Indeed the deed is done. The General has got the endorsement from the Judges he appointed, announced the election date, and before December 1st 2007 will have shed the military uniform and seemingly all will be well. His good friend President George W Bush has said while the emergency is not something the US is elated about, 'General Musharraf has done a lot for democracy.' A truly puzzling statement. But then what Mr. G W Bush thinks of the General is not important, what the people of Pakistan will feel is more crucial.
Yes indeed the General was doing fine for democracy up to a year or so back, then the proverbial 'drunk with power' syndrome got to the man. Locking up political opponents, firing a Judge for alleged corruption without referring the case to the judiciary to try their own, and mishandling the siege of a mosque a few hundred meters from the Presidential residence in Islamabad all started a response from the General that has not made sense. In an interview to BBC the General tried to justify his actions and asked 'you think I just went mad in the last few months?'. The truth is Yes sir you have gone pretty mad. Here is why.
Building democracy by tearing up the constitution, locking up over 3,000 lawyers and human rights activists and rewriting the rules to protect your position is NOT Democracy. Interestingly Benazir Bhutto in championing 'democracy' cut her deals, then the general reneged and she did a hasty U turn and now might well contest the election as the sole main political leader if Nawaz Sharif is not allowed to contest the election. Under the new rules Mr. Sharif has to be personally present to file his nomination papers, so it is likely he will convince his Saudi hosts to let him return. Perhaps this was one of the reasons General Musharraf visited King Abdullah in Riyadh to either ask the Saudis not to let former PM back, but is more likely that he was trying to ask them to get Mr. Sharif agree to not demand the general's removal as President if he, in return, is allowed to return.
The Americans have again got this wrong, as if their main purpose is to fight terrorism and restore democracy then the way forward is rather simpler than backing just the General and Benazir Bhutto. They should engage in a contact with Mr. Nawaz Sharif and indeed the religious political parties in getting them to agree that Washington will support a full free election in return all political parties must agree to reduce violence within Pakistan. This is also in the interests of all the political parties, as terrorism within the country takes the political initiative away from the party leadership. Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf, now out of uniform, will not be able to deal with terrorism on their own.
If full and free elections are held and all parties are allowed to contest then this is what is likely, Sind province will go to Benazir's political party, Punjab to Nawaz Sharif, the North West Frontier Province to the MMA (a coalition of religious political parties) and Baluchistan to the Baluchi nationalist parties. Only the PML of Nawaz Sharif can deal with the groups who will win in NWFP and Baluchistan, and it is in these provinces that the problems of militancy and terrorism exist. This is why I have always argued that the country needs a government of national reconstruction where all parties are encouraged to form a collective government. Backing only one or two horses in this complex race will never be a fruitful bet and hence the dialogue has to be more broad based.
For the US hence the option has to be a neutral encouragement for free elections after they have had contacts with all political parties. It would seem while there will be legal and political resentments to the generals 'election' as the President, there is a chance that if free elections are allowed and all are allowed to participate then perhaps the chances are that this sordid deed will be buried in the need for national interest.
Friday, November 23, 2007
Tuesday, November 20, 2007
Sher View: Counting the General's days
Through interviews given in the presidential palace in Islamabad to carefully selected foreign journalists, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan has been valiantly trying to present himself as a champion of democracy and free media. To underscore that point, the veteran general has been donning not his army uniform but has appeared in mufti – smart charcoal-grey suits, and sober shirts and muted ties. Of course, those televised images were mostly seen by foreign viewers, and not by his fellow 160 million Pakistanis. The indigenous media remain muzzled – which is to be expected in light of the fact that the general has suspended Pakistan's Constitution and pretty much imposed martial law. Pakistani journalists have been kept away from their president.
To his credit, Mr. Musharraf has kept a straight face through these interviews. His phlegmatic visage notwithstanding, he must surely know that his days in office are numbered – that the end to his rule may come as early as this weekend when John Negroponte, the Deputy Secretary of State of the United States, arrives in Islamabad to give President Musharraf the news that Washington is unfastening its embrace of the general. Of course, the encounter will be preceded by some due diligence on Mr. Negroponte's part; in fact, he has already been in touch with elements within the current administration, and with members of the civilian opposition. By the time Secretary Negroponte relays the unwelcome news to President Musharraf, the scenario for political succession would have been tidily worked out.
Such a scenario may include the return to Pakistan of Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister whom Musharraf overthrew in a bloodless coup in 1999 and bundled off to exile to Saudi Arabia. When Mr. Sharif gamely tried to return home some weeks ago, he was not allowed back into his own country. There's little question in my mind that the U.S. has not been talking with Mr. Sharif. Unlike his political opponent Benazir Bhutto – who was prepared to make a Faustian pact with Mr. Musharraf in a power-sharing arrangement under which he would continue as president and she would become prime minister – Mr. Sharif not only wants Mr. Musharraf to relinquish Pakistan's presidency but also leave the army altogether. (The general said yesterday that he may do the latter but not the former.)
My political and business sources tell me that the chancelleries of Europe have been open to the idea of a return by Mr. Sharif. Indeed, some European leaders have privately encouraged the Bush Administration to widen its dialogue with Pakistani constituencies beyond Ms. Bhutto and her Pakistan People's Party. They have emphasized that she does not – yet – have support from the street; specifically, Pakistan's students have not rallied to her cause. It's nice to have lawyers agitating in her behalf, but let it be noted that the Pakistan's agents of change historically have been students: Generals Mohammed Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan – both military dictators – were forced to yield power only after protests led and manned by students became so massive that the "voice" of the street could not be ignored.
General Musharraf has shown few signs of acknowledging this history. I can't blame him, of course – after all, who wants to raise intimations of one's own political mortality? What the general did not say in his media interviews has been at least as important – if not more – than the predictable words he uttered. He did say that his political rival Ms. Bhutto was under house arrest to "protect" her from terrorist attacks. But he neglected to mention that Imran Khan, an iconic hero of cricket who turned to politics, was being manhandled and arrested under Pakistan's draconian anti-terrorist measures. Mr. Khan's crime was to lead a student protest against the imposition of the emergency, which is normally the right of any person under a democracy. Could it be that General Musharraf is scared that the charismatic Mr. Khan will be the rallying figure for the country's youthful population?
General Musharraf would do well to study his own nation's history. Almost three decades ago, Benazir Bhutto's father Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appeared on national television when faced with rising protests against his increasingly dictatorial rule. With arrogance that was barely concealed, he said that the seat of power he sat upon was much stronger than people imagined. In less than a month after that speech, General Zia ul-Haq – then chief of the army – deposed him in a military coup.
As I watched President Musharraf's interviews from my vantage point in Dubai, I could not help but think that while the general talked of saving Pakistan he seemed to be oblivious to the fact that it needs saving from his own authoritarian actions – actions that clearly don't have an agenda beyond political survival. Indeed, his assertion that national elections have been historically held in Pakistan came across as scarcely credible in view of the fact that the polls were conducted under the barrel of the gun and emergency powers of the army. History may not be the general's forte, but surely he must know that one of those elections – in 1988 – was held when General Zia was killed mysteriously in a plane crash. Military dictators don't necessarily retire or fade away in Pakistan. And while I certainly don't wish General Musharraf ill, it wouldn't be hyperbole to say that his termination as president could come with extreme prejudice.
The general is cornered. His tough-talking interviews are not going to placate the protests against him. Perhaps what Imran Khan was trying with the students causes the most concern to the military, and it is not surprising that he would be dubbed a terrorist – not because he was planning terrorist acts but because he was igniting the fuse General Musharraf's army would worry most about.
While the protests continue – accompanied by a chorus of threats from Western capitals about cutting aid – General Musharraf himself must be worried about that his political slippage. The idea of him stepping down is now not only an anathema but would be political suicide from his perspective. Though he has tried to play down the situation by promising elections, and even saying that he would relinquish his army post but remain president, he must dread John Negroponte's forthcoming visit. Under the circumstances, how warm will Mr. Musharraf's hospitality be to his hangman?
President Musharraf could simply ignore Mr. Negroponte's "advice" as the meddling by a foreign power in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, albeit one that traditionally has been a geopolitical ally of the United States, and one whose partnership is central to Washington's war on global terrorism. Mr. Musharraf rules under the Provisional Constitutional Order – in effect, a military diktat to sanction the emergency – and he and his friends are putting immense pressure of the judges of the provincial High Courts of Pakistan's four provinces to take a new oath of office. This would reinstate the High Courts, allowing the federal government to keep the nation's Supreme Court suspended. This, the general hopes, will give him some legitimacy beyond the dubious provisions of the Provisional Constitutional Order. Reports have been pouring in that each of the judges of the High Courts are visited a number of times a day to pressure them into taking the new oath.
Secretary Negroponte recognizes that there can be no return to even a semblance of normalcy in Pakistan while General Musharraf is still at the helm. This would be the ideal time for one to be fly on the wall of the Pakistan Military Headquarters where the Joint Chief of Staffs must be meeting. It is not beyond imagination to think that pressure from within the army must be mounting on General Musharraf to step down, and allow the smooth transition to civilian rule. Indeed, there's the precedent of General Aslam Beg in 1988 arguing an identical point; it would not be unlikely to see some of the Corp Commanders – the equivalent of the joint chiefs of staff -- trying to impress this position on general Musharraf. This is all the more possible considering that the general has claimed he allows "full democracy and expression of views" by his army officers.
If, as expected, Mr. Negroponte makes it clear to General Musharraf that the US position with respect to him has changed, it would mean not only a change in Pakistan's governance. It would send a strong signal that will allow a change – whether from internal pressures of the army or as a result of America wanting to be an honest broker for democracy – allowing an interim government where a return to democracy will be possible. It is also possible that since two of general's closest advisors are his former military secretary -- now heading the Inter Services Intelligence -- and his wife's relative -- who heads the Military Intelligence -- the chances are he could be fed information he wants to hear rather than what needs to be heard by President Musharraf. In other words, the general and his cabal will all be living in a fool's paradise.
While the general may feel he and his cabal have the situation under control, it is clear that having promising elections but keeping politicians either locked up or in exile can hardly be salutary to President Musharraf's cause. Nor will such continued condition be perceived as a sane act of a man supposedly committed to the fashioning of a democrat system in Pakistan, however daunting the task. Perceptions do matter in the daily life of individuals and institutions, and of nations. Right now, General Musharraf's army is seen as hostage takers of the country rather. President Musharraf would rather have himself and his uniformed caudillo be seen as brave saviors. And while he can dictate governance for the moment, unfortunately for him Mr. Musharraf cannot reshape perceptions that are solidifying that the time has come for him to leave with his dignity – and neck – intact.
To his credit, Mr. Musharraf has kept a straight face through these interviews. His phlegmatic visage notwithstanding, he must surely know that his days in office are numbered – that the end to his rule may come as early as this weekend when John Negroponte, the Deputy Secretary of State of the United States, arrives in Islamabad to give President Musharraf the news that Washington is unfastening its embrace of the general. Of course, the encounter will be preceded by some due diligence on Mr. Negroponte's part; in fact, he has already been in touch with elements within the current administration, and with members of the civilian opposition. By the time Secretary Negroponte relays the unwelcome news to President Musharraf, the scenario for political succession would have been tidily worked out.
Such a scenario may include the return to Pakistan of Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister whom Musharraf overthrew in a bloodless coup in 1999 and bundled off to exile to Saudi Arabia. When Mr. Sharif gamely tried to return home some weeks ago, he was not allowed back into his own country. There's little question in my mind that the U.S. has not been talking with Mr. Sharif. Unlike his political opponent Benazir Bhutto – who was prepared to make a Faustian pact with Mr. Musharraf in a power-sharing arrangement under which he would continue as president and she would become prime minister – Mr. Sharif not only wants Mr. Musharraf to relinquish Pakistan's presidency but also leave the army altogether. (The general said yesterday that he may do the latter but not the former.)
My political and business sources tell me that the chancelleries of Europe have been open to the idea of a return by Mr. Sharif. Indeed, some European leaders have privately encouraged the Bush Administration to widen its dialogue with Pakistani constituencies beyond Ms. Bhutto and her Pakistan People's Party. They have emphasized that she does not – yet – have support from the street; specifically, Pakistan's students have not rallied to her cause. It's nice to have lawyers agitating in her behalf, but let it be noted that the Pakistan's agents of change historically have been students: Generals Mohammed Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan – both military dictators – were forced to yield power only after protests led and manned by students became so massive that the "voice" of the street could not be ignored.
General Musharraf has shown few signs of acknowledging this history. I can't blame him, of course – after all, who wants to raise intimations of one's own political mortality? What the general did not say in his media interviews has been at least as important – if not more – than the predictable words he uttered. He did say that his political rival Ms. Bhutto was under house arrest to "protect" her from terrorist attacks. But he neglected to mention that Imran Khan, an iconic hero of cricket who turned to politics, was being manhandled and arrested under Pakistan's draconian anti-terrorist measures. Mr. Khan's crime was to lead a student protest against the imposition of the emergency, which is normally the right of any person under a democracy. Could it be that General Musharraf is scared that the charismatic Mr. Khan will be the rallying figure for the country's youthful population?
General Musharraf would do well to study his own nation's history. Almost three decades ago, Benazir Bhutto's father Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appeared on national television when faced with rising protests against his increasingly dictatorial rule. With arrogance that was barely concealed, he said that the seat of power he sat upon was much stronger than people imagined. In less than a month after that speech, General Zia ul-Haq – then chief of the army – deposed him in a military coup.
As I watched President Musharraf's interviews from my vantage point in Dubai, I could not help but think that while the general talked of saving Pakistan he seemed to be oblivious to the fact that it needs saving from his own authoritarian actions – actions that clearly don't have an agenda beyond political survival. Indeed, his assertion that national elections have been historically held in Pakistan came across as scarcely credible in view of the fact that the polls were conducted under the barrel of the gun and emergency powers of the army. History may not be the general's forte, but surely he must know that one of those elections – in 1988 – was held when General Zia was killed mysteriously in a plane crash. Military dictators don't necessarily retire or fade away in Pakistan. And while I certainly don't wish General Musharraf ill, it wouldn't be hyperbole to say that his termination as president could come with extreme prejudice.
The general is cornered. His tough-talking interviews are not going to placate the protests against him. Perhaps what Imran Khan was trying with the students causes the most concern to the military, and it is not surprising that he would be dubbed a terrorist – not because he was planning terrorist acts but because he was igniting the fuse General Musharraf's army would worry most about.
While the protests continue – accompanied by a chorus of threats from Western capitals about cutting aid – General Musharraf himself must be worried about that his political slippage. The idea of him stepping down is now not only an anathema but would be political suicide from his perspective. Though he has tried to play down the situation by promising elections, and even saying that he would relinquish his army post but remain president, he must dread John Negroponte's forthcoming visit. Under the circumstances, how warm will Mr. Musharraf's hospitality be to his hangman?
President Musharraf could simply ignore Mr. Negroponte's "advice" as the meddling by a foreign power in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, albeit one that traditionally has been a geopolitical ally of the United States, and one whose partnership is central to Washington's war on global terrorism. Mr. Musharraf rules under the Provisional Constitutional Order – in effect, a military diktat to sanction the emergency – and he and his friends are putting immense pressure of the judges of the provincial High Courts of Pakistan's four provinces to take a new oath of office. This would reinstate the High Courts, allowing the federal government to keep the nation's Supreme Court suspended. This, the general hopes, will give him some legitimacy beyond the dubious provisions of the Provisional Constitutional Order. Reports have been pouring in that each of the judges of the High Courts are visited a number of times a day to pressure them into taking the new oath.
Secretary Negroponte recognizes that there can be no return to even a semblance of normalcy in Pakistan while General Musharraf is still at the helm. This would be the ideal time for one to be fly on the wall of the Pakistan Military Headquarters where the Joint Chief of Staffs must be meeting. It is not beyond imagination to think that pressure from within the army must be mounting on General Musharraf to step down, and allow the smooth transition to civilian rule. Indeed, there's the precedent of General Aslam Beg in 1988 arguing an identical point; it would not be unlikely to see some of the Corp Commanders – the equivalent of the joint chiefs of staff -- trying to impress this position on general Musharraf. This is all the more possible considering that the general has claimed he allows "full democracy and expression of views" by his army officers.
If, as expected, Mr. Negroponte makes it clear to General Musharraf that the US position with respect to him has changed, it would mean not only a change in Pakistan's governance. It would send a strong signal that will allow a change – whether from internal pressures of the army or as a result of America wanting to be an honest broker for democracy – allowing an interim government where a return to democracy will be possible. It is also possible that since two of general's closest advisors are his former military secretary -- now heading the Inter Services Intelligence -- and his wife's relative -- who heads the Military Intelligence -- the chances are he could be fed information he wants to hear rather than what needs to be heard by President Musharraf. In other words, the general and his cabal will all be living in a fool's paradise.
While the general may feel he and his cabal have the situation under control, it is clear that having promising elections but keeping politicians either locked up or in exile can hardly be salutary to President Musharraf's cause. Nor will such continued condition be perceived as a sane act of a man supposedly committed to the fashioning of a democrat system in Pakistan, however daunting the task. Perceptions do matter in the daily life of individuals and institutions, and of nations. Right now, General Musharraf's army is seen as hostage takers of the country rather. President Musharraf would rather have himself and his uniformed caudillo be seen as brave saviors. And while he can dictate governance for the moment, unfortunately for him Mr. Musharraf cannot reshape perceptions that are solidifying that the time has come for him to leave with his dignity – and neck – intact.
Sher Value: Oil to score a century!
Crude oil prices will, most probably, breach the $100 per barrel mark, and perhaps by an easier stride from the mid nineties where it stands perched today. However, there is more to the issue of oil prices than just watching it in the nervous nineties, its perhaps the most fabulous story on commodities. Between 1999 and 2006 the price of oil moved from $10 to $60, and between 2006 and now, the end of 2007 it has moved from $60 to $96, and for once none of these increases can be blamed on the OPEC or any political or economic maneuvering of the oil cartel. To put this rise in perspective assume a country exporting 2 million barrels of oil a day in 1999 was earning US$20 million per day, and today the same country is earning US$192 million per day!
To understand this phenomenal rise we have to look at the massive demand for energy that growth in India and China have been witnessing. China’s demand for oil has more than tripled in these seven odd years. There is little evidence that this global demand will slow down and a world recession, while possible, will have to be quite severe to bring this engine to a halt.
As OPEC ministers meet in Saudi Arabia it is not only clear that an output increase is not on the cards but surprisingly some members are arguing that perhaps it is time to dump the dollar as the reference pricing currency. While a continued fall in the greenback value will hurt the purchasing power of oil earnings, and the market will price in ‘compensatory increases’ for the price of oil. This is partially responsible for the recent up ticks as oil inches towards the 100 mark.
However, the price of oil is not only about demand and supply, but also is related to future demand and future supply. As demand has been growing we have to remember that oil reserves are growing at less that .75% per year. In the past two decades new reserves have been discovered at the rate of about 3% per year. What this means is that if oil demand has grown by an average of 12% a year over the past decade then new reserves have only been created at one fourth that level clearly implying that into the future there will be serious supply constraints. While high oil prices will spur on new oil explorations, the cycle of discovery to actual oil production does take a few years to achieve.
Long term economic modeling will suggest that a recession on a world wide scale may perhaps be the best thing to calm things down, the simple truth is that the engines that are pumping away in the emerging markets, and consumer led demand will be hard to reign in. The US was consuming 16 million barrels a day in the 1970’s and today its consuming 22 million barrels but the growth has been elsewhere. Try and imagine if every Chinese and Indian move to own an automobile, scary thought right?
To understand this phenomenal rise we have to look at the massive demand for energy that growth in India and China have been witnessing. China’s demand for oil has more than tripled in these seven odd years. There is little evidence that this global demand will slow down and a world recession, while possible, will have to be quite severe to bring this engine to a halt.
As OPEC ministers meet in Saudi Arabia it is not only clear that an output increase is not on the cards but surprisingly some members are arguing that perhaps it is time to dump the dollar as the reference pricing currency. While a continued fall in the greenback value will hurt the purchasing power of oil earnings, and the market will price in ‘compensatory increases’ for the price of oil. This is partially responsible for the recent up ticks as oil inches towards the 100 mark.
However, the price of oil is not only about demand and supply, but also is related to future demand and future supply. As demand has been growing we have to remember that oil reserves are growing at less that .75% per year. In the past two decades new reserves have been discovered at the rate of about 3% per year. What this means is that if oil demand has grown by an average of 12% a year over the past decade then new reserves have only been created at one fourth that level clearly implying that into the future there will be serious supply constraints. While high oil prices will spur on new oil explorations, the cycle of discovery to actual oil production does take a few years to achieve.
Long term economic modeling will suggest that a recession on a world wide scale may perhaps be the best thing to calm things down, the simple truth is that the engines that are pumping away in the emerging markets, and consumer led demand will be hard to reign in. The US was consuming 16 million barrels a day in the 1970’s and today its consuming 22 million barrels but the growth has been elsewhere. Try and imagine if every Chinese and Indian move to own an automobile, scary thought right?
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Sher View: Pakistan: a fragile moment.
After a jet lagged appearance on Riz Khan's talk show on Al Jazeera International, I have had time to reflect a little more deeply on the situation in my country. To say these are precarious times would be an understatement; Pakistan is perhaps at its most fragile moment since its independence in 1947. It is blatantly clear that self interest, which has been the hall mark of most of the nations leaders, be they in uniform or not, has begun to unfold in a sadistic soup of side deals, broken promises, exiles and finally the show of the power of the gun muzzle through 'emergency powers'. 160 million souls have now been again imprisoned behind the shadow of a political intent that is clearly only serving the handful who have decided to determine what is best for the country.
Sadly this attitude and apathy is not confined to Pakistanis only; the United States and others have taken the position of a rhetorical slap on the hand of a general who has gone mad, while hoping their political contriving with just one political leader might be the solution. In the backdrop of this the country's former Chief Justice, with perhaps the record of being the only Chief of an apex court to be dismissed twice in succession, has forgotten his oath to uphold law and taken to supporting a political rather than a legal position.
As emails pour in from observers and friends from abroad wondering why Pakistan is trying to commit political suicide there is a lack of solutions. As the general promises elections one can only wonder if these elections, if and when they are held, can mean anything with an election commission that will partial or indeed with only one political party being a serious contender. It is all the more baffling to note that in the middle of this turmoil an extremist insurgency continues in Waziristan and Swat where militant Islamists have raid their own flags, torn down Pakistan's flag and essentially declared their own Emirate. If the general wanted to combat extremism there is no evidence that he has moved against those elements who clearly have committed treasonable acts and even more surprisingly the former Chief Justice has not felt it worthy to condemn what is clearly an act of treason.
Interestingly the view that some might feel, in the West, that between General Musharaf and Benazir Bhutto there is perhaps a possibility to curb 'terrorism'. In the first place home grown militancy is not linked to Al Qadea, but more a knee jerk reaction to Musharraf's failure to deal with the causes of the resentment within the masses. There is no doubt in my mind that unless a broad based return to a truly democratic system does not occur the political and social will to deal with militancy will not emerge. It is clear that even the religious political parties do not want militancy like that in Waziristan but this is something that has not been understood by General Musharraf and his minders.
It would seem that as this political stalemate continues, even though a placating promise of an election might be some ray of hope, the reality is these are all truncated solutions. There is not enough people power on the streets to topple the general and perhaps only Imran Khan, cricketer turn politician understands that unless the students do not take to the streets the only hope is that the generals comrades in uniform either convince him to back down or take the measures to be a true obundsman for the country and bring some change to the system. Yet will the politicians promise in return not to go back to corruption and nepotism which seems to have been the hallmark of each civilian government. This is, as I said, a fragile moment and its time for Pakistanis to think of the country and not themselves.
Sadly this attitude and apathy is not confined to Pakistanis only; the United States and others have taken the position of a rhetorical slap on the hand of a general who has gone mad, while hoping their political contriving with just one political leader might be the solution. In the backdrop of this the country's former Chief Justice, with perhaps the record of being the only Chief of an apex court to be dismissed twice in succession, has forgotten his oath to uphold law and taken to supporting a political rather than a legal position.
As emails pour in from observers and friends from abroad wondering why Pakistan is trying to commit political suicide there is a lack of solutions. As the general promises elections one can only wonder if these elections, if and when they are held, can mean anything with an election commission that will partial or indeed with only one political party being a serious contender. It is all the more baffling to note that in the middle of this turmoil an extremist insurgency continues in Waziristan and Swat where militant Islamists have raid their own flags, torn down Pakistan's flag and essentially declared their own Emirate. If the general wanted to combat extremism there is no evidence that he has moved against those elements who clearly have committed treasonable acts and even more surprisingly the former Chief Justice has not felt it worthy to condemn what is clearly an act of treason.
Interestingly the view that some might feel, in the West, that between General Musharaf and Benazir Bhutto there is perhaps a possibility to curb 'terrorism'. In the first place home grown militancy is not linked to Al Qadea, but more a knee jerk reaction to Musharraf's failure to deal with the causes of the resentment within the masses. There is no doubt in my mind that unless a broad based return to a truly democratic system does not occur the political and social will to deal with militancy will not emerge. It is clear that even the religious political parties do not want militancy like that in Waziristan but this is something that has not been understood by General Musharraf and his minders.
It would seem that as this political stalemate continues, even though a placating promise of an election might be some ray of hope, the reality is these are all truncated solutions. There is not enough people power on the streets to topple the general and perhaps only Imran Khan, cricketer turn politician understands that unless the students do not take to the streets the only hope is that the generals comrades in uniform either convince him to back down or take the measures to be a true obundsman for the country and bring some change to the system. Yet will the politicians promise in return not to go back to corruption and nepotism which seems to have been the hallmark of each civilian government. This is, as I said, a fragile moment and its time for Pakistanis to think of the country and not themselves.
Thursday, November 8, 2007
Sher View: The General Totters
Being in the boots of General Pervez Musharraf is not one of the things many Pakistanis would desire, particularly right at this moment as he implements the suspension of the Constitution and imposes total military rule -- against the warning of the Bush Administration -- in one of America's longtime allies in the volatile South Asia region.
Faced with a possible Supreme Court judgment that would have gone against his Presidency, a controversial deal with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the bundling off of another former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the rising pressure of militants in his own backyard, clearly General Musharraf was and is a cornered man.
For the past year or so the military strongman clearly lost his touch, if not the political momentum: his handling of the firing of the Supreme Court Chief Justice and storming of the Lal (Red) Mosque barely 200 meters from the Military Intelligence Headquarters were more than mere embarrassments; they showed that the General did have a conspicuous chink in his armor.
While he tried a political foxtrot in the last few months favoring Benazir Bhutto to return in exchange for an amnesty on possible convictions against her on corruption charges -- presumably with an understanding from Ms. Bhutto that the General would remain as the President -- it was becoming clear that the General was not politically savvy about what he was getting himself into. His handling of sending Nawaz Sharif back into political exile in Saudi Arabia -- the country that had guaranteed Mr. Sharif not returning to Pakistan for at least ten years -- clearly showed that the General was picking his favorites among which political opponents would be permitted to come back home from abroad..
What happens next?
The Bush Administration -- which gave Pakistan more than $10 billion, mostly in military aid, since General Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999 -- is scarcely pleased with what the General has donem It is more likely that the Europeans will take economically effective steps against Pakistan’s regime. The Americans will have to balance things given that Musharraf will use the martial law as the necessary weapon he needs to go after the militants of Al Qaeda and Taliban. With press freedoms curtailed or restricted, and military force rather than para-military rangers fighting the militants, his bet will be for quick results if Mr. Musharraf wants some semblance of acceptability in the White House again..
While it is possible that there will be mass political rallies against him in Pakistan -- a land of 177 million Muslims of many persuasions -- it is highly unlikely that General Musharraf and his generals will be as tolerant of street demonstrations as they were during the uproar over the Supreme Court Chief Justice's firing. Benazir Bhutto will perhaps come out of this politically for the worse, finding her deal with the General scuttled. And even though she was acquiring some kudos for speaking out against terrorism after the attack on her convoy upon her return to Pakistan from her exile in Dubai,, she will be hard pressed to prove that democracy was really her sole motive for returning to Pakistan.
The martial law and the General’s sudden about-face actually will favor Nawaz Sharif, who in exile with the Saudis as their "guest," is going to gain the most from this turn of events. It will help him all the more since it seems that the United States had pressed both the General and Benazir Bhutto to come to some understanding; I am told reliably that some American officials urged Musharraf not to undertake any discussions with Nawaz Sharif.
In the street politics of Pakistan this is a huge dividend that Mr. Sharif can encash as and when he wants.
It is possible that General Musharraf acted to pre-empt any dissension within the army ranks. With the November 15th court judgment expected against General Musharraf's presidential election, it is possible his generals were getting uncomfortable about his personalization of the political challenges before the country.
It would well be that the martial law might have staved off any possible attempts by nationalist inspired Generals within the army. One of the most difficult aspects to fathom will be the reaction of the command line generals who have not always felt comfortable with performing martial law duties. Even though since the times of General Zia ul Haq -- one of Mr. Musharraf's predecessors as army chief and president-by-coup -- the army was highly politicized, it cannot be guaranteed that these generals will follow the edict of a President and Chief of Army Staff who seems to be battling more for his life than for his country.
For Pakistan and the region this is a precarious and fragile moment, and martial laws may not be the solution. While dealing with the militants may seem easier by comparison, there is no doubt that the political drama that is unfolding will not end so easily.
General Musharraf has merely written out the first act of a drama the Pakistani public is well versed in, but as with all such dramas the audience has no loyalties. Sadly enough, with Ms. Bhutto'’s political juggling and Mr. Sharif fuming in Saudi Arabia as a "guest," the chances are that General Musharraf will have to have a head-on clash with political forces within the country and most likely within the army.
Only the next few weeks will tell us if the General has truly tottered and fallen. Until then, this past weekend's troubling developments will remain a precarious tangle in Pakistan’s sad political history of military meddling, Islamist maneuverings, and the shredding of the social order.
America may well lose a key ally in the region in its war against global terrorism. It is difficult not to despair about Pakistan's prospects. It is even more difficult bot to despair over the incipient possibility that America's enormous economic, military and political investment in Pakistan may well have been for nought.
Faced with a possible Supreme Court judgment that would have gone against his Presidency, a controversial deal with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the bundling off of another former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the rising pressure of militants in his own backyard, clearly General Musharraf was and is a cornered man.
For the past year or so the military strongman clearly lost his touch, if not the political momentum: his handling of the firing of the Supreme Court Chief Justice and storming of the Lal (Red) Mosque barely 200 meters from the Military Intelligence Headquarters were more than mere embarrassments; they showed that the General did have a conspicuous chink in his armor.
While he tried a political foxtrot in the last few months favoring Benazir Bhutto to return in exchange for an amnesty on possible convictions against her on corruption charges -- presumably with an understanding from Ms. Bhutto that the General would remain as the President -- it was becoming clear that the General was not politically savvy about what he was getting himself into. His handling of sending Nawaz Sharif back into political exile in Saudi Arabia -- the country that had guaranteed Mr. Sharif not returning to Pakistan for at least ten years -- clearly showed that the General was picking his favorites among which political opponents would be permitted to come back home from abroad..
What happens next?
The Bush Administration -- which gave Pakistan more than $10 billion, mostly in military aid, since General Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999 -- is scarcely pleased with what the General has donem It is more likely that the Europeans will take economically effective steps against Pakistan’s regime. The Americans will have to balance things given that Musharraf will use the martial law as the necessary weapon he needs to go after the militants of Al Qaeda and Taliban. With press freedoms curtailed or restricted, and military force rather than para-military rangers fighting the militants, his bet will be for quick results if Mr. Musharraf wants some semblance of acceptability in the White House again..
While it is possible that there will be mass political rallies against him in Pakistan -- a land of 177 million Muslims of many persuasions -- it is highly unlikely that General Musharraf and his generals will be as tolerant of street demonstrations as they were during the uproar over the Supreme Court Chief Justice's firing. Benazir Bhutto will perhaps come out of this politically for the worse, finding her deal with the General scuttled. And even though she was acquiring some kudos for speaking out against terrorism after the attack on her convoy upon her return to Pakistan from her exile in Dubai,, she will be hard pressed to prove that democracy was really her sole motive for returning to Pakistan.
The martial law and the General’s sudden about-face actually will favor Nawaz Sharif, who in exile with the Saudis as their "guest," is going to gain the most from this turn of events. It will help him all the more since it seems that the United States had pressed both the General and Benazir Bhutto to come to some understanding; I am told reliably that some American officials urged Musharraf not to undertake any discussions with Nawaz Sharif.
In the street politics of Pakistan this is a huge dividend that Mr. Sharif can encash as and when he wants.
It is possible that General Musharraf acted to pre-empt any dissension within the army ranks. With the November 15th court judgment expected against General Musharraf's presidential election, it is possible his generals were getting uncomfortable about his personalization of the political challenges before the country.
It would well be that the martial law might have staved off any possible attempts by nationalist inspired Generals within the army. One of the most difficult aspects to fathom will be the reaction of the command line generals who have not always felt comfortable with performing martial law duties. Even though since the times of General Zia ul Haq -- one of Mr. Musharraf's predecessors as army chief and president-by-coup -- the army was highly politicized, it cannot be guaranteed that these generals will follow the edict of a President and Chief of Army Staff who seems to be battling more for his life than for his country.
For Pakistan and the region this is a precarious and fragile moment, and martial laws may not be the solution. While dealing with the militants may seem easier by comparison, there is no doubt that the political drama that is unfolding will not end so easily.
General Musharraf has merely written out the first act of a drama the Pakistani public is well versed in, but as with all such dramas the audience has no loyalties. Sadly enough, with Ms. Bhutto'’s political juggling and Mr. Sharif fuming in Saudi Arabia as a "guest," the chances are that General Musharraf will have to have a head-on clash with political forces within the country and most likely within the army.
Only the next few weeks will tell us if the General has truly tottered and fallen. Until then, this past weekend's troubling developments will remain a precarious tangle in Pakistan’s sad political history of military meddling, Islamist maneuverings, and the shredding of the social order.
America may well lose a key ally in the region in its war against global terrorism. It is difficult not to despair about Pakistan's prospects. It is even more difficult bot to despair over the incipient possibility that America's enormous economic, military and political investment in Pakistan may well have been for nought.
Sher View: The General Totters
Being in the boots of General Pervez Musharraf is not one of the things many Pakistanis would desire, particularly right at this moment as he implements the suspension of the Constitution and imposes total military rule -- against the warning of the Bush Administration -- in one of America's longtime allies in the volatile South Asia region.
Faced with a possible Supreme Court judgment that would have gone against his Presidency, a controversial deal with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the bundling off of another former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the rising pressure of militants in his own backyard, clearly General Musharraf was and is a cornered man.
For the past year or so the military strongman clearly lost his touch, if not the political momentum: his handling of the firing of the Supreme Court Chief Justice and storming of the Lal (Red) Mosque barely 200 meters from the Military Intelligence Headquarters were more than mere embarrassments; they showed that the General did have a conspicuous chink in his armor.
While he tried a political foxtrot in the last few months favoring Benazir Bhutto to return in exchange for an amnesty on possible convictions against her on corruption charges -- presumably with an understanding from Ms. Bhutto that the General would remain as the President -- it was becoming clear that the General was not politically savvy about what he was getting himself into. His handling of sending Nawaz Sharif back into political exile in Saudi Arabia -- the country that had guaranteed Mr. Sharif not returning to Pakistan for at least ten years -- clearly showed that the General was picking his favorites among which political opponents would be permitted to come back home from abroad..
What happens next?
The Bush Administration -- which gave Pakistan more than $10 billion, mostly in military aid, since General Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999 -- is scarcely pleased with what the General has donem It is more likely that the Europeans will take economically effective steps against Pakistan’s regime. The Americans will have to balance things given that Musharraf will use the martial law as the necessary weapon he needs to go after the militants of Al Qaeda and Taliban. With press freedoms curtailed or restricted, and military force rather than para-military rangers fighting the militants, his bet will be for quick results if Mr. Musharraf wants some semblance of acceptability in the White House again..
While it is possible that there will be mass political rallies against him in Pakistan -- a land of 177 million Muslims of many persuasions -- it is highly unlikely that General Musharraf and his generals will be as tolerant of street demonstrations as they were during the uproar over the Supreme Court Chief Justice's firing. Benazir Bhutto will perhaps come out of this politically for the worse, finding her deal with the General scuttled. And even though she was acquiring some kudos for speaking out against terrorism after the attack on her convoy upon her return to Pakistan from her exile in Dubai,, she will be hard pressed to prove that democracy was really her sole motive for returning to Pakistan.
The martial law and the General’s sudden about-face actually will favor Nawaz Sharif, who in exile with the Saudis as their "guest," is going to gain the most from this turn of events. It will help him all the more since it seems that the United States had pressed both the General and Benazir Bhutto to come to some understanding; I am told reliably that some American officials urged Musharraf not to undertake any discussions with Nawaz Sharif.
In the street politics of Pakistan this is a huge dividend that Mr. Sharif can encash as and when he wants.
It is possible that General Musharraf acted to pre-empt any dissension within the army ranks. With the November 15th court judgment expected against General Musharraf's presidential election, it is possible his generals were getting uncomfortable about his personalization of the political challenges before the country.
It would well be that the martial law might have staved off any possible attempts by nationalist inspired Generals within the army. One of the most difficult aspects to fathom will be the reaction of the command line generals who have not always felt comfortable with performing martial law duties. Even though since the times of General Zia ul Haq -- one of Mr. Musharraf's predecessors as army chief and president-by-coup -- the army was highly politicized, it cannot be guaranteed that these generals will follow the edict of a President and Chief of Army Staff who seems to be battling more for his life than for his country.
For Pakistan and the region this is a precarious and fragile moment, and martial laws may not be the solution. While dealing with the militants may seem easier by comparison, there is no doubt that the political drama that is unfolding will not end so easily.
General Musharraf has merely written out the first act of a drama the Pakistani public is well versed in, but as with all such dramas the audience has no loyalties. Sadly enough, with Ms. Bhutto'’s political juggling and Mr. Sharif fuming in Saudi Arabia as a "guest," the chances are that General Musharraf will have to have a head-on clash with political forces within the country and most likely within the army.
Only the next few weeks will tell us if the General has truly tottered and fallen. Until then, this past weekend's troubling developments will remain a precarious tangle in Pakistan’s sad political history of military meddling, Islamist maneuverings, and the shredding of the social order.
America may well lose a key ally in the region in its war against global terrorism. It is difficult not to despair about Pakistan's prospects. It is even more difficult bot to despair over the incipient possibility that America's enormous economic, military and political investment in Pakistan may well have been for nought.
Faced with a possible Supreme Court judgment that would have gone against his Presidency, a controversial deal with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the bundling off of another former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the rising pressure of militants in his own backyard, clearly General Musharraf was and is a cornered man.
For the past year or so the military strongman clearly lost his touch, if not the political momentum: his handling of the firing of the Supreme Court Chief Justice and storming of the Lal (Red) Mosque barely 200 meters from the Military Intelligence Headquarters were more than mere embarrassments; they showed that the General did have a conspicuous chink in his armor.
While he tried a political foxtrot in the last few months favoring Benazir Bhutto to return in exchange for an amnesty on possible convictions against her on corruption charges -- presumably with an understanding from Ms. Bhutto that the General would remain as the President -- it was becoming clear that the General was not politically savvy about what he was getting himself into. His handling of sending Nawaz Sharif back into political exile in Saudi Arabia -- the country that had guaranteed Mr. Sharif not returning to Pakistan for at least ten years -- clearly showed that the General was picking his favorites among which political opponents would be permitted to come back home from abroad..
What happens next?
The Bush Administration -- which gave Pakistan more than $10 billion, mostly in military aid, since General Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999 -- is scarcely pleased with what the General has donem It is more likely that the Europeans will take economically effective steps against Pakistan’s regime. The Americans will have to balance things given that Musharraf will use the martial law as the necessary weapon he needs to go after the militants of Al Qaeda and Taliban. With press freedoms curtailed or restricted, and military force rather than para-military rangers fighting the militants, his bet will be for quick results if Mr. Musharraf wants some semblance of acceptability in the White House again..
While it is possible that there will be mass political rallies against him in Pakistan -- a land of 177 million Muslims of many persuasions -- it is highly unlikely that General Musharraf and his generals will be as tolerant of street demonstrations as they were during the uproar over the Supreme Court Chief Justice's firing. Benazir Bhutto will perhaps come out of this politically for the worse, finding her deal with the General scuttled. And even though she was acquiring some kudos for speaking out against terrorism after the attack on her convoy upon her return to Pakistan from her exile in Dubai,, she will be hard pressed to prove that democracy was really her sole motive for returning to Pakistan.
The martial law and the General’s sudden about-face actually will favor Nawaz Sharif, who in exile with the Saudis as their "guest," is going to gain the most from this turn of events. It will help him all the more since it seems that the United States had pressed both the General and Benazir Bhutto to come to some understanding; I am told reliably that some American officials urged Musharraf not to undertake any discussions with Nawaz Sharif.
In the street politics of Pakistan this is a huge dividend that Mr. Sharif can encash as and when he wants.
It is possible that General Musharraf acted to pre-empt any dissension within the army ranks. With the November 15th court judgment expected against General Musharraf's presidential election, it is possible his generals were getting uncomfortable about his personalization of the political challenges before the country.
It would well be that the martial law might have staved off any possible attempts by nationalist inspired Generals within the army. One of the most difficult aspects to fathom will be the reaction of the command line generals who have not always felt comfortable with performing martial law duties. Even though since the times of General Zia ul Haq -- one of Mr. Musharraf's predecessors as army chief and president-by-coup -- the army was highly politicized, it cannot be guaranteed that these generals will follow the edict of a President and Chief of Army Staff who seems to be battling more for his life than for his country.
For Pakistan and the region this is a precarious and fragile moment, and martial laws may not be the solution. While dealing with the militants may seem easier by comparison, there is no doubt that the political drama that is unfolding will not end so easily.
General Musharraf has merely written out the first act of a drama the Pakistani public is well versed in, but as with all such dramas the audience has no loyalties. Sadly enough, with Ms. Bhutto'’s political juggling and Mr. Sharif fuming in Saudi Arabia as a "guest," the chances are that General Musharraf will have to have a head-on clash with political forces within the country and most likely within the army.
Only the next few weeks will tell us if the General has truly tottered and fallen. Until then, this past weekend's troubling developments will remain a precarious tangle in Pakistan’s sad political history of military meddling, Islamist maneuverings, and the shredding of the social order.
America may well lose a key ally in the region in its war against global terrorism. It is difficult not to despair about Pakistan's prospects. It is even more difficult bot to despair over the incipient possibility that America's enormous economic, military and political investment in Pakistan may well have been for nought.
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