Pakistan: The legacy of 'Terrorism' and the Paradigm Shift.

Indian Prime Minister Modi, when speaking in Houston made a remark, without naming Pakistan, though everyone knew he meant them, about its history of supporting terrorism. This is strand of thinking that is often touted around whenever regional or geopolitics comes into the debate with the context of Pakistan. Its a narrative that is hard to wash not because there are no reasons to explain this history, but because its a label that is difficult to wash off. Sensible minds do not prevail in the propaganda war and Pakistan has never really been able to put its case to the international community.

When Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union and seven main Mujahideen groups emerged in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets, a proxy war ensued whereby the United States, some Arab states and of course Pakistan saw the need to support these seven groups. This support was based upon the premise that they were 'freedom fighters' and hailed even by the United States as the modern day champions of freedom and liberty. The seven groups all had their own peculiar motive and outlook to Afghan politics and Afghan society; yet in the over all scheme of things each was seen as an ally of Pakistan and the US as each had their own areas of influence.

The support that was provided to these groups was in weapons, supplies, and money. It is estimated that Gulbedin Hekmatyar's Hezb i Islami alone received as much as $600 million of funding, mostly from the United States funneled through the Pakistan military. Without going into the many twists and turns from1978 to1994 (the birth of the Taliban) it will suffice to say that while Ahmed Shah Massod's Northern Alliance was the only group to remain cohesive and clear in its mission, the rest were warlords with political ambitions. In varying degrees all other groups remain fragmented in their approach. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 while the US took no interest in the future of Afghanistan, Pakistan having largely backed Hekmatyar, (even though others were supported in a smaller sense) saw that Hekmatyar apart from not having grass root support was also prone to continuing the war but this time against the other factions.

By 1992 the communist regime in Kabul had collapsed as indeed had the Soviet Union met the same fate, and after much effort all the parties (initially barring Hekmatyar) agreed to the Peshawar Accord, brokered by Pakistan, installing an interim government with a power sharing formula and including three major factions including Hekmatyar (ar Prime Minister) Ahmed Shah Masood (as Defense Minister). No sooner had this agreement been reached Hekmatyar ignored Masood's insistence that none of the militias enter Kabul until the new government had become functional. The result was a civil war that destroyed much of Kabul and all the factions were to blame in this upheaval.

As Pakistan got increasingly frustrated with Hekmatyar a new group calling themselves Taliban was organized in the south of the country and many claim from support from Pakistan. While there is no denying that a majority of the initial 15,000 'talib' who formed the Taliban were Afghans from refugees camps in Pakistan and who had largely been educated in Islamic schools (madrassas). As the Taliban success grew the other groups either dissolved or merged into the Taliban ranks. With the Northern Alliance being the only group to oppose the Taliban its ][=success in 80% of the country was guaranteed.

Pakistan's role without a doubt started out as a country supporting freedom fighters, something that seemed to carry the moral and material support of some major Arab countries and indeed the United States of America too. As has been seen in history once an organized insurgency group is created on the mantle of being freedom fighters then once the threat is removed unless these groups are not politically channeled into the new political system they end up being rogue militias that make the task of any new government difficult to restore order. In supporting these groups, which Pakistan never felt it was in the wrong, (after all a superpower like the US was their partner) Gen Zia ul Haq politicized the Pakistan Army. His outlook to a Muslim form of governance (with him as head of course) saw the ISI (the military intelligence wing of the Pakistan Army) to wield enormous power so much so that at times the top brass of the military did not know what the ISI was doing.

It was felt by Zia that the ISI free from the constraints of a military structure and oversight by the main line commanders of the military would be able to achieve the goals of pushing the Soviets out of Afghanistan, an aim that endeared Zia to Washington . To the US using the ISI as a conduit to train and arm the Mujahideen was seen as perfectly plausible as the weapons were seen as going to the Pakistan military where as every one knew their destination was ultimately the Mujahideen groups. Where Pakistan ISI and the US failed miserably was any foresight about the political order they could have in Afghanistan once the Soviets left. No preparation was done in this respect, and because of the ethnic diversity within the Mujahideen groups and their politico religious allegiances so varied no cohesive approach to governance in a free Afghanistan was even seriously worked on.

In the melee of this Afghan melting pot were the large number of foreign fighters, mostly Arabs, who followed the Saudi firebrand Osama bin Laden.  He and his followers established themselves in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule and while they remained out of the internal fighting of the civil war their support for Sunni conservative groups was no hidden secret. In the Taliban they saw an ally who not only ideologically were closer to them but also were supportive allies in welcoming these foreign fighters to stay on in Afghanistan.

The 9/11 attacks on the US completely changed the scenario as US policy makers not only saw in Osama bin Laden being the main culprit of the attacks on US soil but also felt that so long as the Taliban remained in power other attacks from Afghan based groups would continue. It became imperative, rightly or wrongly, for the US to take military action in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, especially the ISI, this event became a major turning point as they saw 'freedom fighters' trained by them (including the Taliban) to suddenly be reframed as 'terrorists'. For Pakistan the situation became all the more difficult as US pressure was exerted to not only break the links with these groups (which the US had encouraged for over two decades) but to also share vital information with the US in helping the US hunt down these 'terrorists'.

It would not be incorrect to state that this caused a major schism within not only Pakistan political circles but also the ISI. There was a school of thought that felt that labelling all these groups as terrorists was wrong without the burden of proof as to which group and people actually carried out the attacks on 9/11. Another moderate group felt that the conduct of these groups during and after the Afghan civil war showed they were simply run by war lords with no concern for social good and them being labelled was terrorists was long overdue. This group also felt that joining the war on terror was perhaps the only course open to Pakistan and would correct the policy mistakes of the Zia era. A third school of thought, to which perhaps the current Prime Minister, Imran Khan, belongs was that Pakistan should not have joined the 'war on terror' and it should also have denied any support to the groups that were the target of the US war on terror

The result of the post 9/11 war on terror were perhaps worst for Pakistan. Since the government of General Musharraf had covertly sided with the US in it war on terror, Pakistani soil and air space was extensively used by the US forces in their war in Afghanistan. In many cases as Afghans hunted by US forces crossed the porous border into Pakistan they were hunted in drone and sniper attacks on Pakistan soil. As hard as it would be for Mr Modi to recognize this, but overnight the former allies (and freedom fighters) of Pakistan's ISI turned against Pakistan. In this 'war on terror' more than US forces it was Pakistani forces and Pakistani society that became the number one target for the 'freedom fighters turned terrorists.' 

Side by side for Pakistan there was a major problem within the ISI and select sections of society. These were people who for twenty years had trained and supported the very groups that were now declared terrorists by the US. These are links that cannot be severed so easily and it would be fair to say that these 'sympathizers' continued silent and covert support for these 'terror' groups much after the official policy of Pakistan had changed. In the scheme of things in the 1990's it was never thought that these groups were going to be the enemies of Pakistan and therefore when the paradigm shift happened with Pakistan supporting the US led war on terror counter intelligence assets within these groups were few.

On the flip side these Afghan groups had close alliances with radical groups within Pakistan and saw that with Pakistan changing its official policy towards them they could influence these radical groups to act against Pakistan. This explains the birth of groups like the Pakistan Taliban, a group most active in terror attacks against the Pakistan army and civilian targets. The war on terror, which Musharraf assumed would be confined to the territory of Afghanistan got internalized into Pakistan, especially within the tribal areas of Pakistan. To complicate matters the US policy of drone attacks was not limited to Afghan soil and extensive targeting of suspected terrorists took place within Pakistan. In most instances the collateral damage in such attacks were civilians and this furthered the anger within Pakistan's radical groups towards Pakistan.

This is not to say that all active militant groups within Pakistan were 'foreign' inspired. Home grown radical groups had sprung up within Pakistan during the 1980's, largely possible due to the proliferation of weapons and the creation of what was called the Kalashnikov culture. Pakistan's border with Afghanistan had always been a porous and rugged terrain and the flow of people and weapons (and drugs) was difficult to control. Side by side Pakistani intelligence services had seen the value of militant groups organized in expelling the Soviets in Afghanistan and there was tendency to encourage militant groups who would eventually be an asset in Indian occupied Kashmir. This was by no ways unheard of as the Indian intelligence service, RAW, had also encouraged militant groups to operate against Pakistan in Baluchistan. RAW had also been active in supporting Ahmed Shah Masood's Northern Alliance in Afghanistan as it was actively opposed by most of the groups that Pakistan supported during the civil war. RAW had actively engaged in operations against the Jamat i Islami in Bangladesh and operations in Sri Lanka and Maldives.

Much is said about ISI's role in creating these 'terrorist' groups and one should step back a realize that as a part of a counter intelligence strategy such measures have been taken by the CIA, the Indian RAW and many other countries. There is nothing new about this, though it would seem in Pakistan the groups emerged through the mass weaponization of society that happened during the Afghan war and then these groups gravitated towards the intelligence services. On the other hand there were groups who had an internal agenda such as the Sipah Sihaba, a militant Sunni group whose professed aim was the eradication of all sections of society who did not fall into their strict interpretation of Sunni Islam.

Sectarian violence against mostly Shia groups became the norm during the 1990's and none of these groups were in anyway connected or controlled by the Pakistan ISI. Sipah Sihaba tried to appeal to the masses through its political activity and in fact even had some members elected to the National Assembly. During the mid to late 1990's many of its radical followers left their ranks and joined splinter groups that grew out of the Sipah Sihaba. These groups were visibly more militant than the Sipah Sihaba and reached out to like minded people in Indian occupied Kashmir. Indeed most of the rank and file of groups like the Pakistan Taliban, the Lashker-i- Jhangvi, the Jaish e Muhammed, etc all came originally from the Sipah Sihaba.

For Pakistan the road to purge its establishments of sympathizers to these groups was relatively easy as most of these groups were carrying out attacks within Pakistan. (Shia Groups also had organized themselves to carry out counter attacks on the Sunni groups). However, the more difficult task was to purge the ISI from people who had worked with and sympathized with the foreign groups who till 2001 were touted as freedom fighters. These included the six groups active in Afghanistan, their successors, the Taliban and the group of foreign Arab fighters led by Osama bin Ladin.

While the state policy of Pakistan had changed it took almost another decade to break away from the covert unsanctioned support of these groups. However, given the past history of Pakistan as a state in the frontline of supporting groups fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, it would not be wrong to assume that they do not have some political influence on these groups. This is the reason that talks between the US and the Afghan Taliban have been through the aegis of Pakistan's contacts with the Taliban. However, it has been a more difficult task to rope in the militant organizations that were home grown.

It would seem the current political and military set up in Pakistan has seen the counter productive nature of these groups and a paradigm shift in Islamabad's thinking has taken place. The result is more concerted diplomatic efforts in relation to issue like Indian administered Kashmir and also a realization that with over 70,000 deaths during the 'war on terror', Pakistan cannot afford an internal militancy. The harder part for Pakistan will be to convince the world at large that the shift in policy has taken place. Indeed people have stigmatized Pakistan, perhaps partially correctly, but have ignored that there is  hardly a country of substance who has not supported violent means for political change. Traditionally the terrorists of yesterday become the freedom fighters of today; Ben Guerion in Israel, Castro in Cuba,  Mandela in South Africa and the list goes on, lending credence to the dictum that one mans terrorist in another mans freedom fighter. In the case of the Afghan groups, including the Taliban the transition has been reversed as a freedom fighter of yesteryears are now the terrorist of today.

As the situation in Indian Kashmir continues to be a stand off between Indian Kashmiris and Indian military forces, Pakistan has shown remarkable restraint in trying to avoid militant groups being active across the Line of Control between the two countries. Kashmir is a highly emotional issue and Imran Khan so far has presented himself as the ambassador to speak for the Kashmiri people he will need to convince the masses that violence supported by Pakistan sending militias across the border is not a solution. In a sense there is a recognition, missed by the international community, that there is enough resentment within Indian Kashmir against the Modi government to allow it to takes it own course in how they organize protest and resistance to New Delhi's 'integration' of Kashmir. India will sound the drumbeat that any violent protests against its presence in Kashmir is from militants sent by Pakistan, and herein lie the dangers of open conflict between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan might do well to take the moral high ground by inviting a larger presence of UN peacekeepers on its side of the line of control to prove to the world that it is not encouraging militants to cross the border. It will then be for India to invite a similar force and an international press corp into its side of Kashmir to make prove their claim that all is well in Kashmir. As much as the highly emotional passionate call within Pakistan would be one to take up arms to liberate Indian Kashmir, it is really  the time to outsmart India rather than outgun New Delhi.