Vax or Not to Vax?

 Covid 19 has swept across the world over the past year with over 249 million reported infections and over 5 million deaths. There is little doubt that the virus remains a major concern. The economic, social and personal costs of this deadly virus remain incalculable and to this day we experience lockdowns and travel bans. While masks and social distancing are considered a broad based tool to contain the spread of the virus, the development of vaccines implies that vaccinations remain the main defence against COVID 19. Yet when it comes to vaccinations the response from people is varied and very emotional. In some countries governmental regulations have driven the vaccination policies, while elsewhere, to vax (vaccination) or not to vax remains a contentious issue.

Before one explores the pros and cons of vaccinations it is important to highlight some of the characteristics of the Covid 19 virus. 

• Covid 19 virus contains a spike protein which, like most viruses, mutates over time. This results in new variants such as alpha, beta, delta and gamma variants and the more recent Omricon strains of the virus. While more research is needed to determine why and how mutations take place, there is a general consensus that mutations are influenced by climate, and conditions typical to a geographic region.
• It is generally believed that most viruses mutate to the point that their potency for harm is minimal or non-existent as it happened with SARS. 
• COVID 19 variants indicate a propensity to be more spreadable even though so far the indication is that each of the subsequent variants have been less lethal than the original virus.
• Unlike other viruses the COVID 19 virus can and is carried by people who show no symptoms of the virus thus making it difficult to contain. In the case of viruses like SARS and Ebola, only patients with full blown symptoms can transmit the virus thus making immediate isolation as the most effective means of containing the virus. This is not the case with COVID-19.

Containing COVID 19 has been a combination of broad measures of protection and with the development of the vaccines the adherence to clinical means to contain its spread. There is not doubt that most of the vaccines were developed rapidly and anti-vaxxers claim this speed of approvals implies not all side effects have been taken into consideration. Indeed, vaccines take years of research and then clinical and human testing before they are approved for mass usage. 

However, in the case of COVID 19 vaccine development some important factors have to be considered.

A. The rampant spread of the virus required extraordinary measures and one of the main catalysts to speed research is financial resources. In this respect governments and private sector poured in phenomenal amounts of cash to fund the research and development of the vaccine. This cut down the R&D times from years to mere months.

B. R&D basic data was shared by many of the developers of the vaccine. Indeed, the Chinese shared the genome structure of the virus soon after it spread in Wuhan, thereby giving researchers a head start to develop a vaccine.

C. It is a valid comment that human testing and pretrials before certification were not as complete as would be normal, (usually a couple of years of testing). There was, however, elaborate clinical modelling done to determine the possible side effects of the vaccine and there was reasonable assurance that side effects could be managed. 

D. The efficacy of the vaccines used in the past year have shown its effectiveness to be as high as 96% in the first eight weeks to 84% six months after the second dose. A second dose does push the efficacy back to 90% and it is determined that this efficacy works against all the variants that have emerged so far. 

The vaccine and anti vaccine camps are equally vocal in their positions and considerable effort is being made by each camp. Let us see their views.

Arguments of the anti vaxxers and a response:

A. The vaccine was 'rushed' and its long term effects are still to be determined. 

Response: What was rushed was the administrative process while all the clinical steps were all followed. Given the financial support it was easier to fund these clinical steps through all its stages rather than wait for piecemeal funding.

B. Testing in human trials have been lower than is typical of vaccines.

Response: This is an incorrect statement as testing is not simply a matter of time but the number of subjects who are available for testing. For example for years bio tech companies have been close to a vaccine for Ebola but given the number of people available for testing is very small in population the minimum threshold of 30,000 subjects has not been achieved. In the case of COVID 19 there was no shortage of subjects and in some countries like say UAE there were over 30,000 volunteers for the testing period. 

C. There have been cases, albeit a few, of fully vaccinated people contracting COVID 19 and succumbing from the virus.

Response: Correlating the vaccination rates with hospitalisations and deaths show that in the case of COVID 19 vaccines the more people have been vaccinated the less hospitalisations and deaths have occurred. In UK alone as more people have been jabbed the less hospitalisations have taken place and death rates have come down. Yes in recent weeks the effects of the Omricon and Delta variants has shown a huge spike in positive tests but we notice hospitalisations have not matched this huge spike. This spike is largely explained by the 'over relaxation' of the safety protocols in terms of social events and mass events (football matches, and music events). 

In addition even with a 90% efficacy there will be the odd case of vaccinated people testing positive and in a few rare cases (a handful) resulting in death. When and if we achieve a 100% vaccination rate then we can determine if these odd cases are a failure of the vaccine or anomalies in the immunology response system of the concerned patient.

D. Vaccinations should be a personal choice and not a government mandated requirement.

Response: The argument of personal rights versus civic duty will always be a never ending saga of arguments. Suffice to mention we as a society follow many laws, regulations and directives that fall under the gambit of social and civic good. These range from seatbelt rules, obeying traffic laws and the list is never ending. Without a doubt the civic duty to protect ourselves and those we come into contact with does dictate that personal choice in the case of a pandemic like this needs to be set aside for the good of society.

E. The mRNA vaccine, which is what all COVID 19 vaccines are, can alter the DNA of the recipient and are considered relatively new methodology for vaccine development. 

Response: This is entirely untrue. mRNA vaccines have been under development for decades and are not at all something that was discovered in response to COVID19. Essentially these are messenger vaccines that create a protein spike on the outside of your DNA cell. This spike protein replicates the characteristics of the COVID 19 virus which then 'messages' your immune system to create the anti bodies to fight the virus. After the second dose it is expected that the body 'learns' to create the anti bodies for the COVID 19 vaccine automatically. The mRNA vaccine does not penetrate into the DNA cell and therefore cannot alter it.

F. Even if you are vaccinated you can transmit the virus.

Response: No vaccine is 100% effective and to that extent this statement is generally true. In general it has been seen close to an average of 80% protection is achieved upto 8 months after the second done. However, vaccinations across society ensure that over 80% of transmission can be blocked by the vaccine. Thus if only say 30% of a society are vaccinated as compared to say 90% in another country then in the first country vaccinated people may be able to transmit the virus. Thus the more a country is vaccinated the better the protection is going to be. 

G. Messenger RNA vaccines alter the genetic code.

Response: Since the mRNA vaccine does not go into the cell it cannot affect the genetic structure or genetic code of the DNA cell. This is all the more true since the COVID 19 virus is not a retrovirus like say AIDS where the DNA cell is compromised and vaccines and medicines used to combat retroviruses do interact with the cell itself.

H. The Long term affects of the vaccine are not known.

Response: Indeed this is true as it is equally true of any other vaccine that is developed. However, with artificial intelligence and clinical modelling with computers vaccine behaviour over longer period of time can be predicted. Suffice to mention the current probability is that most of the possible outcomes have been considered. On balance the uncertainty of long term effects have to weighed against the possible outcome of a virus infection.

I. Some of the anti vaxxers are against chemicals being put into the body.

Response: This is a generic view that anti vaxxers have and is misplaced insofar as the vaccine is concerned, The mMRNA is not a chemical vaccine,(in the Pfizer vaccine) and its active ingredient is ribonucleic acid, which is also produced naturally in our body. The other major ingredient is lipids which again are commonly ingest by us in things like olive oil etc. It the arrangement of these ingredients through bio processing that creates the spike protein that is essential in creating the anti bodies in our system. In the Johnson and Johnson vaccine the active spike is the adenovirus spike (like the common cold virus) which then teaches the body to create antibodies.

J. People can die of the side effects of the vaccine.

Response: Theoretically this is true to COVID 19 vaccines as it is true to any medication. Thus if there was a young person who has a history of hospitalisation from myocarditis (a heart condition) then there is a one in a million chance that such a person could have a seizure and die from the vaccine. This was equally true of the small pox vaccination where there was a risk that people with cavernous sinus thrombosis could die from the vaccine. Again these risks weighed against the millions of vaccinations creates a very low probability of such an outcome.

Conclusion.

While it is recognised that that will be a small percentage of people who will always resist vaccinations, there is a need for an objective discussion with the many others who have been influenced by the anti vaxxers. This entails and open and fair dialogue to ally the fears of people. Vaccinations are the most essential toll available to us for combating this deadly virus, which will continue to mutate to new variants till it becomes, hopefully, naturally extinct. Given the speed of the spread of this virus it is all the more essential that we, as a society, arm ourselves with the means to slow down and if possible arrest the spread of this virus. 

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United Kingdom and Migration.

 The daily news of channel crossings by people illegally trying to migrate to the United Kingdom is regular feature that continues to cause not only tensions between Britain and France but evokes intense debate within British society. Turmoil in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere has fuelled the migration of people seeking to assert their refugee status to seek asylum in the UK. Before one deals with the current refugee crisis it is important to see the history of migration in the UK. 

Since Roman times, as an example, Londonium, as London was called, was a melting pot of many ethnic people. Like most modern countries before the advent of rigid borders it was common for people to move around. In the mid 1800's there were immigrants from Ireland, Germany, Russian Jews and even 1000 Africans who had sided with the British in the American War of Independence and been relocated to Britain. The table below shows the migration pattern from 1800-1945 and then from 1945 to 2010.

Migrant group	Migration 1800–1945 (145 years)	Migration 1945–2010 (65 years)
Africans	10,000	1,000,000
Americans	70,000	250,000
Arabs	10,000	290,000
Belgians	240,000	40,000
Chinese	20,000	320,000
Cypriots	2,000	80,000
French People	40,000	100,000
Germans	100,000	300,000
Hungarians	2,000	38,000
Irish	1,500,000	700,000
Italians	40,000	160,000
Jews	220,000	80,000
Poles	5,000	500,000
South Asians	20,000	1,000,000
West Indians	10,000	400,000
Others	50,000	1,000,000
Total migration	2,339,000	6,231,000
Average migration per year	16,131	95,862

It may be noted that the Alien Act of 1905 and then the Alien Restrictions Act of 1914 slowed down immigration in to Britain. In some cases these acts, especially that of 1914 caused a reduction of Germans and Jews, many of whom then immigrated to United States. 

While many immigrants were fleeing persecution and turmoil, there was also labor shortages in some major segments of British economy which created the impetus for bringing in foreigners. This was nothing new as we had seen through the British colonising years that labor movements were encouraged by British overlords to meet the demands of shortages. Needless to say some of largest owners of the slave trade were British merchants even though few if any slaves were brought into what is Britain today. Slaves were taken to what is today the West Indies and from then on into America, Cuba, Latin America and elsewhere. 

Around the mid 1700's there was a shortage of seaman for the ever growing merchant fleet of vessels that plied between the colonies and Britain. In order to meet this demand, for instance, the British East India Company employed Indian 'lascars' or seamen who were placed in port cities of Britain and were perhaps the first Indians to migrate to the Britain. It was common in those days for English captains of ships to employ Bengali and Goan cooks and then these captains retired and settled back in England it was quite normal to bring their cooks and even 'ayahs' (maids) with them. Records show that in the mid 1700's there were close to 40,000 Indians in Britain and they ranged from lascars, to cooks, students, and emerging Indian businessmen. Indeed one such cook, Sake Dean Mohammed, who was from Bengal went one to open and own in 1810, what is believed to be the first Indian restaurant in London with the name "Hindoostane Coffee House". 

From the mid 1950's Britain started to grant independence to many of its colonies and it was believed that this might slow down the immigration. However, this coincided with a rebuilding of UK's infrastructure, after the war, and a relocation of a large number of British colonial officers and personnel. This created shortages in the labor market and Britain to bring in workers for the transport and building sectors. The added benefit of workers from the Commonwealth countries (former British colonies). was that many of them were not averse to working longer hours and/or night shifts. Indian and Pakistani workers flocked to areas like Lancashire and Yorkshire to fill the jobs in the textile industry, and to London for the transport industry and Slough for the food industry. 

By 1962-65 a flood of resentment swelled amongst 'white' British people who felt these immigrants were taking away their jobs. Subsequently on the back of Conservative Party pressure in this period various Acts were passed by Parliament to control immigration culminating in the 1968 Immigration Act which allowed immigration only to people who had 'a substantial connection; to the UK.  Anti immigrant sentiment remained high as evidenced by the right wing leader Enoch Powells 'Rivers of Blood' speech in 1968. 

With the Conservative Party's sweeping election victory in 1970 immigration was expected to slow down. However, political upheaval in Uganda, under Idi Amin, resulted in an influx of British subjects who had been granted special status under the 1948 Independence Act, were admitted into the UK. This was on the backdrop of the 1972 Immigration Act being debated and passed where by automatic entry for Commonwealth citizens was seriously revered and only skilled people already having been offered a job in UK and/or who could prove their parents or grandparents were British citizens were to be allowed in. All other entries were subject to the will of the British government. 

Contrary to the ultra conservative views of Powell and his supporters immigrants were filling job vacancies that 'white' British people were either not prepared to do, (cleaners, baggage handlers, unskilled labor) or were in sectors where there were chronic shortages, like the National Health Service. The NHS which has been created in 1948 really mushroomed its services in the late 1950's and was seriously short in doctors and nurses. In 1970 it was estimated that 33% of junior doctors positions and 44% of nursing positions were filled by immigrants. In sense this influx of people for the former colonies was like what famous author described as 'reverse colonisation' and has remained source of heated debate to this day.

In the late 1970's civil wars in the Horn of Africa and in Biafra created a new form of crisis where people displaced by conflict while not eligible for immigration felt they could arrive at a UK port and seek asylum. In 1951 the United Nations and passed a convention on Refugees and most countries were signatories to this convention and subsequent Protocol of 1967. Thus there is a clear distinction between people who seek to immigrate versus people who claim refugee status and/or seek asylum. The recent crisis in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan have created a influx into Europe and eventually Britain of asylum seekers and is the fraught with controversy.

The issue of refugees is emotionally charged and controversial and needs to be discussed even if some of the aspects of this debate are uncomfortable. Indeed there is the humanitarian aspect as enshrined in the 1951 UN Convention and the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights which gives every human the right to seek asylum from persecution and prevents recipient countries from returning asylum seekers to countries where the dangers they escaped from exist. These protocols establish the definition of a refugee and while the UNCHR was entrusted with a large body of the administrative and humanitarian protection of refugees, contracting states are obligated to protect and care for refugees. 

One of the essential responsibilities placed on a refugees was that he would seek refuge in the first country where he arrives and if this country has an absence of the conditions he/she are escaping from shall be considered his country of abode. This a key aspect of the dispute between UK and EU countries, particularly France because UK believes France is 'pushing' the refugees to cross the English Channel into UK. In the same view there is a common feeling that many of the refugees are 'asylum shopping' by not staying in the first safe country where they arrived and choosing preferred countries they would like to settle in. Whether this 'asylum shopping' is a personal choice or a choice made for them by the smugglers who profit from the asylum trade is not fully certain.

There is then the element of genuine refugees who face persecution and the danger of death and those who are essentially 'economic refugees'. Many of the refugees feel, as is the case of Afghan refugees, that since many of them worked for NATO, including British, forces now with the Taliban in control these countries 'owe' them the obligation of protection and settlement. Let us take the example of Afghan refugees as a test case to highlight the complexities of the refugee debate.

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan back in 1980s both Iran and Pakistan have housed millions of refugees. Particularly in the case of Pakistan, which at the peak had close to 6 million refugees, the refugee camps became the recruiting ground from where the many militias who fought the Soviets emerged to eventually oust the invaders. The refugee situation did not ease as a bitter civil war followed and then the Taliban takeover, who themselves were ousted by the US and its allies in 2003. Through all these phases the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran remained full and currently it i estimated that there are close to 3.5 million refugees in Pakistan and 2 million in Iran. 

In 2021 total internally displaced people within Afghanistan was 3.5 million of which 677,000 are said of have left the country, mainly for Pakistan and Iran and Europe. UNHCR registration of Afghan refugees is not complete in many ways and stands at 2.2 million, thus causing much confusion on the actual numbers. UK, as apart of the withdrawal from Afghanistan took in 7,000 Afghan nationals and it is estimated another three to four thousand Afghan asylum seekers have crossed the Channel. Since the late 1990's total Afghan refugees settled in Europe, including UK are 570,000, of which about 40,000 arrived from Afghanistan after the withdrawal. 

At the peak US and NATO, and their non NATO allies, had 132,000 troops in Afghanistan, in 2011, while UK at not time had more than 10,000 troops. Of the total forces the US generally had close to 80% in Afghanistan with UK having around 8% of the total. One has to question whether the 570,000 'new' refugees escaping retribution from the Taliban are all political refugees who worked for foreign forces and thus feel their life is in danger. This does lead one to assume a large portion of the asylum seekers are really economic refugees who do not necessarily fall within the spirit and the letter of the law that the 1951 Convention and the Protocol of 1967!

The argument runs that because the Western powers left Kabul in a hurry there was no due process available for these persons, who are now asylum seekers, to legally seek immigration to the West. In fairness there is weight to this argument and one has to conclude that UK, US and their allies did little to think this process through.

The first place of safety for many of the refugees was and has been Pakistan and Iran. Why didn't the Western powers reinforce the administrative structure of these refugee camps and work with both Iran and Pakistan to deal with the refugees. They could then have set up processing centres in these camps to process the various possible cases for legitimate immigration. It would also have allowed them to create refugee camps with good facilities to house these refugees and reduce the incentive for them to fall prey to the smugglers? 

Secondly, Britain is right in its argument that France and some other EU countries should not 'push' the refugees on to cross the Channel. While the rules of first country are clear and all the refugees crossing the channel are violating the rules the problem is that in many cases the first safe country of entry for these refugees is Belarus. It is obvious that Belarus has adopted a policy of moving the refugees on to other European countries and is perhaps the base from which the people smugglers operate. 

Thirdly, the argument that former 'helpers' of foreign forces are still at risk in Afghanistan needs to be fully investigated. Indeed to say there is no one at threat would be flippant but it would also be silly to argue that all members of the former Afghan government and armed forces are targets. If indeed there are elements within the Taliban government who are targeting such people then an engagement should take place with the Taliban to correct the situation and countries like Pakistan can be asked to help in this process. 

Nothing in this suggests that asylum seekers should be sent back into the English Channel or other wise be abandoned. Humanitarian assistance but be accorded to all people who are at risk, this is beyond question. Looking ahead would it be impossible to build housing and services in say Pakistan and Iran and other neighbours of Afghanistan where the refugees can be housed and looked after. One would suspect it would cost less than trying to settle them in UK or Europe. This would also create the basis of repatriating those refugees who sought asylum and did not qualify to these new housing complexes within the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan. It would allow the very few genuine cases of asylum seekers to be processed and in time allow EU and UK to establish processing countries in the refugee camps and housing complexes adjacent to Afghanistan.

Addressing such a delicate issue is not easy but Europe and UK need to establish a new form of thinking and approach to dealing with asylum seekers. Sadly the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol did not create and solution for mass asylum seekers who are either economic asylum seekers or people who would not qualify for entry. In sense all those conventions suggested was that those who do not qualify would continue to languish in refugee camps in the final country they arrived in! Those conventions were designed to deal with a limited form of refugee crisis that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Today we face a different world with different challenges and while we would like to end strife and war the reality is it exists and displaces people. Having a comprehensive approach to deal with such displacement with compassion is very important. 

The Anatomy. of Racism.

 Humans are not born racists but  some are conditioned over time, through upbringing, teaching and interactions, to segment other people into various groups. These groupings are based on physical features, like the colour of the skin, facial features, hair and ethnic characteristics. Historically it was natural to feel an affinity for a group of people 'similar' to ourselves, people who are in different groups were generally approached with caution. The creation of social segments of family, clan and tribe are all associated with our history of interaction. 
Various groups, (tribes) made alliances for a common cause which could range from sharing the spoils of hunting to confronting a common enemy, and by definition also considered differences with some groups as irreconcilable. However through history people have learned to coexist and live together in between prolonged periods of systemic hate and xenophobic sentiments. 
In the past few decades the reemergence of 'racism' has prompted a world wide debate about racism. In the modern context racism is prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism by an individual, community, or institution against a person or people on the basis of their membership of a particular racial or ethnic group, typically one that is a minority or marginalised. Racism is not only directed by white people against black or coloured people, but also has been seen between coloured people. In its extreme forms, as we saw in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia this has resulted in ethnic cleansing. 
Issues that surround racism get even more heightened and complicated when politics and religion are added to the mix of the existing hate and antagonism. While Islamophobia or the treatment of black people are the more obvious examples of racism, in fairness racism is quite widespread in many forms that range from the blatant to the subtle. In some cases racism blends into centuries old beliefs as in India's caste system which is perhaps the worst case of institutional racism that has survived for centuries. 
History aside we today stand at a unique moment where the debate on racism has expanded and yet instead of bringing more tolerance and understanding has in a sense hardened the views on racism. The killings of black men by police in the United States may well have brought life to a new movement 'Black Lives Matter' few understood that there were under currents in US society that shaped the actions of people criticised the BLM movement. When in 2015-16 President Trump hurled his divisive comments about immigrants and half embraced the white supremacists in a way he allowed people to consider groups like the KKK as a normal part of society. Indeed we do not face images of the Klu Klux Klan ridding with whites hoods on and lynching black people, but be sure that they are around in different forms. 
Black Lives Matter is not only suggesting that only black lives matter, bur in a larger sense is for people to recognise that racism is in a sense institutionalised. The recent case of Kyle Rittenhouse highlights this better than anything else begging the questions that if Kyle was a black man who shot and killed two white people and did not have over $2 million donated to his legal fund would he have walked free? While initially 'taking the knee' seemed to suggest it was creating an awareness for BLM, in time it has come to symbolise a stance against all forms of racism. 
In truth many of the more subtle forms of racism are embedded in the behaviours that come from the 200 odd years of global colonialism. Thus when I am asked 'where did I learn to speak English', I can understand it's as much a subtle racist remark as it is a show of ignorance from the person asking me that question. In the same strain when a white South African comments on the current mismanagement of South Africa by the black political leadership one finds the deeper we go into what is a legitimate debate inevitably the tones from the days of apartheid become visible. 
Racism is not only a white and black issue and indeed colored and black people can also be equally racist about white people. Different races other than including white people can be racist, as we saw in the ethnic cleanings in Rwanda and Serbia. Till this day there are prejudices against the Hazara people by the Pushtuns, and across Africa hate is fuelled along ethnic differences. Indeed these ingrained prejudices are often confused with politics as we have seen in Sri Lanka during their civil war or in what is now Bangladesh in its time as East Pakistan. In Europe we saw Germany, under Hitler, implement a policy of persecution of Jews resulting in the death of millions and all in the name of a misplaced nationalism.
On positive side awareness of these racist trends is higher than ever before amongst a younger generation that seeks to put a stop to it. Movements like the civil rights movement in USA, or the aim to address the gross injustices to the Native Americans across the continent of America remain alive and perhaps in small ways making a difference. The battle to fix things is hard because one is fighting generations of in built bias that gives some ethnic and racial groups the misguided notion that they are in some ways superior to the others. This is all the more difficult to address in countries like India where the supposed superiority of some is built around a caste system they feel is ordained by their religion. 
Racism does not spread through the genes of a family. Racism is a mindset that is humanly created through learned behaviour. To that extent it is reversible, in theory, and this is a function not only of education but also addressing the fabric of the society which creates racists. Racism, like a virus, has also mutated into different strands that are difficult to trace and counter act. Kangaroo courts and mob lynchings have been replaced by a stunted judicial system which will typically hand out more severe punishments to a black man as compared to what it would do to a white man. Access to education and jobs is stone walled in some cases so that coloured and black people do not get the same opportunities. 
Reforms have often achieved some success but it's a slow process and in the 'democratic' countries hard to have consensus upon. In some countries political change, like in South Africa, suddenly reversed the table for the minority ruling elite. In so far as the objectives of such change was much needed in some cases, particularly after the death of Nelson Mandela, resulted in a sort of reverse racism where White people were denied some of the opportunities that previously the black people were. Gratefully this did not take the shape of forced segregation as we had seen under Apartheid. 
In some countries like the United States there is a concern that as lines are drawn harder the clash between the reformists and the entrenched white supremacists will become more violent. The Kyle Rittenhouse not guilty verdict is seem by the likes of KKK as a major victory all more as such groups are also vocal supporters of gun rights. In the same breath we have seen through the senseless killing in Wisconsin by a black driver of white people to signify just how bad race relations are getting in the US. While there are calls for healing there needs to be an understanding that things have to change radically for better racial harmony. With politics fuelling the fire of racist hate there is scant optimism that in some parts of America this may be achieved soon. 
Globally there needs to be an individual introspection on how each person can change the racist trends that exist around them. We need to take stock of our prejudices and address them in a manner that they change our perception of people who are not like. Healing is not simply talking about it, but it is to fundamentally change the mindset within us to abolish racism. A good starting point would be to shun divisive politics and  misplaced religious beliefs of superiority from out society. 

Pakistan's Energy Sector: Historical issues and some solutions.

 As the winter approaches talk of energy shortages in Pakistan are rife. After three decades of load shedding and electricity shortages now there is talk of critical shortages of gas. Each government since the 1970's has added to the problem of mismanagement, poor planning and misplaced priorities to the extent that one can say the energy sector is seriously broken. The chronic problems facing this sector are summed up below:

1. Installed generation capacity is 37,000 MW, while peak demand is 27,000 MW, which indicates that there is possibility for generation surplus. However, the transmission capacity is only 22,000 MW resulting in massive shortages in peak seasons. Over the past three decades there is been nominal investment in the transmission and support infrastructure resulting in a situation of shortages. Not tapping this surplus which is not consumed costs the country about 2% of GDP.

2. Consumer tariff levels are below the cost of generation and transmission for electricity resulting subsidies from the government to sustain lower tariffs for consumers. Residential rates at $0.10 per KwH is the same as the generation rate, so once the transmission and administrative cost is factored in there is a loss.

3. There has been no investment in upgrading the generation efficiency of the state owned power generations units resulting is a higher cost of generation. Currently many of Pakistan's power generation units use 14,000 BTU to generate 1 KwH against an accepted international standard of 8,400 BTU. This indicates that their power generation is almost 50% less efficient that the norm. It is estimated that 45.2 billion is needed to upgrade the existing plants. 

4. It is estimated that between 20 to 30% of electricity produced is effected by what is politely called 'transmission loss'; which is really theft. Power theft for legally addressed in the Electricity Act of 2003 but virtually no enforcement has taken place. Political power and a corrupt enforcement regime means that people who steal the power are assured of getting away scot free. 

5. Poor bill collection suggests that around 15 to 20% of bills are unpaid. While the biggest defaulters are the government agencies and departments there is a significant number of private and industrial consumers who just don’t pay their bills. In recent years there has been some effort for government agencies to try and be current on their bill payments but there isn't sufficient evidence that this is the case. In addition, there is such huge deficit of unpaid bills that it is very unlikely it will ever be caught up. 

6. The result of these mismanagement issues have been that the combined amount of the subsidies and the unpaid bills have been financed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) by bank borrowing backed by the government guarantees. This is massive amount as is commonly known as circular debt in the banking fraternity. This debt is rolled over each time tranche matures and is evidence of the extent to which the power sector has been mismanaged. 

7. Structural Inefficiencies were created in the late 1990's and then again in 2007 when there were massive generation shortages. This power generation gap was covered by allowing private co-generation agreements to be put into place with new investors in the power sector with tariff structures that were not realistic. The new investors are pretty much guaranteed between 18% and 25% return on equity by structuring the off take rate at $0.12 per KwH. These agreements are still a bone of contention and also a major financial burden. 

8. Capital inflows have not only dried up for new and more efficient energy system but we have also seen a dearth of finance for the maintenance of the existing power infrastructure. Fossil fuel, Hydro power and coal as the three main sources of energy generation and all suffer from poor investment in terms of upkeep and operations. Hydro dams are silted, old out dated technology is used in the furnace fuel generation plants and the transmission network is not only under capacity but also poorly maintained.

The Power sector in Pakistan while having massive potential is also the backbone for social and economic progress. The mismanagement and inefficiencies in this sector have become endemic and need a serious plan to be put into place to correct this vital sector. Some suggestions are summed up and while these are not entirely comprehensive, for which a major working paper would be needed, but it may help to concentrate on these points.

Main issues to address:

1. Pilferage of power and non payment of the bills, even by government departments should be addressed on a war footing. It is estimated that the combined effect of these two elements results in close to 50% of loss of revenue to the sector. (20% pilferage and 25% non payment of bills). Exemplary punishments should be handed out to those who are stealing power. Disconnection of power supply for non payment of current bills should be a policy even for government departments. 

2. With the above measures the increased revenue collection should be used entirely or atleast 50% to enhance the transmission network so that the installed capacity can be brought to the consumers.

3. As of now there are about 10,000 MW of new generation capacity being installed or considered for installation. This capacity will take 4-5 years to be completed and it is presumed since it use newer technologies the generation cost will be significantly lower than $0.10 per KwH. Additional new capacity has to be studied to see if it is cost effective.

4. Private Power generation units that were given preferential rates in the lat 1990s and 2007 have had over 15 years to recover their capital costs. These agreements should be renegotiated to bring them into line with current market rates for their off take tariffs. The owners of these units have held the upper hand by threatening to reduce or terminate power supply but with new capacity coming on they will have less leverage in the future.

5. While it is estimated that $5.2 billion is needed to upgrade the existing capacity to make it more efficient a five year plan to achieve this should be put into place. As efficiencies improve the cost-benefit of these plants will significantly improve with some units being able to achieve a reduction in costs by as much as 45%. This in turn will reduce the power generation cost per KwH and thus reduce the subsidy that the government provides to this sector.

6. A massive effort to encourage solar farms and solar cogeneration should be immediately implemented. Unlike fossil fuel and hydro projects, which can take from 5 to 8 years to be completed, solar farms can be completed within a year. Additionally current technologies to created concentrated solar plants have not only brought the cost down from $3m per Megawatt 15 years go to around $1 million per Megawatt. These capital costs are significantly lower than any of the other options for power generation. In addition the cost per KwH for solar power is currently between $0.03 to $0.06 per KwH. As most of the solar power can be provided to smaller towns and cities this would eliminate the subsidies that are given to the residential sector in the tariff rate structure. 

7. One of the major obstacles for new investment in the power sector is the massive corruption in the country. From the inception of the project design there are string of government officials who have to approve these projects who demand their 'cut' of the capital costs. One can go so far as to say that its like a mafia within this sector as reporting one official only results in his colleagues being even more difficult in approving the project. One person suggested that the 'cut' demanded is at times as high as 5-6% of the project cost! 

8. Countering the 'oil mafia' within the country is one of the major issues for investors in renewable energy sector. There is within the country a coterie of businessmen and government officials who benefit for the import and distribution of furnace oil to the power generation companies. Whenever, there is a large renewable energy project under consideration this oil mafia works behind the scenes to scuttle the project. Whether such a mafia exists needs to be investigated and appropriate action taken to address their influence. 

While the above measures are common sense and seem rather straight forward the real issue is implementing a plan that puts these into place. The extent of the current mismanagement and corruption is so massive that successive governments have been unwilling to tackle the problem. The clout of the private power generation companies has also been instrumental in the lack of ability to address these issues. For the private power companies their returns are pretty much guaranteed and thus it is not in their interests to change the status quo. 

However, creating an efficient power sector cannot be achieved in one stroke but has to be carefully thought out and achieved in a series of steps. Over a period of three to five years one can implement these recommendations and thus looking forward create a viable power sector. If Pakistan is to achieve economic progress then this is imperative to implement with boldness and clarity.

Social Media: The challenge of freedom.

 Back in 2003 when Mark Zuckerberg started a light website using 'facebook' photos of Harvard University alumni, calling it Facemash, he was accused of privacy violations and misleading the Harvard Crimson (the student newspaper) as to the purpose of Facemash. (Student alumni photos were retained by the Harvard Crimson in a book commonly called 'facebook'). A year later 'the facebook' emerged initially for students of Ivy league students only and then in 2006 facebook itself was launched. Zuckerberg settled some of the legal challenges from co students who accused him of 'stealing' their ideas by offering four of them 1.2 million shares of Facebook when it when public. Zuckerberg dropped the prefix 'the' from the name 'the facebook' and  ended up buying the domain of fb.com for over $4 million. Fifteen years later Zuckerberg still faces major investigations and legal challenges which range fro privacy violations, to data misuse and content violations. 

Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and many recent social media apps have created a paradigm shift in social behaviour ushering a new era of 'connectivity' and engagement that as of 2020 boasts of 3.6 billion worldwide users. It is estimated that over the next four years another 1 billion users will be added to these platforms. When social media platforms emerged they moved the one to one chat model of internet connectivity to an open platform of engagement. In so far as the aim was to keep friends and family on a common platform for staying in touch the 'social media' was spot on. A user could post their activities, photos and thoughts for their friends and family and in a crucial sense created a likeable platform.

In the every essence of connectivity for keeping in touch with friends lay the may ills that social media today carries within its platforms. As people could 'friend' other people whom they did not necessarily know, connectivity was said to have expanded our circle of 'friends' and therefor our influence. Initially people added others with similar interests and then posted content that attracted a bigger following. In Feb 2009 Facebook for example introduced the 'like' button, and with it came the implication that one could dislike some content too. Soon across all social media platforms reports of abusive comments and 'trolling' of people one did not like started to occur. 

It was not long before political figures and parties started to cash in on this massive 'captive' audience of social media users and not only did the content get more political the emergence of hate content was seen on a scale that was and is scary. In a sense users felt the social media offered them anonymity, and did so in cases where people could set up fake accounts. In the run up to the 2016 election the extensive use of social media, especially Twitter by Donald Trump, and in many cases with false 'tweets', was a crucial factor in his election victory. Racist and divisive content was seen more on social media and it was not fuelled by conspiracy theories and fake posts. 

It was not surprising that social media companies were called to task and many of them appeared in Congressional hearings on how these companies had failed in stopping the platforms being misused. In the ten years since social media began concern emerged over the way manner in which they collected user data and then used that data. Things came to boil when it was revealed that social media companies were selling user data for use by political parties. At the core of this was the Cambridge Analytica purchase of data of 87 million users of Facebook. 

Social media companies have tried to reign in the misuse of their platforms and most of this has been in reaction to the investigations in USA and UK against them. Yes fake accounts have been removed, (as much as 250,000 per month) and abusive users have been banned, the most high profile being the former US President Donald Trump, yet there is a growing suspicion that social media companies cannot really put the genie back into the bottle without fundamental and structural changes to how they organise their business.

Social media companies do not charge the user for the use of the platform. However, as their user base increases they acquire an 'eyeball' value that is of immense interest to advertisers. User behaviour and navigation and search experiences are all captured and then advanced algorithms are used to 'target' advertising to the users. Herein lies the problem for social media companies, because just as advertising can be funnelled to a specific user so too can content that matches their profile. So assume a persons 'likes' and navigates to racist content on both the social media or the web, this then allows algorithms or place matching content to user. 

So far then defence that social media companies have placed forward is that while they do remove the content that if offensive they do to 'target' such content to the users. They further stated that content only gets directed to a suer in response to their own content posting. In a recent research experiment a dummy account was set up on social media and this account never posted any content but merely navigated to offensive content and nothing more. Within six weeks of the account being set up it was noticed that content that was offensive was appearing as suggestions to the user account. While this was not a broad based experiment the basic finding of the content channeling is troublesome. 

Social media companies do not want to modify the algorithms for fear that it may affect their main and perhaps only source of income which is advertising. In time however it is more likely that companies will have to adopt an open architecture approach towards their algorithms and adjust them to filter content. Needless to say this is an expensive operation and could well set back the social media income stream. 

While these measures will deal with some of the macro problems that we see on social media there is no doubt that the one to one abusive comments and content cannot be policed so easily. In some cases the use of artificial intelligence to filter posted content has been partially successful, but this method cannot be used for dealign with one on one abusive comments and posts. Most likely social media companies will have to deploy hundreds of moderators who can deal with such complaints. This is an expensive proposition and is likely to have significant impact on the profitability of social media companies. 

There is a growing feeling amongst users that social media platforms have become toxic and while it remains an addictive part of many peoples lives it is more than likely that if the way social media works is not changed more users will be disillusioned. Indeed there will always be the toxic user who thrives on a response to an offensive post to troll further with even more offensive posts and perhaps in the end social media will of use to only such users. However realistically the connectivity that social media brought into our lives have been welcomed where used positively. Smart social media companies will have to think of ways to retain such users, till such time we can watch the monster of social media battle those who want to tame it sensible and respectable behaviour. 

Collapse of the Afghan Army: An Overview

 As the Taliban rolled into the outskirts of Kabul it was evident that the Afghan army was crumbling, in many cases without a shot being fired. The collapse was disheartening to many, so much so that President Biden chided that if Afghans were not willing to fight for their own country how could they expect US soldiers to die for them. Indeed one would have expected that 20 years of training and billions of dollars on equipment and training costs surely the end result would or could have been a better fighting force. 

However, a summary dismissal of the Afghan army performance ignores the many factors that led to such a sorry state of affairs. The end result of a surrender ignores the gradual erosion of the will to fight that commenced 20 odd months before the recent 'victory' of the Taliban. While such a debacle warrants a full and deeper analysis it might be worth one's while to summarise the factors that led to the Afghan army's meek dissolution.

Structure of the Afghan Armed Forces.

The Afghan army was basically rebuilt after the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, even though at that point the Taliban controlled army was not a cohesive military as the Taliban preferred, and perhaps still prefer, to consider their idealised Taliban militia fighters as the mainstay of military might. Since 2001 the US and its NATO allies poured money and equipment and personnel to train and build a new army.  The 200,000 strong military that emerged was composed of a good proportion of the ethnic minorities of Hazara, Tajiks and Uzbeks, mixed with progressive Pushtuns. While pains were taken to avoid units to be raised along tribal and ethnic fault lines a good measure of former military commanders or warlords we inducted into the army to reduce the ability of former warlords to have private armies.

However, this also was the basic catalyst for nepotism and resulted in a military force which was very top heavy with officers and that too in senior ranks disproportionately more than soldiers under their command. There are some suggestions that in 2019 there were as many as 1000 senior officers with ranks above brigadier. Of the 200,000 inducted soldiers it is estimated that about 21,000 were the commando soldiers composed of seven battalions and represented the only effective fighting force in the Afghan army. It is estimated that these battalions were engaged in 80% of the fighting against the Taliban. Within these units, by and large, morale was high and over the two odd decades they had won the respect of their American and NATO supporters. Today it is estimated that as Kabul fell to the Taliban these former commandos moved into the Panjshir valley and joined forces with the Northern Alliance (also now referred to as the Norther Resistance Front).

Operational Pattern of the Afghan Army.

Since 2001 the role of the Afghan army in battling the Taliban progressed over various phases. From an initial force that 'made up the numbers' for US forces, who did the bulk of the fighting, the Afghan army, and mainly its commando battalions, were carrying out independent operations against the Taliban. In all operations of the Afghan army air support, remote battlefield intelligence (drones, satellites etc) all came from US and NATO forces. Since 2015 the Afghan airforce and air wing of the Army was slowly being rebuilt but at the time of the Taliban take over still relied on operational support, (target selection and guidance), maintenance and engineering solely on US forces or their civilian contractors. 

Typical missions carried out by the Afghan commando units would be soldiers being ferried into a battle zone by helicopter, closely overseen by satellite and drone surveillance and when threats emerged then US or NATO planes would be called in to neutralise such threats. These missions were largely successful when it came to direct combat with the Taliban, but once the mission was over the countryside was conceded back to the Taliban as local and district administration of the Karzai and then the Ghani governments was ineffective and in many cases corrupt. 

Afghan army operations were heavily if not entirely reliant on the combat operational support that the US and NATO forces provided them and on the ability to maintain the equipment provided to them. One major failing of the US planners was that they did not consider the educational and technical weakness of the average solider of the Afghan army and thus giving them equipment that required a relatively well developed technical ability to operate and maintain the equipment created inherit weaknesses in the fighting force. This problem got more acute after 2014 when President Obama first announced an intention to withdraw and substantial cuts in aid and operational support personnel occurred. 

It would seem that no strategic thinking went into planning and developing an Afghan Army which could function independently. US officials, especially the skeptics, would argue that the Afghan soldier never had the tools and skills to function as an independent military force. This is an over simplification as numerous military forces exist in the region who function independently and effectively. If forward thinking had been applied then an effective military force could have been created from the beginning with the objective that in a decade or so it should be able to operate independently. 

Ineffective Political Governance.

After the ouster of the Taliban in 2001 the government that was assembled was based on the support of the waring factions that had been fighting the Taliban prior to 2001. This was in principle the Northern Alliance and warlords from Uzbek and Tajik ethnic minorities. Like minded Pushtuns also assembled around the Karzai government but by and large the administration at provincial and district levels was based off existing tribal hierarchies. These local administrative set ups had largely remained unchanged during the Taliban time and even before. During times of strife these tribal loyalties were not only negotiable but also at time dual in nature owing their loyalties to both the Kabul government and the Taliban as the situation so demanded. 

However, years of civil war had taught these local administrations that relying on funding from a central government was not feasible and hence tribal chiefs and war lords developed their own funding from road blocks, taxing the local businesses and in some cases from the narco trade. In the 20 years that the US was trying to rebuild Afghanistan not one attempt was made to overhaul the corrupt administrative system which was expected to deliver security and basic necessities to the population. While on paper massive funding, to the tune of $144 billion, was made available to the government in Kabul, the actual funds that saw their way into the 34 provinces and 421 districts of Afghanistan were negligible. 

While a number of aid agencies were operating in the provinces in the areas of health care and social welfare their operations were not large enough to fill the void from lack of governmental services. In addition the funding that Kabul was allocating was being pilfered and only nominal progress was being shown on the ground to get further funds released. In many instances police and local officials were not paid their salaries on time and from 2015 onwards delays of nine months in salaries were common. 

While the Kabul government concentrated on security in Kabul itself, after 2015 it developed a policy to concentrate only on the major provincial centres leaving much of the countryside not administered from Kabul. The Taliban, on the other hand, had developed an effective policy to at least provide security in these far flung districts even if they did not have the means to provide health care and other amenities. Most Afghans in the rural areas were tired of decades of war and insecurity and with the Taliban offering security and no extortion and bribes at checkpoints they controlled they were winning the hearts of the rural population of the country. 

In contrast the US and its allied government in Kabul was seen more as an occupying force and in every sense the US policy makers were making the same mistakes they made in Vietnam. Corruption was so rampant that it infected the Afghan army too. It was normal for military commanders to sell fuel and ammunition on the black market and in some cases even military equipment ended up with warlords and eventually Taliban hands. While in time a deeper analysis will be done of the US debacle in Afghanistan it still remains a puzzle as to why the IUS and its allies did not take any measures to stop the corruption of the Karzai and Ghani governments? 

US policy short comings.

Apart from the fact that the US decision to invade Afghanistan (and Iraq) was faulted, (you don't invade a whole country to capture one man), polices and actions post invasion were ill thought and poorly executed. If the aim was to build a modern and progressive Afghanistan than working with the very war lords who had subjugated the Afghan people was hardly a solution for the long term. Military objectives were primary to US policy makers and political and social reform remained a step child of US policy in Afghanistan. Mediocre advisers who were either Afghans or supposed experts on the country sang from a hymn page which had no connection with the ground realities of the country. 

From 2014 US policy on Afghanistan was seeking not only disengagement from a war they knew they were not going to win but was also marked by an endless search for an exit strategy. President Obama after initially increasing the troops on the ground eventually began to talk of ending the war and a withdrawal of US troops. However, Obama fell short of specifying a timeline or a more detailed policy. His successor Donald Trump pushed ahead with a withdrawal and held meetings with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, to arrive at what is termed as the Doha Agreement. Under the agreement the US agreed with the Taliban that troops would be reduced from 13,000 to 2,500, which was promptly done, and that by May 1, 2020 all US troops would leave Afghan soil. 

What was bizarre about these talks and the subsequent agreement was that the existing government in Kabul were excluded from the talks. In addition no framework or conditions other than a Taliban undertaking not to attack US and NATO troops was mentioned in the agreement. Most importantly no political settlement or indication of the future government of Afghanistan was mentioned in the agreement. In essence this was a 'cut and run' deal done by the outgoing Trump administration in haste and perhaps partially to leave the Biden administration a 'hot potato' to handle. The Biden policy was to continue with the Trump-Taliban deal, however to extend the exist date from May 2020 to August 31st 2021 but did not push the Taliban for working towards a comprehensive peace deal with the government in Kabul. 

The Doha agreement was to have a major impact on the morale of the Afghan army. Those elements of the Afghan commando battalions who had been at the forefront of the fighting against the Taliban felt like 'a dagger had been put through their heart' when they heard of the agreement. This was all the more telling considering that through all of 2019, when the agreement was being negotiated in Doha, Taliban attacks on Afghan security forces were at their highest peak (8,204 attacks). In contrast attacks on US and NATO forces were waning and it was clear to the Afghan army that they were on their own. 

The Biden administration is being slammed for a sharp and hasty pull out from Afghanistan where in fairness both Biden and Trump should carry that burden. One would indeed have expected that Biden could have, at the time of extending the withdrawal date, encouraged and insisted on the Taliban and the Ghani government sorting out a peace deal. The Taliban it was said was willing to speak to the government in Kabul provided Ghani resigned and his successor held such talks. Biden could have renegotiated various aspects of the Doha Agreement to ensure that Taliban were also to implement steps essential for an inclusive government. 

Perhaps the gravest damage to the morale of the Afghan army was the absence of any representation of the Kabul government in the Doha talks. These were signals to the rank and file that the US was willing to abandon them for the sake of securing a safe withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Taliban were better organised to exploit this gapping weakness of the Doha talks by sending messages into the many districts that the US was 'abandoning the Ghani government and its establishment'. This explains why the Taliban was able to take over many of the districts of Afghanistan without a bullet being fired as it pitched to local tribal chiefs that they would be better served with a Taliban government. 

Compromised Operational Readiness.

Due to massive corruption in the senior ranks of the Afghan armed forces and the ministry of defence in Kabul the Afghan army was in a pathetic state of operational readiness. While some of commando units were organised enough to fight even their resolve was being tested each month with no salaries, shortages of ammunition and most importantly the lack of any air support. When the US announced their pull out in Feb 2020, the many contractors hired to maintain and support Afghan army equipment including its small air force, also left Afghanistan. The Afghan army's fighting units suddenly found that they were not trained to fight without air support and with out over the horizon intelligence gathering they were in a sense fighting blind. 

On the ground the morale of these few fighting units was further eroded when they saw Taliban forces using American weapons and in many cases driving US Humvees and armoured vehicles. The Taliban tactics of hit and run had been effective through out the many years of them fighting US and NATO forces, and while the Afghan commandos were also picking  selective fights they lacked the air power to decisively defeat the Taliban in such encounters. As the tide turned in 2019 and most of 2020 the Ghani government insisted on holding on to small rural districts rather than withdraw to strategic highways and town centers. This depleted the effectiveness of the Afghan commandos who knew that most of the 180,000 plus Afghan army was just numbers of paper. 

In conclusion it was would be wrong to say that the Afghan army was not prepared to fight for their country. They had been built and trained by the US in a manner which required a broad based change in the mind set of military and political leadership. The US policy makers ignored that a military cannot function in a political and administrative vacuum. History has taught us that one cannot have military solutions to what are essentially political issues. The combination of all the elements mentioned above indicate that there was a systemic failure in Afghanistan and this principally rests upon the planning and direction of that plan from day one. Most damaging to the military's will to fight were the depth and extent of the  corruption in the country and the narrow self interest of the United States in negotiating their own withdrawal with little regard for the future of Afghanistan. The battle with the Taliban was being lost since a decade ago as the effort to win the hearts of the people in the countryside was failing. 

A "New" Afghanistan: Blessing or Anathema.

 In October 2001 those who saw American bombers drop tons of bombs on a Taliban controlled Afghanistan may have  felt it was a defining moment for the country. Almost two decades to the day we now have another defining moment for Afghanistan and the region with the Taliban's return to power. A 'new' Afghanistan is emerging not only because the Taliban are trying to impress upon us that they have changed, but because ground realities of Afghan society have changed. Gone are the war lords and private armies that helped the US and its allies. The new generation of Afghans, in the cities especially, may not be so submissive to the Taliban as they were in 1996. The West has pulled out with clarity that they do now wish to be involved in the country they tried to build back because the emotional, material and political cost was no more tenable. 

USA argues that if the purpose of the invasion in 2001 was to stop terrorist activity targeted against America then they see their Afghan war as a success. However, this is far from the truth because leaving Afghanistan in the manner they have and the Taliban's lack of cohesiveness on this issue means that countries fearing terrorist activity have to be more worried. There is a historical perspective to the Taliban's position on terrorism and its track record that influences its conduct in the future.

Since its inception the Taliban's central leadership has been firm only in terms of spiritual leadership. This central leadership has had some claims on spiritual and religious leadership and some of its senior leaders have either attended higher religious education or have studied under the tutelage of respected ulema (teachers) of Islam. However, local commanders of the Taliban, especially in far flung provinces, were lacking the knowledge and experience to be considered capable of even understanding the basics of Islamic traditions. This was true in the 1990's and even today holds true to a great extent. This explains the dichotomy in the way the Taliban have dealt with issues of women's rights, presence of foreign fighters and in general its conduct on social matters. 

Mullah Omar, who led the Taliban through the 1990's, relied heavily on the support of the local commanders and was surrounded by many who guided him on matters of policy. These local commanders used Pushtun codes of conduct in dealing with many issues. This explains why Mullah Omar refused to hand over Osama bun Laden to the Americans because under Pushtun code he was a guest and therefore under Pushtun code he was to be protected. The more modern minded 'mullahs' within Taliban felt that since bin Laden had continued to carry arms as a guest he had violated the code of protection and therefore could be handed over. In Mullah Omar's defence he did offer the US the option of trying Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan or sending him to Saudi Arabia to be tried under their laws, an offer Washington ignored.

This fractured leadership explains why the Taliban ended up having such contradictory policies where they banned prostitution and forced sexual slavery but still local commanders encouraged Arab and Pakistani fighters of Al Qadea to enslave women from the Uzbek and Tajik minorities. It seemed in many districts under Taliban control it was left to the local commander to decide if he thought foreign fighters were welcome or not. In most cases these commanders had little if any understanding of the issues of global terrorism and saw foreign fighters as allies who fought the Soviets alongside the Mujahideen and therefore were welcome. 

While the Taliban of today has presented a more understanding face when it comes to the issue of Afghanistan becoming a base for foreign fighters it does seem this is an assurance designed only for Western consumption. In 2021 when the Taliban swept through the country it released many prisoners which included about 2000 fighters of the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) including its leader Mullah Fazullah. Pakistans request to the Afghan Taliban to either hand over Mullah Fazullah to Pakistan or at least not to release him were ignored by Taliban. Interestingly there are a number of groups active in Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan who have some presence in Afghanistan and also receive tacit support from India. Some sources have claimed that the TTP is very much a terrorist group that has India's support even though India has, in the past, not been very warm to the Afghan Taliban. 

It is unlikely that the Taliban government will be able to curb existing militant groups from establishing some presence on their soil. There are already reports that some of the ultra conservative commanders within Taliban in provinces like Helmand, are not pleased with the 'concessions' the main leadership in Kabul is giving on issues of women's role in society. As these fissures grow it is highly likely that groups like ISIS-K (an off-shoot of ISIS) will draw these disgruntled Taliban to its ranks, as indeed it has done so in the past. On a more emotional perspective the Taliban take over of Afghanistan will be a boost to many militant groups in the region who may hope they can replicate the Taliban success elsewhere. 

In the years ahead the Taliban governments 'promise' of not allowing their country to be used as a base of any attack on another country will be put to test. However, there are subtle points to consider in the Taliban promise. While they may keep their 'promise' of not letting attacks be launched from their soil they cannot assure that attacks could be planned and supported from Afghanistan without any direct attacks from Afghan soil. It is highly likely that groups opposed to the US and its allies will slowly gravitate to Afghanistan and will set up shop in varying degrees. The groups may not need a 'friendly' government to make their presence felt, all they need is a government that is not actively seeking to shut them down and in this regard the Taliban may fit the bill. 

It is interesting to note that some elements within Pakistan have embraced and rejoiced at the Taliban victory in Afghanistan. The only positive one can see for Pakistan is that Kabul now has a government not hostile to Islamabad, however, this does not mean that the Taliban will reign in TTP. We have already seen a couple of attacks on the border areas of Pakistan carried out by TTP fighters operating from Afghanistan. Thus the notion that since Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the United States, had a major role in the creation of the Taliban in the 1990's it will continue to exert its influence today is not entirely correct. Without a doubt the relationship between Kabul and Islamabad will be a testing one, made all the more difficult with India wanting to not only mend fences with the Taliban but to counter act any influence that Pakistan (and perhaps China) might have in Kabul.

Western intelligence agencies are most certainly not comfortable with the changes that have happened within Afghanistan. First of all they these changes were too rapid for the agencies to develop new plans and relationships within Afghanistan that can give it the intelligence gathering capability to neutralise terrorist groups. Secondly, while at the district and village level the Taliban intelligence and knowledge may well be superior to that of the previous Afghan government, such intelligence is purely targeted towards elements who oppose the Taliban and may not necessarily be concerned about activities beyond the borders of Afghanistan. There are very deep questions to be answered about how the Taliban will develop an intelligence service capable of being useful to Western intelligence agencies. 

It is precisely these shortcomings which will attract the likes of ISIS, Al Qadea and dozens of other splinter groups to consider some sort of presence in Afghanistan. Such groups are assured that apart from the major cities, especially Kabul, they will have enough sympathisers within the far flung districts from amongst Afghans who have had a terrible experience of US and Western presence in the country. To the academics the biggest puzzle to solve is that how the United States went from being the country that helped the Mujahideen liberate Afghanistan from Soviet occupation to becoming the 'occupiers' who ended up being hated just as much as the Soviets?

Afghanistan Abandoned.

 As chaotic scenes of Afghanistan's fall to Taliban emerge we see a return of the Kalashnikov culture while the United States attempts to sugar coat what is essentially its defeat. Two decades ago few could have imagined that the ousted Taliban would ever return to power. In October 2001 US and its allies embarked on a war in Afghanistan with the ostensible reason to fight terrorism and rid the country of the Taliban who sheltered Al Qadea. In the two decades since then the US embarked on what it called 'nation building' with the aim to modernise Afghanistan and rebuild its armed forces as an eventual deterrent to the resurgence of the Taliban. 

Hamad Karazi was installed as the President who remained in power till 2014, winning re-election in controversial elections which were allegedly fraudulent. He was succeeded by Ashraf Ghani, who fled Kabul leaving it to the Taliban and thus bringing to the fore the current crisis. There is no denying that Afghans feel abandoned by the allies who not only propped these two Presidents over the past two decades but also promised a stronger country that could eventually stand on its own feet. 

There are many aspects to this debacle and is a text book case of how not to conduct such foreign adventures. The fall of Kabul is a failure of the United States and its allies as much as it is the failure of progressive Afghans and most of all the two governments of Karazai and Ghani. If the American current stance is that the purpose of their presence was to hold Al Qadea responsible for the attack on the US, then one has to ask when that was achieved ten years ago why was their presence still so overwhelming in the country? The usual answer is that US priorities were to help the Afghan government rebuild itself. However, it was well know that corruption was so rampant that all the money that poured into the country ended up lining the pockets of a highly corrupt group of people.

It would be wise to examine the implications of the current events and what led to this situation from the perspective of different actors and stakeholders. 

The United States of America.

Irrespective of how Washington paints the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fall of Kabul, the imagery vividly reminds us of the fall of Saigon in April 1975.

There are indeed distinctive differences between the political imperatives in 1975 as compared to 2021, yet many, even within the US, will see the withdrawal as abandoning allies. In so far as US involvement in Vietnam was to fight communism, their presence in Afghanistan was to fight Jihadism as professed by both the Taliban and Al Qadea. In 2001 the Taliban government in Kabul were hesitant to hand over Osama bin Laden which then led to a US invasion of the country. In a fragmented and divided Afghanistan forging an effective central government was a challenge well beyond the comprehension of American policy makers. $143 billion were poured into the Afghan government, of which $88 billion went towards arming and training a new Afghan army. 

American's were aware of the rampant corruption in Kabul and did little to create a governance to ensure that these funds were used effectively. Analysts suggest that as much as 35% of these funds went into private coffers and at no time were the people in Kabul held accountable. Much like the 1970's American policy makers were ignorant to the fact that one cannot find military solutions to what are essentially political problems. 

While the Taliban were defeated in 2001, they did not surrender but simply dissolved into the general population. Their fighters for most of the time were either farmers or ordinary citizens to then emerge from time to time to carry out attacks and then dissolve back into the population. The US and the newly formed Afghan army may well have controlled the major cities and strategic points in the country, yet there was a general feeling that large tracts of the countryside were the domain of the Taliban. 

Successive US administrations talked of leaving Afghanistan but the ground realities indicated that the Taliban threat was always nascent and ever present. When the administration of President Trump began to negotiate with the Taliban the writing on the wall was clear. More importantly, for the Taliban these negotiations gave them a legitimacy that they had lacked for most of the past twenty years. US allies in Kabul were largely ignored in this rapprochement with the Taliban and political watchers felt that perhaps a comprehensive agreement for a 'new Afghan' administration was bring forged with the Taliban. Events have since shown this was not the case and as President Biden plugged the plug announcing a full pullout Ashraf Ghani and his government were pretty much on their own. 

While the Taliban have been emphasising that they are not the same as 20 years ago, talking of forgiveness and women's rights it is obvious they seek, principally from Washington, a recognition of their government which is vital to them. Interestingly Western commentators are wary of believing that we have a Taliban 2.0, (a new version) and are talking of 'holding them accountable to their word'. While this may well be the need one wonders why they commentators do not hold Ashraf Ghani and Hama Karazai accountable for the billions of dollars that were stolen from the aid and assistance provided to the Afghan government over the past twenty years?

US and Afghanistan's neighbours will be keen to see the Taliban keep their word on not letting foreign fighters make the country a base for operations. Somehow it seems there is a veiled message that if the Taliban are not recognised and supported then all bets are off. Indeed remnants of Al Qadea and ISIS will be keen to view Afghan territory as a possible friendly soil to plant their seeds in. If in the future Afghanistan were to become a hub for terrorist activity it will pose some unique challenges for the US. Unlike 2001 when there were numerous anti-Taliban factions, namely the Northern Alliance, to ally with the US, given their withdrawal in 2021, will be hard pressed to find allies within Afghanistan who would trust them. 

The Taliban.

As we are flooded with images of the Taliban having taken Kabul, there is a postscript that the Taliban likes to attach that his is a 'new' Taliban unlike that from twenty years ago. Their initial messages  are of guaranteeing the rights of women (under their definition of the Sharia law) and seeking to form an inclusive government all designed to show this new face of the Taliban. They are keen to gain legitimacy more so from the international community and one could give them the benefit of the doubt in so far as they may well have changed from the Taliban of old. 

The Taliban are aware that in the past two decades the dynamics of Afghan society, mostly within the cities has changed. The role of women as a potent and effective force within society has been visible. While the Taliban will try and roll back some of these social changes it is more than likely that their acceptance of women to work is influenced by a realisation that some of the freedoms of the past two decades cannot simply be bottled up again. 

However, the Taliban are not a monolithic organisation with an effective internal structure of command and control. While they have tried to portray an image of a unified central leadership in reality across the 35 plus provinces of Afghanistan there will be local commanders with their own agenda of leadership. Further, the emphasis that the Taliban have placed on following Sharia law, while simplistic in rhetoric, means that interpretations of Sharia law may well vary amongst local leaders. 

In addition if there is a fall out between the international community, especially the leading Western nations, and the Taliban over their acceptance within the international community of nations then the Taliban may well abandon this new image they have been pushing forward. Already the news that Afghanistans reserves of nearly $10 billion will not be made available to the Taliban till clarity of the form of the new government has emerged sows the seeds of such conflicts. 

Internally the Taliban have to contend with the minorities who do not confirm to the Taliban shade of ideology like the Hazara (many of whom are Shia muslims) or the Uzbeks and Tajiks. Two decades ago when the Taliban were in power these minorities bore the brunt of Taliban angst and anger with the extent of persecution reaching executions. Further these minorities were also the rank and file of the North Alliance that fiercely opposed Taliban rule. For the current leadership of the Taliban the biggest challenge will be how they will show inclusiveness with regards to these minorities. 

For the Taliban foreign relations will be vital in the current climate. Unlike 1996 when they formed their first government this time they are more dependent on foreign aid and assistance. Also in 1996 there was no backdrop of an attack on US by Al Qadea thus their actions within Afghanistan were not of much consequence to Washington. The task of building the economy of the country cannot be done in isolation and while Washington may not be as generous in dishing out money the Americans do understand that an   impoverished Afghanistan will be the hotbed for anti American groups to operate from. 

In a regional context the Taliban will have to ensure that groups such as the Tehrik i Taliban Pakistan, (TTP) who have been carrying out attacks within Pakistan are reined in. While the Pakistan Taliban are an entirely different group they will draw inspiration of the Afghan Taliban's success to test their ability within Pakistan. The Taliban, while formed in Kandahar, were at a crucial time of its history supported by Pakistan and while they may not be controlled by Pakistan they certainly are conscious of ensuring good relations with Pakistan. 

Establishing credibility will be a major issue for the Taliban as they have been making promises which are dramatically different from their previous stated position on women's rights and treatment of its opponents. Additionally they have stated that they wish to form an inclusive government and it will most certainly be a challenge in bringing in groups who have opposed the Taliban. It is highly unlikely that such a government will uphold a true power sharing mechanism and Taliban will most certainly hold key positions in such a government. For the moment the Taliban are holding all the cards and it remains to be seen what will be the trade offs for them to gain international legitimacy. 

The Afghan Public.

Afghan society is unbearably complex where segmentation follows religious, tribal, ethnic and urban considerations. While the country is predominantly Sunni Muslim (90%) there are around 10% Shia Muslims, many of whom are well educated and occupy important positions in government and society. Pushtuns make up 42% of the population from whose ranks the Taliban are formed. Tajiks (who speak Dari a language very closely assimilated to Persian) are 27%, Hazaras and Uzbeks are 9% each and then there are other smaller ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Hazaras have suffered the worst under Taliban rule and it is reported that in July 2021 the Taliban carried out some executions of Hazaras. 

The ethnic minorities, mainly the Tajik and Hazara have been the bulk of the forces that have opposed the Taliban. There is no denying that these ethnic minorities view Taliban promises of forgiveness and inclusiveness with great suspicion. On the  flip side a majority of the Pushtun population welcome the Taliban not necessarily for ideological reasons but for the fact that the Taliban seemingly can bring the security situation under control. In general for a population that has seen war and strife for over four decades they see safety and security is paramount concern. The US and its Afghan allies failed in many respects to provide the security and peace which in the end determines the success of an administrations efforts to govern. 

The Taliban must also be aware that in Afghanistan the younger generation has not only grown in the past twenty years but is also nurtured in the free social structure of the past two decades. This generation within cities like Kabul have been brought up with images of Taliban's brutal rule of the mid 1990's and thus form the bulk of the public opinion that feels the Taliban in 2021 cannot be trusted. It is not surprising that the majority of Afghans who worked with the US and its allies will feel vulnerable and fear reprisals from the Taliban.

In the more far flung regions of the country while there may not be feverish support for the Taliban take over it would be fair to say the people there have lost the will to resist. There are reports that in areas like Panjshir former Afghan army soldiers are organising a resistance. It would seem in the absence of US and NATO forces willing to continue the fight in Afghanistan such resistance will not be meaningful. At best it would position the Tajik and Uzbek leaders to negotiate a better participation in any coalition government.  

More importantly for Afghanistan it remains to be seen how the Taliban will deal with the major tribes and the ethnic minorities. While there is a the Loye Jirga (an assembly of all tribal leaders) the Taliban have in the past ignored the Jirga when it felt they were not siding with them. Yet at the micro level Taliban commanders in various districts of the country know that they cannot ignore the tribal chiefs and thus the jirga and its many tribal chiefs may well have some sway in the direction of Afghan society. The Taliban creed on social norms, as they see being religiously correct, have some commonality with traditional Pushtun tribal social norms regarding women and explains why for tribal Afghans (in rural areas) their dictums on 'burqa' are not seen as restrictive. 

This clearly does not gel well with the younger emerging educated women in cities like Kabul. If anything good came from the past 20 years of US and NATO involvement in Afghanistan it is the sense of empowerment they created amongst the younger generation. This is a key factor in the way the Taliban have portrayed themselves as a 'different' Taliban to the one from 1996. In the months ahead actions of the Taliban will determine how inclusive will they actually be in wake of a total pull out of foreign forces. The challenge of bringing trust back to a society that remembers Taliban actions of 20 years ago and from the recent past will be enormous for the Taliban leadership. The Taliban has, essentially, always been a movement and not a cohesive well administered body. While at the moment there seems some cohesiveness between the political leadership and local commanders within the Taliban, this will be put to test in the months and years ahead. 

Afghanistans Neighbours. 

There is a common misconception that Pakistan created the Taliban. The reality is that the Taliban were initially a home grown movement with the aim to creating law and order in two districts of Kandahar. As their popularity grew in Kandahar, Saudi, US and Pakistan intelligence agencies saw in them the potential of being the only group that could end the civil war in Afghanistan. US weapons, Saudi money and Pakistan logistic support backed the group as they swept across the country in 1995-96. 

In 2021 Pakistani intelligence agencies influence on the Taliban is peripheral and limited to issues of Pakistan's security and ensuring that relations are cordial enough for Pakistan not to close its borders to a landlocked Afghanistan. The emergence of a Taliban faction composed of mainly Pakistani militants operating out of Afghanistan but with an agenda to attack Pakistan changed the security perspective for Islamabad. While the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is not in any way related to the Afghan Taliban there is no doubt that Pakistan's main aim is to eliminate this group. This would also explain the fencing of the border with Afghanistan and high level border patrols being installed on the Pakistan side of the border.

A large measure of Pakistans efforts in Afghanistan are to counter India's activities within Afghanistan. Many in Pakistan intelligence agencies are aware of India's support to anti Pakistan groups based in Afghanistan. India's closer ties with the fallen government of Ashraf Ghani were in part predicated by Delhi's desire to deny Pakistan any influence in Afghanistan. One of the major aims of Pakistan will be to push the new Taliban government to act against all the groups who have been operating against Pakistan interests from within Afghan territory. 

While Pakistan's influence over the Afghan Taliban may be limited in terms of internal affairs, there is no denying that it remains the only neighbour who could have some leverage over Kabul on regional matters. Even though the Taliban have taken pains to emphasise that Afghanistan will not host any group that operates against other countries, many splinter groups of ISIS, and Al Qadea will attempt to operate from Afghan soil. This is largely because the Taliban administration may not have the resources to commit to anti terrorist intelligence gathering. Pakistan has lost close to 40,000 military and civilian souls to the US sponsored war on terror and therefore will be very keen to help the Taliban create enough intelligence infrastructure to prevent a resurgence of both the TTP and the ISIL-K. 

It is also very likely that China will build its relations with a Taliban controlled Kabul not because of any affinity with the new forces in Afghanistan but because of realpolitik to protect its interests in the region. In addition China's thirst for minerals may mean it will work hard to get commercial contracts to exploit these mineral resources which are estimated to be over $1 trillion. It would therefore seem that given the China and Pakistan relationship is very close that these two countries could well be very important in the shaping of a new Afghanistan. 

Prospects of Civil War.

It is highly likely that civil and military strife will continue in various parts of Afghanistan given that there are segments within Afghan society that may choose to continue to resist the Taliban. In the north the Panjshir valley, which was the base of Ahmed Shah Masood's Northern Alliance, has already become a rallying base for the former vive President Amrullah Saleh and he has called for armed resistance to the Taliban to continue. It is unsure who, from the international powers, would support such a move, but many hawks in Washington and other Western capitals will not unwelcome the creation of some counter weight to the Taliban. 

Whether the brewing trouble in the Panjshir valley will become a full blown war with the Taliban depends upon how Kabul's new rulers deal with the many tribes of the Hazara, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Political forces within the Taliban would welcome some form of inclusive government if only to blunt any attempt to fuel a movement against the Taliban. Given that many of Talibans military commanders in the field do not completely share the views of its political leadership there is a chance that localised military operations against the ethnic minorities may continue sporadically. 

The Taliban are also conscious of the ISIL-K's presence within the country and they have already carried out a devastating bomb attack on evacuating Afghans killing scores of Afghans and over a dozen US  troops. While this group does not have widespread support its rank and file is composed of former Taliban fighters who are too hardline to accept any of the changes the Taliban professes. It remains to be seen if ISIL K will be able to recruit more Taliban fighters to its cause and if it can become a large enough force to be a serious military threat to the Taliban. 

Final Words.

As Western presence in Afghanistan crumbles to the quick exit we have seen of their military and the government they propped up one has to wonder what this two decade war was all about. If the task of remaining in Afghanistan for twenty years was about nation building then the US and its allies have failed miserably. Yes on the social front progress was achieved and a freer Afghan society was emerging in Kabul. Much has been said about women's rights and fears that Taliban will force women into the burqa and time after time we are reminded of this. However beyond the city of Kabul we must also acknowledge that Afghanistan is a tribal society where for centuries before the Taliban the culture of the Pushtun and Hazara always was steeped in traditions of keeping women covered and subservient to men. All the Taliban did was put a religious spin onto this and thus faced less criticism for their action in much of rural Afghanistan. Over the past sixty odd years this was changing in the rural areas where the strict burqa was being replaced with the chador (a shawl covering the hair). 

The issues of stability to Afghanistan is more than just dealing with the issue of the burqa, and in this respect the West failed to understand that Afghanistan has only been stable when there has been a strong central government. However a strong central government that is not corrupt and is willing to bring progress through the tribal system to the common people. The West knowingly ignored the corruption of the governments that were installed in Kabul and did not realise that the war against the Soviets and the civil war had left no single force capable to unify the country and also be a clean government. This is where the Taliban held the cards with an image of fighting corruption and ensuring security of the people. (after all the movement started to bring security to two districts in Kandahar). 

The only institution that US and its allies could have built as a stable force was the Afghan armed forces. However, the training and development of the Afghan army was shaped to be a support force to whatever the US and NATO did. Corruption was allowed into the military and it is estimated at over 35% of its operational budget was pocketed by corrupt generals and politicians. The lack of morale that followed indicated that even the best of times desertion rates were as high as 20% in the army. Given that the Afghan army needed constant air support for operations and logistic support very little was done to develop the Afghan airforce. Thus when the US decided to pull out Afghan units on the ground were left stranded not only operationally but also for supplies. 

Afghanistan's economic recovery will be a major concern. In addition to the damage of four decades of war there is little confidence in the Taliban leadership to have the capabilities to manage a modern states economic system. The mammoth task of creating an effective governmental administration has fallen on the Taliban who have never really managed their own affairs in a cohesive manner when it comes to economic matters. This will be the main challenge for Afghanistan as may see that while the Taliban may well provide security will they be able to do national building, something the US and its allies failed to do.