such an assertion can me made. The entire loan book of the bank is US$ 53 billion of which just retail lending is $ 6.56 billion and then there is the trade finance and corporate lending, which when is adjusted to the over all loan book, by reason of deduction can only end up with the Dubai Inc exposure as $12 billion or so.
In addition, the local banks also have have massive deposits from the government entities and this is a major part of their float that comes to them and is a key part of the interest margin that they earn.
At the time of the Dubai World announcement in November 2009 the total debt estimated, which includes obligations to suppliers and contractors, was around $82 billion. Yes new obligations were taken with the Central Bank and the recent Abu Dhabi assistance which would not, in theory change the position of the over all obligation. Assume that of the $25 billion raised from the Central Bank and the Abu Dhabi assistance, about 75% was used to retire debt and the balance kept in reserve for operations or other maturing obligations, then even the net effect would be that the obligations would go up to US$88 billion.
How this can suddenly be considered a having increased to US$130-170 billion is baffling to me. I have always assessed that of the $82 billion about $60 billion is bank loans or bonds issued in the market and the balance $ 22 billion is creditors like consultants, contractors and service providers. A number of these creditors had either agreed or willing to agree to a reduction in their amounts in exchange for a definite payment plan.
I can buy the argument that if all the grandiose plans that were underway in Dubai were to continue at the same pace as they were in the early part of 2008 then indeed one can argue that the debt obligations of Dubai Inc would have mushroomed. Whether they would have been to the extent of $130-170 billion is a moot question. Intersestingly a couple of weeks back EFG Hermes published a report on the UAE banks and had made not any mention of the assertion that is being made today! So what information has come to light that would prompt this sort of assessment?
I am not suggesting that the research analysts at this reputable bank are being malicious but I do feel, very strongly, that issuing blase' statements is not conducive to the functions of a research analyst. After all we are not talking of an increase of say 10% which can be said to have happened in the normal course of business. In effect the suggestion is that the exposure to Dubai Inc is well over 120% more than was known to them or the market a few weeks back. This is where I think there are two options when I read such reports, a. press the delete button, or b. apply some common sense (which could be uncommon these days) and see is there any logic to this sort of thinking.
Clearly I took the second course. However, this asserts my position a few weeks back that it is time that a white paper is issued by Dubai Inc on the debts, the assets and that will clear up the air. This has, willy nilly, become a public matter through the way such reports have emerged in the media. This therefore needs a clear and coherent response from the right circles. I agree that bloggers like me can only speculate on the matter at hand, but we can use logic.
In a nutshell I find the nature of this report on the debt from EFG Hermes to be speculative in nature and I do believe that they owe it to the audience to explain themselves. Simply to assert that this could well be on account of bilateral loans from the banks which might not be reported is a rather serious accusation. I would presume the UAE Central Bank and the Auditors of the banks, all of whom are well reputed professionals, could hardly have sat by quietly eating their homous oblivious to any new lending spree in to Dubai Inc. I am in the consulting business and know for sure that new debt of Dubai Inc or most even well known companies is not on offer these days. Banks have hunkered down and just preserving themselves for the moment (not necessarily the best strategy in my opinion) but nevertheless that is how it is.
Ofcourse when the year end balance sheets come out in a few weeks time we will know for sure what the final verdict is. Till then I will reserve judgment and simply say that this report needs validation, and EFG Hermes may have got this one wrong.
Showing posts with label debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label debt. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Dubai World: Some free advice.
Not being an insider, or otherwise in the know of what is happening between the lenders and Dubai World I am in a sense handicapped as to how to approach the issue of offering some unsolicited advice. At the outset therefore this attempt may well be scuttled as 'un-needed' but being a well wisher of Dubai and the UAE and conscious of the delicacy of the matter I am venturing forth with some advice.
Some of the biggest names in the business world have fallen on hard times, this is part of the financial history we know, and any study of them and their successful come back is based on one truth; an acceptance of the situation and the embracing of a high degree of humility to steer through the crisis. Because one whetted the appetite of bankers eager to lend and in a sense were in control of the situation is now a matter of the past, today its a different set of circumstances and counting friends is as important as cultivating new ones.
If I was Dubai World here is what I would do:
1. Seek a quick and equitable solution with the banks. Make this a priority above all else.
2. Given them the true picture of the health, or lack of it, today and show them the plan over say a five year period of how things are likely to change. Build scenarios, from the conservative to the most optimistic; the truth of what will happen lies in between.
3. Seek their advice where they offer it, and most importantly LISTEN.
4. What Dubai World needs to achieve is to fix the mismatch of its borrowing from the short term to the longer term, but this needs to be matched to a plan and not a simple roll over in a vacuum. Bankers need to know when they will be paid and how?
5. Do not take any confrontational stance, avoid words like 'standstill', 'rebates', 'write offs' and 'discounts'.
6. Do not threaten to seek bankruptcy this is no more an option given that everyone has expressed a public stance of solving the debt issue and remarkable progress has been made, some, ofcourse, with the support from Abu Dhabi.
7. Remember always, and this also applies to banks, that when you negotiate do not put people in the corner, then they act irrationally. A good negotiator keeps the other party in the center of the room so they can see all the exits and options,
8. Make it clear that there can be longer term repayments and these will need the support of the banks if they want to be repaid and allow for accelerated payments if the better, more optimistic scenarios start to unravel.
9. Given the recent two months of focus on these issues, this is no more an issue that ONLY concerns Dubai World, it effects the UAE and indeed even the region. This is the test of credibility and commitment.
10. Always remember that not all banks want this to be a battle of brinkmanship so it does not do good to walk the tight line each time.
For those who think that all the money went into a endless pit in the sand they too must realize that there are assets; land and other assets that Dubai World owns elsewhere. Yes the land is impaired in value, but it has some infrastructure on it and land may go sick for a while but it never dies. Eventually these land values will recover and this is a matter of patience, all that is needed is to realize that when you nurture confidence and do things to build confidence then this helps the recovery process. The world will not remain in a perpetual state of recession and this is also true of Dubai.
It was mentioned somewhere in the press that in January 2010 we would see progress on the restructuring talks between the banks and Dubai World. It is important that this process continues and information is made more available that indeed such meetings may well be going on. But get the news out that there is a dialogue; a much better message then people guessing what is going on.
Over all we must remember that indeed this a matter that can be resolved, the banks want it resolved and so does Dubai World. It is now a question of finding out what will be the meeting place of this resolve. This is a much better place to be in than neither side wanting to negotiate, yet there has to be give and take. The circumstances dictate that and demand that. Pride, on either side of the table should be put aside, as must the opinions of lawyers who may prefer to be pit bulls wanting to fight rather than legal counsels assisting in an equitable solution.
I believed that the Sukuk that started this whole saga would be paid and it was. I also believe that a restructuring will happen, even though at times it might seem everyone has hit a brick wall and tension will heighten. The truth is that everyone knows too much is at stake for it not to happen.
Some of the biggest names in the business world have fallen on hard times, this is part of the financial history we know, and any study of them and their successful come back is based on one truth; an acceptance of the situation and the embracing of a high degree of humility to steer through the crisis. Because one whetted the appetite of bankers eager to lend and in a sense were in control of the situation is now a matter of the past, today its a different set of circumstances and counting friends is as important as cultivating new ones.
If I was Dubai World here is what I would do:
1. Seek a quick and equitable solution with the banks. Make this a priority above all else.
2. Given them the true picture of the health, or lack of it, today and show them the plan over say a five year period of how things are likely to change. Build scenarios, from the conservative to the most optimistic; the truth of what will happen lies in between.
3. Seek their advice where they offer it, and most importantly LISTEN.
4. What Dubai World needs to achieve is to fix the mismatch of its borrowing from the short term to the longer term, but this needs to be matched to a plan and not a simple roll over in a vacuum. Bankers need to know when they will be paid and how?
5. Do not take any confrontational stance, avoid words like 'standstill', 'rebates', 'write offs' and 'discounts'.
6. Do not threaten to seek bankruptcy this is no more an option given that everyone has expressed a public stance of solving the debt issue and remarkable progress has been made, some, ofcourse, with the support from Abu Dhabi.
7. Remember always, and this also applies to banks, that when you negotiate do not put people in the corner, then they act irrationally. A good negotiator keeps the other party in the center of the room so they can see all the exits and options,
8. Make it clear that there can be longer term repayments and these will need the support of the banks if they want to be repaid and allow for accelerated payments if the better, more optimistic scenarios start to unravel.
9. Given the recent two months of focus on these issues, this is no more an issue that ONLY concerns Dubai World, it effects the UAE and indeed even the region. This is the test of credibility and commitment.
10. Always remember that not all banks want this to be a battle of brinkmanship so it does not do good to walk the tight line each time.
For those who think that all the money went into a endless pit in the sand they too must realize that there are assets; land and other assets that Dubai World owns elsewhere. Yes the land is impaired in value, but it has some infrastructure on it and land may go sick for a while but it never dies. Eventually these land values will recover and this is a matter of patience, all that is needed is to realize that when you nurture confidence and do things to build confidence then this helps the recovery process. The world will not remain in a perpetual state of recession and this is also true of Dubai.
It was mentioned somewhere in the press that in January 2010 we would see progress on the restructuring talks between the banks and Dubai World. It is important that this process continues and information is made more available that indeed such meetings may well be going on. But get the news out that there is a dialogue; a much better message then people guessing what is going on.
Over all we must remember that indeed this a matter that can be resolved, the banks want it resolved and so does Dubai World. It is now a question of finding out what will be the meeting place of this resolve. This is a much better place to be in than neither side wanting to negotiate, yet there has to be give and take. The circumstances dictate that and demand that. Pride, on either side of the table should be put aside, as must the opinions of lawyers who may prefer to be pit bulls wanting to fight rather than legal counsels assisting in an equitable solution.
I believed that the Sukuk that started this whole saga would be paid and it was. I also believe that a restructuring will happen, even though at times it might seem everyone has hit a brick wall and tension will heighten. The truth is that everyone knows too much is at stake for it not to happen.
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
Moody's Cheap Shot.
During my banking days I often met with rating agencies and always found them to be a rather pompous lot who 'researched' alot and often were judgmental to the point of sounding like pontificating pundits. They performed an important task for the financial markets and while generally did a decent job, but once in a while they messed up in royal style. Moody's downgrade of Dubai Electricity and Water Authority (DEWA) is based on Dubai government's "recent decision to explicitly segregate its direct obligations from those of its GRIs, following which a decision was subsequently made to pursue a debt restructuring for Dubai World'.
Moody's conveniently sets aside Dubai's assertion that it was never a guarantor of the liabilities of Dubai World, this was stated and known to all Sukuk holders, while Dubai government does seem to suggest that as a shareholder it will support the restructuring of Dubai World. Admittedly, as I have said before, the public handling of this matter was far from elegant, Moody's downgrading of DEWA and then going over the top and downgrading companies lilke Mubadala, TAQA, and other GRI's of Abu Dhabi Government is perhaps clearly evidence of their lack of understanding the risks in this market. In addition the biggest surprise of all is the assertion that Etisalat, the Federally owned largest telecommunications operator, is also slated for a downgrade review.
Moody's baseline credit support for GRI's is based on whether the governments who have substantial interest in the GRI will lend it the support if it is needed. Thus these down grades imply that Moody's feels that Abu Dhabi Government may not be able to or willing to support the likes of TAQA, Mubadala, Etisalat and others. This truthfully suggests that somebody at Moody's has not done their homework, Abu Dhabi has the financial means, liquidity and will to support any of the entities that have been named in the review for downgrade of Moody's. DEWA is a large utility company and Moody's downgrade triggers a payment of $872 million and not $ 2 billion as is being reported in some sections of the financial press. It must be stressed that the particular sukuk in question was not guaranteed by Dubai government and was against the billings inflow of DEWA.
Moody's is not being entirely fair in its massive across the downgrades of all the entities it named in its recent press release. Ofcourse, one is prone to wonder what their motives were in a situation where such reviews while acceptable for say Dubai World or entities directly effected by the debt resturcturing attempt, certainly do not warrant the same of the other entities named. This does remind one of 1997 fiasco when Moody's downgraded Hanover Re (one of Europe's largest re insurers). It transpired that Moody's has issued an unsolicited rating on Hanover Re and then asked them to formally apply for a rating, which Hanover Re did not accede to. When Moody's demanded payment for the unsolicited rating and Hanover Re refused, Moody's downgraded the company causing $175 million losses to the company in the stock price. In 2005 Moody's was subpoenaed by a court in the US and only in July 2008 it sheepishly admitted that some of this officials, who they conveniently called 'independent financial advisers' had engaged in unethical practices and that it had corrected the problems for the future.
The 'issuer-pay' model for fees of Moody's is highly questionable as it asks the issuer of securities to pay for the rating that it issues and is a subject matter still under serious review by regulators. It also gives Moody's the power to not only negotiate high fees but also hold companies whose paper it rates to ransom, as was indeed was the case of Hanover Re. The Securities and Exchange Commission in the US in July 2008 issued a scathing report questioning the practices of rating agencies and pointed out Moody's in particular. When nine employees openly questioned Moody's own ethical practices in 2007 they were 'downsized' from the company and Moody refused to comment on the 'internal matter.'
I am not suggesting any conspiracy theory but rather the lack of proper analysis, or depth of knowledge on this matter.
My simple consideration now is that that these ratings that have been put on review for downgrade, i.e. Etisalat, Mubadala, TAQA and many others in the UAE, clearly do not deserve such a harsh treatment. So I wonder why Moody's would take such an nonsensical and rash step when a person familiar with UAE, and especially Abu Dhabi could easily explain that for say Abu Dhabi alone the daily revenue of oil alone is over $140 million per day, then add the investment income, and income from services, and the list goes on. I am sorry to say but the boys at Moody's you got this one wrong and it would be wise to wipe the egg of your face and get your act right. But then I better be careful they might downgrade my sukuk's, glad no one issued one in my name.
Moody's conveniently sets aside Dubai's assertion that it was never a guarantor of the liabilities of Dubai World, this was stated and known to all Sukuk holders, while Dubai government does seem to suggest that as a shareholder it will support the restructuring of Dubai World. Admittedly, as I have said before, the public handling of this matter was far from elegant, Moody's downgrading of DEWA and then going over the top and downgrading companies lilke Mubadala, TAQA, and other GRI's of Abu Dhabi Government is perhaps clearly evidence of their lack of understanding the risks in this market. In addition the biggest surprise of all is the assertion that Etisalat, the Federally owned largest telecommunications operator, is also slated for a downgrade review.
Moody's baseline credit support for GRI's is based on whether the governments who have substantial interest in the GRI will lend it the support if it is needed. Thus these down grades imply that Moody's feels that Abu Dhabi Government may not be able to or willing to support the likes of TAQA, Mubadala, Etisalat and others. This truthfully suggests that somebody at Moody's has not done their homework, Abu Dhabi has the financial means, liquidity and will to support any of the entities that have been named in the review for downgrade of Moody's. DEWA is a large utility company and Moody's downgrade triggers a payment of $872 million and not $ 2 billion as is being reported in some sections of the financial press. It must be stressed that the particular sukuk in question was not guaranteed by Dubai government and was against the billings inflow of DEWA.
Moody's is not being entirely fair in its massive across the downgrades of all the entities it named in its recent press release. Ofcourse, one is prone to wonder what their motives were in a situation where such reviews while acceptable for say Dubai World or entities directly effected by the debt resturcturing attempt, certainly do not warrant the same of the other entities named. This does remind one of 1997 fiasco when Moody's downgraded Hanover Re (one of Europe's largest re insurers). It transpired that Moody's has issued an unsolicited rating on Hanover Re and then asked them to formally apply for a rating, which Hanover Re did not accede to. When Moody's demanded payment for the unsolicited rating and Hanover Re refused, Moody's downgraded the company causing $175 million losses to the company in the stock price. In 2005 Moody's was subpoenaed by a court in the US and only in July 2008 it sheepishly admitted that some of this officials, who they conveniently called 'independent financial advisers' had engaged in unethical practices and that it had corrected the problems for the future.
The 'issuer-pay' model for fees of Moody's is highly questionable as it asks the issuer of securities to pay for the rating that it issues and is a subject matter still under serious review by regulators. It also gives Moody's the power to not only negotiate high fees but also hold companies whose paper it rates to ransom, as was indeed was the case of Hanover Re. The Securities and Exchange Commission in the US in July 2008 issued a scathing report questioning the practices of rating agencies and pointed out Moody's in particular. When nine employees openly questioned Moody's own ethical practices in 2007 they were 'downsized' from the company and Moody refused to comment on the 'internal matter.'
I am not suggesting any conspiracy theory but rather the lack of proper analysis, or depth of knowledge on this matter.
My simple consideration now is that that these ratings that have been put on review for downgrade, i.e. Etisalat, Mubadala, TAQA and many others in the UAE, clearly do not deserve such a harsh treatment. So I wonder why Moody's would take such an nonsensical and rash step when a person familiar with UAE, and especially Abu Dhabi could easily explain that for say Abu Dhabi alone the daily revenue of oil alone is over $140 million per day, then add the investment income, and income from services, and the list goes on. I am sorry to say but the boys at Moody's you got this one wrong and it would be wise to wipe the egg of your face and get your act right. But then I better be careful they might downgrade my sukuk's, glad no one issued one in my name.
Saturday, December 5, 2009
Can Dubai survive the Debt crunch?
Dubai's dream of progress and prosperity may well have been dented but its not a failed dream. In the context of the world economic crisis the crisis that Dubai faces is not as monumental as is being suggested. Dubai Worlds obligations are listed at $60 billion but these are obligations to contractors, suppliers, and indeed bond holders and debt providers. A number of contractors and consultants have only recently indicated that they would be willing to take a haircut on their receivables, some suggesting as high as a 35% reduction in exchange for a payment plan. After all, the logic goes, that these contractors benefited with robust profits from the same clients in the good days and indeed are more accommodating as the times get rough.
Over the weekend Bond holders of the $4 billion Sukuk were adamant that given they have 25% of the Sukuk holders on their side they can negotiate tough to force a payment of the bonds. Failure to have this 25% might well mean that Sukuk will be restructured, and even if an enforcement is done there are complex legal issues concerning Sukuk's which, frankly, have not been tested in a court of law before. Interestingly, if Dubai government, as the shareholder of Dubai World, did want to pay this Sukuk off, then even it runs the risk of being accused of causing losses to Sukuk holders who sold the bonds after the initial announcement of the standstill, since the standstill announcement came from Dubai government and not Dubai World itself.
Paying this Sukuk is possible and if the restructuring or extension to May 2010 is agreed by more than 75% of the holders then the current issues will subside to some extent. If not then I do feel that the resources to pay this $4 billion bond will happen even though may leave many of us wondering why the whole drama happened in the first place. I suspect that when the Dubai Government announced the 'standstill' it was felt that the market would take this news positively as the government was stepping in. This clearly backfired and the market took the news they didn't like most and made a meal of it all. If I was a bond holder and a principal shareholder being the government was initiating a new plan for repayment I would rather go with it then to rely on the assets of this particular Sukuk (in this case Nakheel's land bank which is highly deflated at the moment). But lawyers and bankers do not always make the best decisions in such moments.
However, we have to look beyond to how Dubai can survive this debt crunch.
The issue that needs to be addressed for Dubai is essentially $26 billion of debt for Dubai World, which is like a fly in the ointment at the moment. In essence the Dubai story is not over simply because a recovery in the region will bring focus back to the essential element that everyone asks. Where would you like to be based to do business in the Middle East? The answer is always going to be Dubai because of the investment it has made in the infrastructure, connectivity with the world, its airports and ports and most of all the UAE as a whole is a pretty safe place to be in. Yes its property market is dented, some believe taking as much as three years to repair itself, but its position as a financial hub, a tourist stop over and a traditional role as a commercial hub are not effected in any severe sense.
The most important thing Dubai must do is initiate a seven to ten year bond program, some of it supported by the government itself, and thus plug the gap between short term obligations and long term cash flows. To do this their handling of the current Sukuk crisis is important and will set the stage for restoring the dented confidence. Yes support can come from the Federal Government, as it has recently, or the Abu Dhabi controlled entities (as the recent $5 billion placement shows) and once goodwill is restored the ability to restructure may not be all that hard.
Interestingly, my banker friends tell me, prior to the November 25th standstill announcement discussions with bankers on an over all approach were going very well. Infact some even felt that an over all restructuring of the debt was a foregone conclusion. Indeed a bad public relations gambit backfired it all and focus on a smaller piece of the debt became paramount. Now the task ahead is to get back to the same level of confidence that was there three weeks back and build from there.
In the realm of a three year period the over all position of Dubai will be considerably better, even though we only look at the GDP as an indicator we forget that a substantial part of their GRE holdings are overseas and these can, in a global turn around, be crown jewels can can be sold off for a sizable profit. I believe the return to the enabling economy model where commerce, tourism and services will become the rock bed of the recovery that is highly possible.
Over the weekend Bond holders of the $4 billion Sukuk were adamant that given they have 25% of the Sukuk holders on their side they can negotiate tough to force a payment of the bonds. Failure to have this 25% might well mean that Sukuk will be restructured, and even if an enforcement is done there are complex legal issues concerning Sukuk's which, frankly, have not been tested in a court of law before. Interestingly, if Dubai government, as the shareholder of Dubai World, did want to pay this Sukuk off, then even it runs the risk of being accused of causing losses to Sukuk holders who sold the bonds after the initial announcement of the standstill, since the standstill announcement came from Dubai government and not Dubai World itself.
Paying this Sukuk is possible and if the restructuring or extension to May 2010 is agreed by more than 75% of the holders then the current issues will subside to some extent. If not then I do feel that the resources to pay this $4 billion bond will happen even though may leave many of us wondering why the whole drama happened in the first place. I suspect that when the Dubai Government announced the 'standstill' it was felt that the market would take this news positively as the government was stepping in. This clearly backfired and the market took the news they didn't like most and made a meal of it all. If I was a bond holder and a principal shareholder being the government was initiating a new plan for repayment I would rather go with it then to rely on the assets of this particular Sukuk (in this case Nakheel's land bank which is highly deflated at the moment). But lawyers and bankers do not always make the best decisions in such moments.
However, we have to look beyond to how Dubai can survive this debt crunch.
The issue that needs to be addressed for Dubai is essentially $26 billion of debt for Dubai World, which is like a fly in the ointment at the moment. In essence the Dubai story is not over simply because a recovery in the region will bring focus back to the essential element that everyone asks. Where would you like to be based to do business in the Middle East? The answer is always going to be Dubai because of the investment it has made in the infrastructure, connectivity with the world, its airports and ports and most of all the UAE as a whole is a pretty safe place to be in. Yes its property market is dented, some believe taking as much as three years to repair itself, but its position as a financial hub, a tourist stop over and a traditional role as a commercial hub are not effected in any severe sense.
The most important thing Dubai must do is initiate a seven to ten year bond program, some of it supported by the government itself, and thus plug the gap between short term obligations and long term cash flows. To do this their handling of the current Sukuk crisis is important and will set the stage for restoring the dented confidence. Yes support can come from the Federal Government, as it has recently, or the Abu Dhabi controlled entities (as the recent $5 billion placement shows) and once goodwill is restored the ability to restructure may not be all that hard.
Interestingly, my banker friends tell me, prior to the November 25th standstill announcement discussions with bankers on an over all approach were going very well. Infact some even felt that an over all restructuring of the debt was a foregone conclusion. Indeed a bad public relations gambit backfired it all and focus on a smaller piece of the debt became paramount. Now the task ahead is to get back to the same level of confidence that was there three weeks back and build from there.
In the realm of a three year period the over all position of Dubai will be considerably better, even though we only look at the GDP as an indicator we forget that a substantial part of their GRE holdings are overseas and these can, in a global turn around, be crown jewels can can be sold off for a sizable profit. I believe the return to the enabling economy model where commerce, tourism and services will become the rock bed of the recovery that is highly possible.
Monday, November 30, 2009
The Dubai World saga.
The story of Dubai World and its debt is turning into a soap opera that it really does not deserve to be. Some simple facts are being ignored from all sides, and suggests that we are all either naive or simply hoping that somehow the realities of a debt burdened company will simply change by 'talking' our way out of it. There are some essential media mistakes that indeed Dubai government officials have made and made it all the more difficult to handle then it really was.
The way I see it is that bond holders and lenders always knew that they are lending to a government owned entity without the explicit guarantee of the Government of Dubai. Whether their argument that being a shareholder of Dubai World they didn't need the guarantee to be explicit is really worthy of being tested in a court of law is still to be seen. As a former banker I am clear in that being the sole shareholder of the company doesn't mean you have guaranteed all the debts of the company, even though it may place moral responsibilities on you, strictly from a legal point of view such a guarantee is never explicit unless stated in the debt documents. This the bankers and the bond holders knew when they lent the money, even though they may argue their 'assumption' was that being a Government Related Entity (GRE) the risks of lending were less.
On the flip side of the coin, government officials who are stating that such lending to Dubai World is 'not guaranteed' may well be stating the legal position very accurately, however, they are missing a crucial part of how banks and lenders will see this statement. They will assume therefore that statements in the past three months of support for Dubai World and other GRE's were not meant in the spirit they were and with the current statement of disengaging the debt from being a government obligation, while legally correct, actually limits Dubai's ability to raise debt in the future.
This is where the much admired PR machine of Dubai has totally failed. In the first place what was the need for the 'standstill' statement on November 25th? They should have first had discussions with the bond holders and agreed a 'rollover' or 'extension' and then AFTER an agreement on the matter or otherwise made a statement. Secondly, when all the uproar is going on, why should a government official go on TV and state the obvious 'the government has not guaranteed the debts of Dubai World'. This is known to the bond holders, why say it again?
I am asked often about what I would do in this situation. Well first I am not fully aware of the all the financial matters within Dubai World so I am venturing a guess of a strategy that I believe will work, and perhaps will be excused not knowing the exact asset details that Dubai World. But in essence this is what I would do.
1. Dubai Government to state that yes it is the shareholder of Dubai World and given it is taking a more direct oversight of the current situation it is going to issue a White Paper on the status of Dubai World. It should then commission this study.
2. The Government along with Dubai World management should issue a statement of its total assets and assume they are, as some reports suggested in the past US$75 billion, then state how much of that is impaired with the current global financial situation.
3. Given that a major problem has been the mismatch of funding to the projects it should then offer a new program of debt which would be in chunks of three years, five years and seven years. The longer term debt could be supported by the Government of Dubai, or specific assets, or a combination of both. All short term debt holders then be convinced through a proper dialogue to participate in the longer term restructured debt, and where possible seek support from regional long term fund providers, be they from Abu Dhabi, or Federal Bodies, or even GCC banks.
4. Consider a selective program, stated now as an intent, to take some of the parts of Dubai World public through IPO's and in some cases with the recovery of the world economic situation, to even consider selling them off to repay debt.
5. Create a single platform for communication on the debt issue and related matters to avoid statements from all over the place.
While this all may sound simplistic, but I believe these steps will be better than what is the situation today. Lenders will be happier to have a true dialogue with the stakeholders rather than talking through the press on these matters. I do believe that as confidence is restored through these steps the over all picture will improve exponentially and restore much need confidence back to the system.
The way I see it is that bond holders and lenders always knew that they are lending to a government owned entity without the explicit guarantee of the Government of Dubai. Whether their argument that being a shareholder of Dubai World they didn't need the guarantee to be explicit is really worthy of being tested in a court of law is still to be seen. As a former banker I am clear in that being the sole shareholder of the company doesn't mean you have guaranteed all the debts of the company, even though it may place moral responsibilities on you, strictly from a legal point of view such a guarantee is never explicit unless stated in the debt documents. This the bankers and the bond holders knew when they lent the money, even though they may argue their 'assumption' was that being a Government Related Entity (GRE) the risks of lending were less.
On the flip side of the coin, government officials who are stating that such lending to Dubai World is 'not guaranteed' may well be stating the legal position very accurately, however, they are missing a crucial part of how banks and lenders will see this statement. They will assume therefore that statements in the past three months of support for Dubai World and other GRE's were not meant in the spirit they were and with the current statement of disengaging the debt from being a government obligation, while legally correct, actually limits Dubai's ability to raise debt in the future.
This is where the much admired PR machine of Dubai has totally failed. In the first place what was the need for the 'standstill' statement on November 25th? They should have first had discussions with the bond holders and agreed a 'rollover' or 'extension' and then AFTER an agreement on the matter or otherwise made a statement. Secondly, when all the uproar is going on, why should a government official go on TV and state the obvious 'the government has not guaranteed the debts of Dubai World'. This is known to the bond holders, why say it again?
I am asked often about what I would do in this situation. Well first I am not fully aware of the all the financial matters within Dubai World so I am venturing a guess of a strategy that I believe will work, and perhaps will be excused not knowing the exact asset details that Dubai World. But in essence this is what I would do.
1. Dubai Government to state that yes it is the shareholder of Dubai World and given it is taking a more direct oversight of the current situation it is going to issue a White Paper on the status of Dubai World. It should then commission this study.
2. The Government along with Dubai World management should issue a statement of its total assets and assume they are, as some reports suggested in the past US$75 billion, then state how much of that is impaired with the current global financial situation.
3. Given that a major problem has been the mismatch of funding to the projects it should then offer a new program of debt which would be in chunks of three years, five years and seven years. The longer term debt could be supported by the Government of Dubai, or specific assets, or a combination of both. All short term debt holders then be convinced through a proper dialogue to participate in the longer term restructured debt, and where possible seek support from regional long term fund providers, be they from Abu Dhabi, or Federal Bodies, or even GCC banks.
4. Consider a selective program, stated now as an intent, to take some of the parts of Dubai World public through IPO's and in some cases with the recovery of the world economic situation, to even consider selling them off to repay debt.
5. Create a single platform for communication on the debt issue and related matters to avoid statements from all over the place.
While this all may sound simplistic, but I believe these steps will be better than what is the situation today. Lenders will be happier to have a true dialogue with the stakeholders rather than talking through the press on these matters. I do believe that as confidence is restored through these steps the over all picture will improve exponentially and restore much need confidence back to the system.
Friday, November 27, 2009
Dubai's Debt Surprise
Almost thirty years back if someone had told me that a financial event in the Emirate of Dubai would shock world markets I would have smiled, sipped my tea and wondered what the person making such a statement was smoking. Three decades on, and with highways, a Metro, the tallest buildings in the world and an assortment of what were commonly called Dubai's crown jewels, Dubai had become, till the mid of last year, the choice economy to comment upon. Yet suddenly, with perhaps the worst timing possible, a terse announcement of a major Dubai conglomerate asking the banks for a 'standstill' on its debt, Dubai became the center piece of not only a financial crisis around the world but also the whipping horse for the financial press. The fact that the Dubai Debt Crisis has become a talking point is not a surprise, after all the US governments debt is also worrying at times through our civilizations financial history, however the way all this has been revealed has been more of a shock. The following reasons for this stand out.
1. Why publicly ask for a 'standstill', when the English financial dictionary has more subtle words like 'roll over', 'extension' and 'renegotiate' that are available to soften the impact of what is being asked for?
2. Why time the decision a day before the local markets will be closed for an extended holiday and the international markets going into Thanks Giving?
3. Why not explain the connection between a tacit Government announcement a month back that the debt would be met, and also the arrangement $5 billion of fresh debt the very day an old debt is being placed on 'standstill'?
Indeed the questions are many and the answers have been few. The fact that the episode, if I may call it that, has not been handled elegantly is an understatement. Yet analysts will be wondering where do we go to from this juncture? I believe a few explanations may shed light on this bizarre handling of events, given that a debt of almost similar size maturing on November 30, 2009 was successfully rolled over, why a debt maturing two weeks later has been so badly managed?
A. I believe that proper advice from seasoned bankers was not taken and had it been so then the possibility of a debt roll over was more easily possible than such a blunder. If the intention was to financially protect the assets of DP World then when the Sukuk was trading at around 65 it could have been a better time (about eight months back) to simply ask for a 'standstill' or a retirement of the debt and save over 55% of the $4.5 billion bond value (it was set to mature at 115). So I do not believe the intention was to 'default' but more likely to get some breathing room.
B. If the intent is to get breathing room then the fact that the committee managing Dubai's financial matters has been recently restructured (only a week back), they could have gone to the banks and bond holders and suggested that as the new committee gets a grip of things time is needed so a breather is requested and an extension is necessary.
C. It would well be that a distinction is being drawn between direct Dubai Government debt and the debt of Dubai owned corporations who do not have explicit Dubai Government debt insurance or guarantees. While this is a dangerous course to take in the current environment it does nevertheless stress that the point has been made and might well lead to the Government then 'stepping in' to retire the debt and in effect negotiate with the banks that a retirement should be followed by fresh debt against the full faith of the government itself. This is a tricky path given that the very faith that backed this lending has been dented by the way the 'standstill' was handled.
D. The fact that another US$ 5 billion is on tap from the second tranche of the US$10 billion bond offering (of which the first $5 billion was placed the same day of this dreadful announcement) indicates that there is a possibility that this will be tapped immediately to cover the DP World bond needs by December 14, 2009.
All these routes all may well put some badly needed band aid on the wounds to the reputation of Dubai, but for the long run it will be clear that Dubai will need better advice of how to handle already frayed nerves of bankers and bond holders. Will there be enough goodwill left on the table for all parties to carry the trust forward is a matter that will be tested in the coming weeks and months. While the debt seems large and perhaps unmanageable, the truth is that Dubai had the goodwill to have steered through these waters. Now bankers feel that goodwill was cast aside in large measure not by what was needed to be done, but how it was done.
Yet I would be optimistic for this being resolved simply because at some level parties within the UAE will stop seeing this as Dubai's embarrassment and realize its an embarrassment for the UAE as a whole. It is at this level that the matter can best be resolved and I suspect this will be the way this will be solved.
1. Why publicly ask for a 'standstill', when the English financial dictionary has more subtle words like 'roll over', 'extension' and 'renegotiate' that are available to soften the impact of what is being asked for?
2. Why time the decision a day before the local markets will be closed for an extended holiday and the international markets going into Thanks Giving?
3. Why not explain the connection between a tacit Government announcement a month back that the debt would be met, and also the arrangement $5 billion of fresh debt the very day an old debt is being placed on 'standstill'?
Indeed the questions are many and the answers have been few. The fact that the episode, if I may call it that, has not been handled elegantly is an understatement. Yet analysts will be wondering where do we go to from this juncture? I believe a few explanations may shed light on this bizarre handling of events, given that a debt of almost similar size maturing on November 30, 2009 was successfully rolled over, why a debt maturing two weeks later has been so badly managed?
A. I believe that proper advice from seasoned bankers was not taken and had it been so then the possibility of a debt roll over was more easily possible than such a blunder. If the intention was to financially protect the assets of DP World then when the Sukuk was trading at around 65 it could have been a better time (about eight months back) to simply ask for a 'standstill' or a retirement of the debt and save over 55% of the $4.5 billion bond value (it was set to mature at 115). So I do not believe the intention was to 'default' but more likely to get some breathing room.
B. If the intent is to get breathing room then the fact that the committee managing Dubai's financial matters has been recently restructured (only a week back), they could have gone to the banks and bond holders and suggested that as the new committee gets a grip of things time is needed so a breather is requested and an extension is necessary.
C. It would well be that a distinction is being drawn between direct Dubai Government debt and the debt of Dubai owned corporations who do not have explicit Dubai Government debt insurance or guarantees. While this is a dangerous course to take in the current environment it does nevertheless stress that the point has been made and might well lead to the Government then 'stepping in' to retire the debt and in effect negotiate with the banks that a retirement should be followed by fresh debt against the full faith of the government itself. This is a tricky path given that the very faith that backed this lending has been dented by the way the 'standstill' was handled.
D. The fact that another US$ 5 billion is on tap from the second tranche of the US$10 billion bond offering (of which the first $5 billion was placed the same day of this dreadful announcement) indicates that there is a possibility that this will be tapped immediately to cover the DP World bond needs by December 14, 2009.
All these routes all may well put some badly needed band aid on the wounds to the reputation of Dubai, but for the long run it will be clear that Dubai will need better advice of how to handle already frayed nerves of bankers and bond holders. Will there be enough goodwill left on the table for all parties to carry the trust forward is a matter that will be tested in the coming weeks and months. While the debt seems large and perhaps unmanageable, the truth is that Dubai had the goodwill to have steered through these waters. Now bankers feel that goodwill was cast aside in large measure not by what was needed to be done, but how it was done.
Yet I would be optimistic for this being resolved simply because at some level parties within the UAE will stop seeing this as Dubai's embarrassment and realize its an embarrassment for the UAE as a whole. It is at this level that the matter can best be resolved and I suspect this will be the way this will be solved.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)