Bangladesh 1971- Kashmir 2019. Some thoughts

The 1971 Bangladesh crisis which emerged from political chaos into a civil war leading to Indian military intervention for the liberation of East Pakistan into the new country of Bangladesh was a monumental event in the history of the South Asian sub-continent. The 1970 elections in then united Pakistan clearly were a victory for Mujib ur Rehman's Awami League in East Pakistan, and rightfully he should have been invited by the then President, General Yahya Khan to form the government. Instead political pressures and the reluctance of both Yahya and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the People's Party who won in West Pakistan, (but not enough to form a majority government) led to a confrontation between the Bengali people of East Pakistan and the military, which was predominantly from West Pakistan.

The resulting civil war and the killings on both sides were barbarian to say the least. The resentment within the Bengali people of East Pakistan had been brewing for decades before as they considered themselves are second class citizens and were in a sense alienated from the mainstream of Pakistan political structure. This is all the more surprising as during the period of the struggle for an Independent Pakistan, in the 1940's, it was the more politically minded Bangalis of what became East Pakistan were were staunch supporters of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan.

India's intervention into East Pakistan was justified on the basis of helping the Bengali people achieve independence and put an end to the civil war. These were considered noble aims, and if one were to look at it independently, perhaps the right course for any neighboring country to take given the situation on the ground. As a Pakistani many of my fellow countrymen would consider me unpatriotic in admitting that the creation of Bangladesh was the result of the actions of not only the leadership of the time in West Pakistan, but also the result of years of policy, both political, social and economic, to treat East Pakistan differently to the rest of the country.


Today, in 2019, we look at the situation of Indian held Kashmir and while one cannot say there is an outright civil war, but there is no denying that there is widespread discontent with the Indian government and the presence of the Indian army. The argument that the curfews and detentions continue because there is a fear that 'miscreants' and 'terrorists' will take advantage of the lifting of the curfews to spread trouble is a false justification. With or without curfews the miscreants and terrorists will find a way to carry out what they wish. This does sound terribly close to what the Pakistan army would do in East Pakistan to justify the curfews and detentions in 1970.

It took Pakistanis time to realize that their policies and actions in what was former East Pakistan were wrong and those actions sowed the seeds of dissent upon which the independence of Bangladesh occurred. It was and is a lesson to countries that they must respect the wishes of its people from all ethnic and religious segments.

India has to accept that the executive suspension of an article of its constitution, which was done contrary to due process (see my older blog https://aqsher.blogspot.com/2019/08/modis-legal-pitfalls-on-art-370.html?m=1), does not swipe the problem away. This is a problem on which the UN has passed resolutions, its a problem on which both India and Pakistan have signed agreements, and in the end its a disputed territory. The Kashmiri leadership, which may not be the right leadership in the eyes of the ruling Indian BJP, is still the political voice of the people of Kashmir. Their detention is itself proof of India's own discomfort with their own position that the people of Kashmir have welcomed the decision that New Delhi has made.

India must learn from history; just as Pakistan thought decisions made in Islamabad would be welcomed Dhaka during the 1970's) similarly India must accept that it is the people of Kashmir themselves who have to make the determination of their own future. India has the assurance that even if the situation within Kashmir reached proportions of those akin to a civil war, Pakistan, having a smaller military would not intervene in a classical war type action. What India fears most is that as it loses it moral argument over its actions in Kashmir and the agitation against its military presence in Indian held Kashmir increases, Pakistan will have little option than to support groups within Indian Kashmir fighting to expel the Indian army. Today, unlike 1970, we have the word 'terrorist' in our political lexicon and this explains India's narrative against Pakistan that it supports terrorists. One could argue that any support from Pakistan to groups fighting the Indian army would be no different than India having supported the Mukhti Bahini who fought against the Pakistan army in Bangladesh!

There is growing international concern over India's human rights record in Kashmir and with the integration of Indian held Kashmir into India fears of a major resettlement of Hindus from India into Kashmir will be encouraged to change the demographics of Kashmir. Allegations abound that Indian forces have arrested close 6,000 people, while some sources suggest as much as 13,000 people in detention. The lock down of Indian Kashmir continues and there are genuine concerns of atrocities by the Indian army against Kashmiris. India's failure to allow human rights groups to visit the area, or indeed allow the international press free access within Indian Kashmir are all disturbing indicators that all is not well with the Indian action on Kashmir.

At the moment it would seem Pakistan is avoiding the more drastic steps it could take and concentrating on a diplomatic front to deal with the Kashmir issue. I suspect that Pakistan may also take a higher moral ground at some stage by suggesting that a referendum should be in both Indian held Kashmir and on the Pakistan side of Kashmir giving the people three choices, a) Join India, b) Join Pakistan and c) form and Independent Kashmir. While at the moment Pakistan may be less likely to consider this proposal, India would on the other hand oppose any referendum of any nature. In terms of creating a better position, albeit it politically and morally, even Pakistan proposing a three option referendum would really put the cat amongst the pigeons.

Pakistan: The legacy of 'Terrorism' and the Paradigm Shift.

Indian Prime Minister Modi, when speaking in Houston made a remark, without naming Pakistan, though everyone knew he meant them, about its history of supporting terrorism. This is strand of thinking that is often touted around whenever regional or geopolitics comes into the debate with the context of Pakistan. Its a narrative that is hard to wash not because there are no reasons to explain this history, but because its a label that is difficult to wash off. Sensible minds do not prevail in the propaganda war and Pakistan has never really been able to put its case to the international community.

When Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union and seven main Mujahideen groups emerged in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets, a proxy war ensued whereby the United States, some Arab states and of course Pakistan saw the need to support these seven groups. This support was based upon the premise that they were 'freedom fighters' and hailed even by the United States as the modern day champions of freedom and liberty. The seven groups all had their own peculiar motive and outlook to Afghan politics and Afghan society; yet in the over all scheme of things each was seen as an ally of Pakistan and the US as each had their own areas of influence.

The support that was provided to these groups was in weapons, supplies, and money. It is estimated that Gulbedin Hekmatyar's Hezb i Islami alone received as much as $600 million of funding, mostly from the United States funneled through the Pakistan military. Without going into the many twists and turns from1978 to1994 (the birth of the Taliban) it will suffice to say that while Ahmed Shah Massod's Northern Alliance was the only group to remain cohesive and clear in its mission, the rest were warlords with political ambitions. In varying degrees all other groups remain fragmented in their approach. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 while the US took no interest in the future of Afghanistan, Pakistan having largely backed Hekmatyar, (even though others were supported in a smaller sense) saw that Hekmatyar apart from not having grass root support was also prone to continuing the war but this time against the other factions.

By 1992 the communist regime in Kabul had collapsed as indeed had the Soviet Union met the same fate, and after much effort all the parties (initially barring Hekmatyar) agreed to the Peshawar Accord, brokered by Pakistan, installing an interim government with a power sharing formula and including three major factions including Hekmatyar (ar Prime Minister) Ahmed Shah Masood (as Defense Minister). No sooner had this agreement been reached Hekmatyar ignored Masood's insistence that none of the militias enter Kabul until the new government had become functional. The result was a civil war that destroyed much of Kabul and all the factions were to blame in this upheaval.

As Pakistan got increasingly frustrated with Hekmatyar a new group calling themselves Taliban was organized in the south of the country and many claim from support from Pakistan. While there is no denying that a majority of the initial 15,000 'talib' who formed the Taliban were Afghans from refugees camps in Pakistan and who had largely been educated in Islamic schools (madrassas). As the Taliban success grew the other groups either dissolved or merged into the Taliban ranks. With the Northern Alliance being the only group to oppose the Taliban its ][=success in 80% of the country was guaranteed.

Pakistan's role without a doubt started out as a country supporting freedom fighters, something that seemed to carry the moral and material support of some major Arab countries and indeed the United States of America too. As has been seen in history once an organized insurgency group is created on the mantle of being freedom fighters then once the threat is removed unless these groups are not politically channeled into the new political system they end up being rogue militias that make the task of any new government difficult to restore order. In supporting these groups, which Pakistan never felt it was in the wrong, (after all a superpower like the US was their partner) Gen Zia ul Haq politicized the Pakistan Army. His outlook to a Muslim form of governance (with him as head of course) saw the ISI (the military intelligence wing of the Pakistan Army) to wield enormous power so much so that at times the top brass of the military did not know what the ISI was doing.

It was felt by Zia that the ISI free from the constraints of a military structure and oversight by the main line commanders of the military would be able to achieve the goals of pushing the Soviets out of Afghanistan, an aim that endeared Zia to Washington . To the US using the ISI as a conduit to train and arm the Mujahideen was seen as perfectly plausible as the weapons were seen as going to the Pakistan military where as every one knew their destination was ultimately the Mujahideen groups. Where Pakistan ISI and the US failed miserably was any foresight about the political order they could have in Afghanistan once the Soviets left. No preparation was done in this respect, and because of the ethnic diversity within the Mujahideen groups and their politico religious allegiances so varied no cohesive approach to governance in a free Afghanistan was even seriously worked on.

In the melee of this Afghan melting pot were the large number of foreign fighters, mostly Arabs, who followed the Saudi firebrand Osama bin Laden.  He and his followers established themselves in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule and while they remained out of the internal fighting of the civil war their support for Sunni conservative groups was no hidden secret. In the Taliban they saw an ally who not only ideologically were closer to them but also were supportive allies in welcoming these foreign fighters to stay on in Afghanistan.

The 9/11 attacks on the US completely changed the scenario as US policy makers not only saw in Osama bin Laden being the main culprit of the attacks on US soil but also felt that so long as the Taliban remained in power other attacks from Afghan based groups would continue. It became imperative, rightly or wrongly, for the US to take military action in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, especially the ISI, this event became a major turning point as they saw 'freedom fighters' trained by them (including the Taliban) to suddenly be reframed as 'terrorists'. For Pakistan the situation became all the more difficult as US pressure was exerted to not only break the links with these groups (which the US had encouraged for over two decades) but to also share vital information with the US in helping the US hunt down these 'terrorists'.

It would not be incorrect to state that this caused a major schism within not only Pakistan political circles but also the ISI. There was a school of thought that felt that labelling all these groups as terrorists was wrong without the burden of proof as to which group and people actually carried out the attacks on 9/11. Another moderate group felt that the conduct of these groups during and after the Afghan civil war showed they were simply run by war lords with no concern for social good and them being labelled was terrorists was long overdue. This group also felt that joining the war on terror was perhaps the only course open to Pakistan and would correct the policy mistakes of the Zia era. A third school of thought, to which perhaps the current Prime Minister, Imran Khan, belongs was that Pakistan should not have joined the 'war on terror' and it should also have denied any support to the groups that were the target of the US war on terror

The result of the post 9/11 war on terror were perhaps worst for Pakistan. Since the government of General Musharraf had covertly sided with the US in it war on terror, Pakistani soil and air space was extensively used by the US forces in their war in Afghanistan. In many cases as Afghans hunted by US forces crossed the porous border into Pakistan they were hunted in drone and sniper attacks on Pakistan soil. As hard as it would be for Mr Modi to recognize this, but overnight the former allies (and freedom fighters) of Pakistan's ISI turned against Pakistan. In this 'war on terror' more than US forces it was Pakistani forces and Pakistani society that became the number one target for the 'freedom fighters turned terrorists.' 

Side by side for Pakistan there was a major problem within the ISI and select sections of society. These were people who for twenty years had trained and supported the very groups that were now declared terrorists by the US. These are links that cannot be severed so easily and it would be fair to say that these 'sympathizers' continued silent and covert support for these 'terror' groups much after the official policy of Pakistan had changed. In the scheme of things in the 1990's it was never thought that these groups were going to be the enemies of Pakistan and therefore when the paradigm shift happened with Pakistan supporting the US led war on terror counter intelligence assets within these groups were few.

On the flip side these Afghan groups had close alliances with radical groups within Pakistan and saw that with Pakistan changing its official policy towards them they could influence these radical groups to act against Pakistan. This explains the birth of groups like the Pakistan Taliban, a group most active in terror attacks against the Pakistan army and civilian targets. The war on terror, which Musharraf assumed would be confined to the territory of Afghanistan got internalized into Pakistan, especially within the tribal areas of Pakistan. To complicate matters the US policy of drone attacks was not limited to Afghan soil and extensive targeting of suspected terrorists took place within Pakistan. In most instances the collateral damage in such attacks were civilians and this furthered the anger within Pakistan's radical groups towards Pakistan.

This is not to say that all active militant groups within Pakistan were 'foreign' inspired. Home grown radical groups had sprung up within Pakistan during the 1980's, largely possible due to the proliferation of weapons and the creation of what was called the Kalashnikov culture. Pakistan's border with Afghanistan had always been a porous and rugged terrain and the flow of people and weapons (and drugs) was difficult to control. Side by side Pakistani intelligence services had seen the value of militant groups organized in expelling the Soviets in Afghanistan and there was tendency to encourage militant groups who would eventually be an asset in Indian occupied Kashmir. This was by no ways unheard of as the Indian intelligence service, RAW, had also encouraged militant groups to operate against Pakistan in Baluchistan. RAW had also been active in supporting Ahmed Shah Masood's Northern Alliance in Afghanistan as it was actively opposed by most of the groups that Pakistan supported during the civil war. RAW had actively engaged in operations against the Jamat i Islami in Bangladesh and operations in Sri Lanka and Maldives.

Much is said about ISI's role in creating these 'terrorist' groups and one should step back a realize that as a part of a counter intelligence strategy such measures have been taken by the CIA, the Indian RAW and many other countries. There is nothing new about this, though it would seem in Pakistan the groups emerged through the mass weaponization of society that happened during the Afghan war and then these groups gravitated towards the intelligence services. On the other hand there were groups who had an internal agenda such as the Sipah Sihaba, a militant Sunni group whose professed aim was the eradication of all sections of society who did not fall into their strict interpretation of Sunni Islam.

Sectarian violence against mostly Shia groups became the norm during the 1990's and none of these groups were in anyway connected or controlled by the Pakistan ISI. Sipah Sihaba tried to appeal to the masses through its political activity and in fact even had some members elected to the National Assembly. During the mid to late 1990's many of its radical followers left their ranks and joined splinter groups that grew out of the Sipah Sihaba. These groups were visibly more militant than the Sipah Sihaba and reached out to like minded people in Indian occupied Kashmir. Indeed most of the rank and file of groups like the Pakistan Taliban, the Lashker-i- Jhangvi, the Jaish e Muhammed, etc all came originally from the Sipah Sihaba.

For Pakistan the road to purge its establishments of sympathizers to these groups was relatively easy as most of these groups were carrying out attacks within Pakistan. (Shia Groups also had organized themselves to carry out counter attacks on the Sunni groups). However, the more difficult task was to purge the ISI from people who had worked with and sympathized with the foreign groups who till 2001 were touted as freedom fighters. These included the six groups active in Afghanistan, their successors, the Taliban and the group of foreign Arab fighters led by Osama bin Ladin.

While the state policy of Pakistan had changed it took almost another decade to break away from the covert unsanctioned support of these groups. However, given the past history of Pakistan as a state in the frontline of supporting groups fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, it would not be wrong to assume that they do not have some political influence on these groups. This is the reason that talks between the US and the Afghan Taliban have been through the aegis of Pakistan's contacts with the Taliban. However, it has been a more difficult task to rope in the militant organizations that were home grown.

It would seem the current political and military set up in Pakistan has seen the counter productive nature of these groups and a paradigm shift in Islamabad's thinking has taken place. The result is more concerted diplomatic efforts in relation to issue like Indian administered Kashmir and also a realization that with over 70,000 deaths during the 'war on terror', Pakistan cannot afford an internal militancy. The harder part for Pakistan will be to convince the world at large that the shift in policy has taken place. Indeed people have stigmatized Pakistan, perhaps partially correctly, but have ignored that there is  hardly a country of substance who has not supported violent means for political change. Traditionally the terrorists of yesterday become the freedom fighters of today; Ben Guerion in Israel, Castro in Cuba,  Mandela in South Africa and the list goes on, lending credence to the dictum that one mans terrorist in another mans freedom fighter. In the case of the Afghan groups, including the Taliban the transition has been reversed as a freedom fighter of yesteryears are now the terrorist of today.

As the situation in Indian Kashmir continues to be a stand off between Indian Kashmiris and Indian military forces, Pakistan has shown remarkable restraint in trying to avoid militant groups being active across the Line of Control between the two countries. Kashmir is a highly emotional issue and Imran Khan so far has presented himself as the ambassador to speak for the Kashmiri people he will need to convince the masses that violence supported by Pakistan sending militias across the border is not a solution. In a sense there is a recognition, missed by the international community, that there is enough resentment within Indian Kashmir against the Modi government to allow it to takes it own course in how they organize protest and resistance to New Delhi's 'integration' of Kashmir. India will sound the drumbeat that any violent protests against its presence in Kashmir is from militants sent by Pakistan, and herein lie the dangers of open conflict between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan might do well to take the moral high ground by inviting a larger presence of UN peacekeepers on its side of the line of control to prove to the world that it is not encouraging militants to cross the border. It will then be for India to invite a similar force and an international press corp into its side of Kashmir to make prove their claim that all is well in Kashmir. As much as the highly emotional passionate call within Pakistan would be one to take up arms to liberate Indian Kashmir, it is really  the time to outsmart India rather than outgun New Delhi.

India: From Secularism to Hindu Jingoism.

Many Pakistanis who embraced the view that Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, wanted an Islamic Pakistan with a secular society and secular form of governance (based on his speech to the Constituent Assembly) always looked at India's progress towards a secular path with envy. In the mid 1970's Pakistan, under General Zia, nosedived into his brand of Islamic polity which eroded any semblance of a secular will as may have been expressed by Jinnah. India, one always felt, had the entrenched secular back bone, we felt, that it would in the end resist the temptations of a Hindu jingoism the target of which would be India's minorities. Prime Minister Modi and his Home Minister Amit Shah in one stroke changed that.

Through decades of India's political and social journey communal and religious tensions were there, riots and hate crimes targeted against Muslims and to some extent Christians occurred and in one way or another India managed to absorb the effect of these incidents. While India was ruled for much of the period after Independence by the more inclusive and secular Congress Party, even the right wing Hindu party BJP's earlier governments did not forcefully try to change the secular narrative of India. While the discussion on how the militant Hindu RSS thinking over took the leadership of the BJP, mostly under the leadership of PM Modi is a different debate the fact remains that India's secularism is being over run by a Hindu jingoism that has to be troubling to the souls of Mahatama Gandhi, Nehru and Indira Gandhi.

We have seen through history when the intellectual repository of the country abandons independent thought, inquiry and argument and accepts conformity it gives fuel to the forces who seek a new narrative without question. While there are voices of dissent over India's new unspoken slogan of "Hindustan only for Hindu's", the counter narrative to these voices is not  of discussion but of introducing a binary option which entails that because one cannot accept this jingoism you must be labelled a traitor. The Congress Party is no more painted as a political party in opposition to the BJP but rather as an ally of India's enemy Pakistan and its leaders as traitors.

The nationalist argument and its dogma, in its basic essence, is a difficult creed to preach on the Indian sub-continent because given the demographics, the ethnicity and the religious complexion of the people of the sub-continent, (including both India and Pakistan) a nationalist label only lends itself to the people in a political sense. Thus its the political and perhaps economic needs that define India as one nation and Pakistan as another nation. While Pakistan, having been formed on the basis of a homeland for Muslims may have a more cohesive religious complexion, it still has different ethnic groups (Sindhi, Baluch, Punjabi, and Pashtun being the main ones), and the concept of nationhood is more a religious and political concept of nationalism.

For India, this becomes more complex because unlike Pakistan where religious minorities are very tiny the dominance of Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians within Indian society is quite significant. Based on ethnicity as a factor the differences in India are enormous and this translates into social and cultural barriers within India where it was always felt a secular complexion was the only way to give India an identity that can then lend itself to a common Indian nationalism. Over 20% of its people are not Hindus and the largest group being Muslims who are about 200 million people. Under the secular complexion India could appeal to Indian Muslims for a sense of patriotism towards an Indian nationalism and in a sense was the charm to the outside world of this coexistence being a symbol of India's success. Indeed this does not imply it was always rosy and smooth and communal violence was always on the landscape of India in one form or the other. But, by and large, one could state that the experiment of a secular nationalist slogan within India was carrying some weight.

It was this thinking that was behind the reasons that Nehru agreed to a special status to Indian Kashmir. It was a Muslim majority region, disputed with Pakistan and needed this treatment in a constitutional framework to ensure that Nehru could take the sting out of the independent minded Kashmiris. Whether the dispute with Pakistan would be ever resolved or not was then considered a matter of foreign policy in the eyes of Indian governments led by the Congress Party. Indeed tensions within Kashmir remained and still remain as from a Kashmiri standpoint they always felt the arrangements that India had put in place still did not deal with the promise that Kashmiris would decide their own fate.

India's push towards a Hindu dominated narrative, at times at the expense of other religious and ethnic minorities, is spearheaded under the One India slogan and a need to 'integrate' different sections of the Indian diaspora into a national identity. Prima facia this is the narrative that Modi's BJP would like to project, supported by a section of the nationalist media. However should such actions have been a part of the Congress Party under its secular badge then chances are the minorities would have had more faith in the intent and sincerity of the Congress Party intentions. For Modi and Amit Shah to brand such 'integration' slogans there is the problem of their Hindu nationalist past, especially Modi's RSS political parentage and is more than likely to cause shivers amongst the Muslim, Sikh and Christian minorities of India.

BJP is going to extra length to convince us that its move in Kashmir has nothing to do with religion, while at the same time it has declared over 1.9 million Indians as non citizens (a large percentage of them Muslims) under its new nationality rules. So long as Kashmiris, and other minorities remember that Indian Kashmir was the only Muslim majority state it is difficult not to agree that BJP's historical wish to not have a Muslim majority state in India is the driving force behind their current policy. In a larger context Modi has opened a can of worms with his move on Kashmir because it unsettles the debate about Indian nationalism, which without its secular bias is difficult to sell under the  "India for Hindu's only" dogma.

This Hindu jingoism is approaching disturbing dimensions when the Indian head of the army states that the army is only waiting for the government to tell them to 'liberate Pakistan occupied Kashmir'. In so far as passionate jingoism is concerned that is a good line to spew out, but in reality one would ask why liberate a land where there are no curfews, no occupation by a million troops, no lock down of internet and telephone services and certainly no arrests of over 4,000 political opponents. For the international community the stark reality of such comments is that perhaps as long as India cannot subdue its part of Kashmir the chances are that it will externalize the issue by attacking Pakistan side of Kashmir to 'liberate' it.

On a broader geo strategic front the Taliban, who have been flirting with peace talks with the US in Afghanistan, would be licking their chops at the prospect of internal strife within Indian held Kashmir. It is precisely this sort of situation which is the breeding ground for them to foster a home grown Indian Kashmiri Taliban. Pakistan, given its war with its own Pakistan Taliban would be cautious to support such an adventure by the larger Taliban groups in Afghanistan. India would never admit that many of the terror attacks within Indian Kashmir are from home grown terrorists who see themselves as freedom fighters.

In essence India's departure from a secular complexion to what Modi and his allies are pushing is more worrying for India itself than anyone else. Can India afford to play this domestic card which opens the can of worms in different parts of India and not just Kashmir? To what extent will the dogma of a Hindu nationalist movement go before a return to mass communal violence, like we saw in Gujarat riots of 2002, occur again. Longer the current disenfranchisement of India's secular foundation continues the chances of the powder keg of communal tensions being set alight increase. India's strength was its secular complexion and it was the harbinger of harmony in a diverse country and was the force of unity rather than religious divisions that are encouraged by the Modi government.  Sadly that secular India is dying at the hands of a Hindu jingoism that could become a monster difficult to tame.

Staring down at a nuclear showdown!

India and Pakistan have both worked hard not only to continue their nuclear weapons programs but have also tried to demonstrate that both can be responsible members of the club of nations who possess nuclear weapons. Irrespective of the arguments of why they should have them in the first place, the fact remains the the Indian sub continent is the moist nuclear weapon saturated space per square mile on the planet. Since possessing nuclear weapons both adversaries have had limited war skirmishes and neither has threatened to use nuclear weapons.

Pakistan, which has faced numerous terrorist attacks, largely as an over hang from the war in Afghanistan, (where it did support militant elements at a time), has taken extra pains to ensure its command and control system is not only not compromised but also vital information is shared with the major powers to give them comfort that a militant group cannot simply walk in and take over Pakistan's nuclear weapons. It was thus all the more surprisingly that a former US Secretary of Defense recently said the nightmare scenario for him is such an eventuality happening.

However, in August the dynamics within the Indian sub continent have suddenly changed with the actions of Indian PM Modi changing the status of Indian administered Kashmir. While the merits or demerits of this have been discussed elsewhere, from a military strategic point of view one has to wonder what happens if India and Pakistan go to war yet another time over Kashmir.

Many would like to believe like the Kargil war of the 1990's and other skirmishes between the two nations another slug match will also remain limited in hostilities and nuclear weapons will not be a factor in such a war. Imran Khan, the Pakistani Prime Minister, has gone to some length to assure the world that it would not be the first to start hostilities and not the first to use nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan's strategic doctrine has never had a 'no first use' policy, and there is a reason for this. Pakistan dwarfs India in terms of conventional arms and the size of their armed forces. India has invested heavily in its navy including nuclear submarines all which can blockades Pakistan's two commercial ports and on the ground India could throw all its military might to occupy Pakistani territory and then negotiate hard of Kashmir.

Some would say well this has not happened in the 1990's during the Kargil war so why would India take such an aggressive position towards Pakistan when it did not do the same in the past 20 years. Simply put, the political leadership during those times was not motivated with by an image of greater India and a predominantly Hindu India nurtured in the thinking of the RSS (a Hindu militant organization from whose ranks PM Modi rose to lead the BJP). In addition the should India not be able to restore normalcy in its part of Kashmir soon enough then blaming Pakistan and carrying out what it calls surgical strikes across into Pakistan will be the only public relations exercise that Modi can use to divert attention from Kashmir.

This time around it would seem in the backdrop  of the August Modi moves on Kashmir a surgical strike by India would perhaps not get an equivalent response or a defensive response of just shooting at planes crossing into Pakistan. The Pakistan political set up and the army cannot be seen to be weak in any such response. This clearly sets the stage for escalation to a level where the conflict cannot be contained. Herein lies the problem then with nuclear weapons.

The basic doctrine of Pakistan's nuclear strategy is that only if it was losing a ground war to India and any chance of repelling Indian gains through conventional means cannot be successful then only would nuclear weapons be used. This is the basic reason for Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons soon after India made the first move to go nuclear. Thus for Pakistan to have a 'no first use' policy on nuclear weapons would never make sense. Indeed, Pakistan's doctrine does not have a first use policy in an offensive mode. In other words it is unlikely that Pakistan would use a nuclear weapon at the start of hostilities, however limited, to simply try and gain a strategic advantage. The reason for this is logical as there is not enough geographical space between the two neighbors to use a nuclear weapon in such an offensive role without a fall out on the attacker itself.

It would seem that from India's point of view their nuclear arsenal is seen as a deterrent to avoid Pakistan or for that matter China to consider an attack. First strike capability and surviving a first strike to them counter attack in nuclear terms is not only a complicated calculation but also a very messy affair with millions of casualties on each side. There is little or no public information on the level of sophistication that each of the two countries possess in terms of their nuclear warheads and delivery systems, though it would seem that Pakistan might well have invested in tactical nuclear capabilities to give it more flexibility should it ever have to use them for a strike to prevent being over run in conventional warfare.

If reason prevails then its obvious to prevent a first use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, India will have to measure its military actions against Pakistan. Any push to over run Pakistan and capture territory including a major city will result in escalation to the nuclear level. In such a scenario India will have to measure what benefit a limited conventional war will gain for it in Kashmir and indeed will it not be seen by its own people as a diversion to the events within Kashmir. India's right wing political thought seems to suggest that a Bangladesh type invasion is possible into the Pakistan side of Kashmir, forgetting that the situation in 1971 in Bangladesh was one of a civil war and one that the then Pakistan military and political elite totally mishandled.

It is therefore all the more important for the world to understand that the sub continent is at a very precarious level of tensions and it is important for all parties to play their role to defuse the situation. A war between India and Pakistan will not benefit anyone and in the long run there will be no winners. There are forums to resolve this dispute and these must be explored. Passions have to be tempered and sense has to prevail and at the end of the day it must be the Kashmiri people who must decide their own fate.

Media Attention and Kashmir.

The situation is Kashmir has had a mixed bag of media attention. Admittedly the US mainstream media is rather caught up in their own news and mention of Kashmir has been scant to negligible. Even Bernie Sander's scathing comments on what he called the appalling conditions in Indian administered Kashmir barely got a few seconds on the air waves. However, closer to the sub continent itself both Indian and Pakistani media channels have been cranking up the news on the dispute, each with its own narrative.

Sadly international media has looked at the Kashmir issue much like a dead horse that occasionally is beaten to give the semblance of coming to back to life and therefore suffers the fatigue of seventy years. During the Kargil war between India and Pakistan the focus was more on the limited war between them rather than on Kashmir itself. Whenever the leaders of India and Pakistan have mustered up the courage to be civil to each other the customary declaration to 'discuss' the Kashmir issue has been banded around in press statements. The UN for its part has been content to never really discuss the matter believing that both sides are agreeing to discuss the matter. In a sense the international media has much juicier stories from the Trumps and the marriages of royal families rather than talk of state of affairs in Kashmir.

In August of this year all this changed with Indian Prime Minister Modi changing the status of Kashmir. In a sense he not only brought the dead horse of Kashmir back to life, he even injected it with enough political fluid to hop around, perhaps on three legs, to suddenly wake up some quarters of the media to pay attention to the issue. Perhaps the gamble was that the world will not really care if a seventy year old horse lives or dies or indeed if its status is changed to some other animal; now an integrated part of India.

While the international press is slowly focusing on the situation in Indian administered Kashmir, with BBC, New York Times, Washington Post and many others beginning to write about the subject, Indian and Pakistan media have been in a media overdrive. Lets see how this looks from the outside.

India, as I have always said, has always had the louder media voice; the Bollywood effect, the larger economy, the larger country and a media entrenched in the style of Fox News. India's television is a mixture of Hindi and regional languages, with also an effective presence of a few channels largely using English as the medium of delivery. While this is also because in India perhaps English is the language of preference when addressing a wide diverse base of people some of whom only speak their regional tongue and some English (more than Hindi in some cases), this also affords Indian media to be addressing a wider international audience.

I have a number of Indian friends, and some of them are journalists and I do admire their social networking skills. Whenever I introduced an Indian journalist to someone I soon found that they had networked not only with that person so well but also three and four layers of friends around the person I had introduced them to. While this may not help the narrative it sure brings more eyeballs to the screens you want to be seen.

By and large the louder voice of Indian media, especially television is that of those who support the BJP line. Not surprising that Republic TV and Times Now would label any Indian politician disagreeing with PM Modi on Kashmir as a "Pakistan supported traitor". Yes there is also the voice within India of those who question the government and have tried to bring a reasonable debate to the issue, even if drowned by the shouting of the anchors on these channels. The story spin of Indian media is all the more remarkable that patriotism and nationalism seem to be the kingpins upon which a story revolves. Surprisingly the spin of the Indian 'brave' pilot who was shot down, captured by Pakistan and returned, is still spilled out as the hero who shot down a Pakistani F 16, when no such independent third party proof exists. (In fact the US counted the Pakistan inventory and said no F16 was lost).

Whether the arguments are right or wrong the Indian media has positioned itself better on the spin side of things. Ignore what is not in the agenda, push the narrative even if its wrong and when it becomes clear the spin is not working just quietly drop the story. The delivery of their message though is commendable; smartly presented, fluent in English the presenters have an aggressive almost bullying demeanor, but the message is consistent.


Pakistan's media on the other hand perhaps has a better and more compelling narrative, if you follow Urdu. It almost seems that the disease of years past inflicts the Pakistan media even today; the incessant urge to only convince their own people and ignore the international audience. I could not find one well presented international affairs program on any on Pakistan's TV channels. In terms of their Urdu channels I would say on content, delivery and presentation they were excellent, but then there is an audience to which India is speaking and the Pakistan media is not getting their attention. In the print media newspapers like Dawn, The News and others have had an excellent reportage and in fairness those who have criticized PM Imran Khan's handling of the Kashmir issue have not been dubbed as traitors or Indian agents.

I do believe that the situation in Indian Kashmir will not improve over night and New Delhi knows that you cannot detain 4000 people and not expect to have any repercussions in the area. For Indian media the gloss over of the situation on the ground can hold out for some time, but if international medias attention increases and the situation within Indian Kashmir does not improve they will either have to change their narrative or simply drop the story on Kashmir.

On the Pakistan side the government will have to measure its words and avoid fueling radical groups to cross the border and engage in military acts against the Indian forces in Indian controlled Kashmir. Even though home grown acts of violence against Indian forces by Indian Kashmiris will be blamed on Pakistan there is a need for Islamabad to be calm and play the media game better than India. Encouraging the likes of Reuters, CNN and BBC to actually set up field offices on the Pakistan side of Kashmir will give them a psychological victory in the media face off with India. Imran Khan's statement today that Pakistan will not start a war with India is encouraging and it needs to be supported by diplomatic efforts and a better international media presence.

For the moment while I believe India may be wining the media war, Pakistan can quickly turn the tables with some clever thinking by its media moguls and the government. A crucial step will be  to change the footprint of the TV channels in Pakistan by bringing out a couple of decent international affairs programs in English. They have the personnel to do it with comperes like Humaira Shah (Geo TV) and Hamid Mir and many others. Indian media for its part needs to tone down the Fox look alike image and have less shouting and more discussion to the air.