On haircuts and debt settlements.

There has been recent talk, some of it unsubstantiated press rumors, that Dubai World, the debt laden Government Related Entity of Dubai, has been contemplating, on the advice of its consultants, to consider as much as a 40% haircut on the debt and repayment of the balance over seven years with no interest. Needless to say, banks had two reactions ignore the rumor, (hard to do in the present day) or just balk as the audacity of the whole idea. Haircuts and debt repayments only happen to work, if that is the word to use, when there is literally no hope for any possibility of the principal debt ever being repaid. If the rumor was an attempt to test the waters, then the consultants need a fair dose of understanding that you hold a dialogue with the banks and do not pretend to have a conversation through the rumor mill, this always backfires.

While I am not privy to the discussions or indeed the people who are making these decisions, so what I venture our is conjecture and my recommendations may well be off the mark; yet as a three decade resident in the financial world of UAE, and an ardent well wisher for the country I would imagine a solution oriented approach is what is needed. What are the options ahead for this debt settlement?

In the first place we must be clear that the entire extent and complexity of the Dubai World debt is not entirely public and in similar vein neither is the possible cash flow profile over the next few years really known to the general public. Thus, if a seven or five year repayment is suggested it goes without saying that the cash flow projections will have to match this settlement profile. Keeping this in mind I would suggest the following.


1. When considering a haircut of any amount there has to be a clear understanding that this is seriously hurt the image and the standing of not only Dubai but also UAE within the financial community. Even if such an offer is accepted it will be with the gesture and lack of goodwill to provide additional funding in the future even when things are better. Bankers have a long memory and will remind you of their losses from decades back. Any haircut that is suggested has to be tied to an incentive. My suggestion would be to offer the banks a 70% settlement with the balance 30% to be strucurted as a Zero coupon bond with a long maturity and the caveat that this 30% would be exempted from payment under a formula for early payments. Thus if the 70% is to be paid say in seven years then for each year this amount is paid earlier there is a percentage of the 30% zero coupon bond that is written off. This creates an incentive for DW to pay early to get the discount. Ofcourse, the 70% should carry a new negotiated interest rate.

2. While legally there is the possibility of a bankruptcy to be considered and a financial 'guru' even said to me that there is no harm in such a route being explored and mentioned the examples of Enron, Japan Air Lines and many others. My simple response is that those were not GRE's and were joint stock companies with a broad public shareholding, DW's default will in the end be seen as a moral default of the entities behind it and this is not an option that should be even discussed.


Then the smart one's will ask are we not in a catch 22 situation?

In a sense yes, but then we have to consider long term solutions. Here is what I would do.


1. Within the UAE finance structure the Dubai Government should consider a long term Treasury Bond issuance program. These bonds should not only be seen as a monetary measure to deal with the deficit but also to restructure the debt of the GRE's in a manner similar to what many governments around the world do. US Treasuries are issued all the time and new issues retire old bonds and the cycle goes on under a long term program. It is precisely the lack of this program that has resulted in the funding of long term project needs with short term borrowing resulting in this mess.

2. The current Federal and Abu Dhabi Government assistance should also be rolled into this Treasury Bond program and perhaps even seek a tier one issuance with the Federal Government or Abu Dhabi government subscription of the earlier issues. This will bring much needed liquidity into the trading of these Treasury Bonds.

3. The UAE Central Bank to support such a program in the classification of these as investment securities rather than as simply loans to Dubai Government.

4. Set out the assessment of the cash flows of Dubai World and seek an debt retirement program which is realistic and not based upon the hope of things improving. It will mean that more detailed information on the cash flow and asset profile of the company and then to see how this can be managed to meet the obligations. With the backdrop of a Treasury Bond program the pressure to come up with three, five or seven year debt repayments will be overcome as the Treasury Bonds, through their liquidity and re-issuance programs will be able to manage a more orderly debt retirement rather than a pressured situation as we sit in today.


The reality is that any settlement of this debt has to be realistic in its scope and intent; failure to recognize the sensitivity of the situation within the financial world would have repercussions that might be hard to deal with. It is therefore vital that for the good the country's standing a positive approach is important in this situation. I am not convinced that haircuts and interest waivers is the solution, this is not giving the right message.

Banking Report: Analyzed

The EFG Hermes report on some of the banks is interesting by all means, while not aimed at a credit assessment but more at stock performance, it nevertheless presents a balanced view. While there are some notable exceptions in the report I have seen, like Mashreq and Union National Bank (my former bank), it does make the point that the current financial woes are not as bad as they sound. The 3rd quarter performance of the banks was better than expected and judging by the analysis the banks that appear as laggards in their analysis are not on account of credit issues but more management style and focus in terms of the economic segmentation they pursue for earnings. While I am a traditionalist who would not rely on inter bank borrowing to fund the loan book, I concede in the ten years I have been out of managing a bank a great deal has changed. While back in the 1990's international banks panicked at the slightest political trouble in the region, the trend since then has been more mature and banks do not cut lines at the slightest of whims as they used to back then. Thus inter bank funding is more stable and can be seen as a factor in funding the loan books of banks, even though I was surprised that some banks from the sub continent got over cautious through the recent Dubai World crisis and while not cutting exposures to the country did have a 'wait and see' policy.

Indeed it was interesting that their analysis of the Dubai Inc (a loose word to describe all the debt of Dubai Government and the GRI's) is spot on in mentioning that while the numbers seem significant, even to GDP, there are two aspects that need consideration, a) the surplus cash flow of the good companies can be used through the parent structure mechanisms to help the weaker ones. and b) there are a number of assets that are eventually available for a sell off or privatization, (though they don't make these two points-that is how I read it). The current restructuring is a major element of this conundrum that needs to be solved and for this I would urge the Dubai World and the government to set a much faster pace to come to a settlement with the banks on this issue.

While the financial press have made a big deal, even today, about the support that has come from Abu Dhabi and hinted about it not being available in all circumstances (see today's FT) they forget that no support can be a carte blanche and has to be discussed on the merits. Interestingly yesterday an Abu Dhabi official spoke to Moody's Investors, as they have reported, and discussed that they have more than twice the reserves of the whole UAE public sector debt (assuming even the GRI's) in just one entity, to which if you add the Central Bank reserves and the other assets held by UAE entities the situation is more than comfortable. This is where I get so frustrated with reporters than they miss the big picture. Abu Dhabi thinks of the country as a whole, and eventually will be there to stitch things up, perhaps at a cost but it will be done.

The analysis of the banks in each of the cases is interesting. It is heartening to note that banks like EmiratesNBD and National Bank of Abu Dhabi still figure out as the strongest and the impact of either one of them of the current situation is minuscule. EmiratesNBD with a captial adequacy of near 20% and a provision of 95.5% of loans actually stands out better than Moody's would have us believe just two weeks back. None of the banks in terms of their capital adequacy numbers or coverage for non performing loans seem to be a problem. It is highly likely that into the mid of 2010 we may find over provisions on most of the balance sheets, which I strongly advise the bankers not to move back into profits. This will offset some of the need for higher provisioning on the general commercial and personal lending portoflios that may have suffered through the slow down.

In the end the macro economic scenario will play an important part. Higher liquidity, small to medium sector finance availability, and better respositioning of the asset-liability mismatch, which plagues all banks in the region, will ensure a stable to better year ahead. Significant in this process will be the following factors:

a. Better GDP performance.
b. Stability on the issue of the debt restructuring.
c. Middle market performance being better, i.e. trading, retail and services.
d. A steady real estate market, which while overburdened with supply will still gradually get over the panic stage.
e. A greater awareness of UAE position as a regional hub for business.

While I am not predicting major new avenues of business income for the banks in the year ahead, i.e. IPOs etc, I do feel that they will protect their market share better, hoping a better corporate and government sector performance will offset a weaker personal debt performance in the year ahead. Banks who manage to address the asset-liability mismatch early into the year will find themselves lighter on their feet and more nimble to take advantage of a recovery.

In terms of safety of the banking system I have the least of worries. No Bank incorporated within the UAE has ever been allowed to go under. (BCCI was not UAE incorporated and interestingly according the Sept 2009 Liquidators report of that failed bank 81% of all creditors have been paid, which must be some sort of a record as normally failed banks struggle to pay off 40-50%). I am positive of this that the UAE cannot and will not let a bank fail, to which is added a better regime of regulatory control and a more mature management in most banks.

How do I see the year ahead for the banks? In a nutshell: stable to better performance, dealing with the recent past bringing cheer with each successful settlement or restructuring and in terms of safety pretty much at the top of the definition of 'prime quality'.