Collapse of the Afghan Army: An Overview

 As the Taliban rolled into the outskirts of Kabul it was evident that the Afghan army was crumbling, in many cases without a shot being fired. The collapse was disheartening to many, so much so that President Biden chided that if Afghans were not willing to fight for their own country how could they expect US soldiers to die for them. Indeed one would have expected that 20 years of training and billions of dollars on equipment and training costs surely the end result would or could have been a better fighting force. 

However, a summary dismissal of the Afghan army performance ignores the many factors that led to such a sorry state of affairs. The end result of a surrender ignores the gradual erosion of the will to fight that commenced 20 odd months before the recent 'victory' of the Taliban. While such a debacle warrants a full and deeper analysis it might be worth one's while to summarise the factors that led to the Afghan army's meek dissolution.

Structure of the Afghan Armed Forces.

The Afghan army was basically rebuilt after the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, even though at that point the Taliban controlled army was not a cohesive military as the Taliban preferred, and perhaps still prefer, to consider their idealised Taliban militia fighters as the mainstay of military might. Since 2001 the US and its NATO allies poured money and equipment and personnel to train and build a new army.  The 200,000 strong military that emerged was composed of a good proportion of the ethnic minorities of Hazara, Tajiks and Uzbeks, mixed with progressive Pushtuns. While pains were taken to avoid units to be raised along tribal and ethnic fault lines a good measure of former military commanders or warlords we inducted into the army to reduce the ability of former warlords to have private armies.

However, this also was the basic catalyst for nepotism and resulted in a military force which was very top heavy with officers and that too in senior ranks disproportionately more than soldiers under their command. There are some suggestions that in 2019 there were as many as 1000 senior officers with ranks above brigadier. Of the 200,000 inducted soldiers it is estimated that about 21,000 were the commando soldiers composed of seven battalions and represented the only effective fighting force in the Afghan army. It is estimated that these battalions were engaged in 80% of the fighting against the Taliban. Within these units, by and large, morale was high and over the two odd decades they had won the respect of their American and NATO supporters. Today it is estimated that as Kabul fell to the Taliban these former commandos moved into the Panjshir valley and joined forces with the Northern Alliance (also now referred to as the Norther Resistance Front).

Operational Pattern of the Afghan Army.

Since 2001 the role of the Afghan army in battling the Taliban progressed over various phases. From an initial force that 'made up the numbers' for US forces, who did the bulk of the fighting, the Afghan army, and mainly its commando battalions, were carrying out independent operations against the Taliban. In all operations of the Afghan army air support, remote battlefield intelligence (drones, satellites etc) all came from US and NATO forces. Since 2015 the Afghan airforce and air wing of the Army was slowly being rebuilt but at the time of the Taliban take over still relied on operational support, (target selection and guidance), maintenance and engineering solely on US forces or their civilian contractors. 

Typical missions carried out by the Afghan commando units would be soldiers being ferried into a battle zone by helicopter, closely overseen by satellite and drone surveillance and when threats emerged then US or NATO planes would be called in to neutralise such threats. These missions were largely successful when it came to direct combat with the Taliban, but once the mission was over the countryside was conceded back to the Taliban as local and district administration of the Karzai and then the Ghani governments was ineffective and in many cases corrupt. 

Afghan army operations were heavily if not entirely reliant on the combat operational support that the US and NATO forces provided them and on the ability to maintain the equipment provided to them. One major failing of the US planners was that they did not consider the educational and technical weakness of the average solider of the Afghan army and thus giving them equipment that required a relatively well developed technical ability to operate and maintain the equipment created inherit weaknesses in the fighting force. This problem got more acute after 2014 when President Obama first announced an intention to withdraw and substantial cuts in aid and operational support personnel occurred. 

It would seem that no strategic thinking went into planning and developing an Afghan Army which could function independently. US officials, especially the skeptics, would argue that the Afghan soldier never had the tools and skills to function as an independent military force. This is an over simplification as numerous military forces exist in the region who function independently and effectively. If forward thinking had been applied then an effective military force could have been created from the beginning with the objective that in a decade or so it should be able to operate independently. 

Ineffective Political Governance.

After the ouster of the Taliban in 2001 the government that was assembled was based on the support of the waring factions that had been fighting the Taliban prior to 2001. This was in principle the Northern Alliance and warlords from Uzbek and Tajik ethnic minorities. Like minded Pushtuns also assembled around the Karzai government but by and large the administration at provincial and district levels was based off existing tribal hierarchies. These local administrative set ups had largely remained unchanged during the Taliban time and even before. During times of strife these tribal loyalties were not only negotiable but also at time dual in nature owing their loyalties to both the Kabul government and the Taliban as the situation so demanded. 

However, years of civil war had taught these local administrations that relying on funding from a central government was not feasible and hence tribal chiefs and war lords developed their own funding from road blocks, taxing the local businesses and in some cases from the narco trade. In the 20 years that the US was trying to rebuild Afghanistan not one attempt was made to overhaul the corrupt administrative system which was expected to deliver security and basic necessities to the population. While on paper massive funding, to the tune of $144 billion, was made available to the government in Kabul, the actual funds that saw their way into the 34 provinces and 421 districts of Afghanistan were negligible. 

While a number of aid agencies were operating in the provinces in the areas of health care and social welfare their operations were not large enough to fill the void from lack of governmental services. In addition the funding that Kabul was allocating was being pilfered and only nominal progress was being shown on the ground to get further funds released. In many instances police and local officials were not paid their salaries on time and from 2015 onwards delays of nine months in salaries were common. 

While the Kabul government concentrated on security in Kabul itself, after 2015 it developed a policy to concentrate only on the major provincial centres leaving much of the countryside not administered from Kabul. The Taliban, on the other hand, had developed an effective policy to at least provide security in these far flung districts even if they did not have the means to provide health care and other amenities. Most Afghans in the rural areas were tired of decades of war and insecurity and with the Taliban offering security and no extortion and bribes at checkpoints they controlled they were winning the hearts of the rural population of the country. 

In contrast the US and its allied government in Kabul was seen more as an occupying force and in every sense the US policy makers were making the same mistakes they made in Vietnam. Corruption was so rampant that it infected the Afghan army too. It was normal for military commanders to sell fuel and ammunition on the black market and in some cases even military equipment ended up with warlords and eventually Taliban hands. While in time a deeper analysis will be done of the US debacle in Afghanistan it still remains a puzzle as to why the IUS and its allies did not take any measures to stop the corruption of the Karzai and Ghani governments? 

US policy short comings.

Apart from the fact that the US decision to invade Afghanistan (and Iraq) was faulted, (you don't invade a whole country to capture one man), polices and actions post invasion were ill thought and poorly executed. If the aim was to build a modern and progressive Afghanistan than working with the very war lords who had subjugated the Afghan people was hardly a solution for the long term. Military objectives were primary to US policy makers and political and social reform remained a step child of US policy in Afghanistan. Mediocre advisers who were either Afghans or supposed experts on the country sang from a hymn page which had no connection with the ground realities of the country. 

From 2014 US policy on Afghanistan was seeking not only disengagement from a war they knew they were not going to win but was also marked by an endless search for an exit strategy. President Obama after initially increasing the troops on the ground eventually began to talk of ending the war and a withdrawal of US troops. However, Obama fell short of specifying a timeline or a more detailed policy. His successor Donald Trump pushed ahead with a withdrawal and held meetings with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, to arrive at what is termed as the Doha Agreement. Under the agreement the US agreed with the Taliban that troops would be reduced from 13,000 to 2,500, which was promptly done, and that by May 1, 2020 all US troops would leave Afghan soil. 

What was bizarre about these talks and the subsequent agreement was that the existing government in Kabul were excluded from the talks. In addition no framework or conditions other than a Taliban undertaking not to attack US and NATO troops was mentioned in the agreement. Most importantly no political settlement or indication of the future government of Afghanistan was mentioned in the agreement. In essence this was a 'cut and run' deal done by the outgoing Trump administration in haste and perhaps partially to leave the Biden administration a 'hot potato' to handle. The Biden policy was to continue with the Trump-Taliban deal, however to extend the exist date from May 2020 to August 31st 2021 but did not push the Taliban for working towards a comprehensive peace deal with the government in Kabul. 

The Doha agreement was to have a major impact on the morale of the Afghan army. Those elements of the Afghan commando battalions who had been at the forefront of the fighting against the Taliban felt like 'a dagger had been put through their heart' when they heard of the agreement. This was all the more telling considering that through all of 2019, when the agreement was being negotiated in Doha, Taliban attacks on Afghan security forces were at their highest peak (8,204 attacks). In contrast attacks on US and NATO forces were waning and it was clear to the Afghan army that they were on their own. 

The Biden administration is being slammed for a sharp and hasty pull out from Afghanistan where in fairness both Biden and Trump should carry that burden. One would indeed have expected that Biden could have, at the time of extending the withdrawal date, encouraged and insisted on the Taliban and the Ghani government sorting out a peace deal. The Taliban it was said was willing to speak to the government in Kabul provided Ghani resigned and his successor held such talks. Biden could have renegotiated various aspects of the Doha Agreement to ensure that Taliban were also to implement steps essential for an inclusive government. 

Perhaps the gravest damage to the morale of the Afghan army was the absence of any representation of the Kabul government in the Doha talks. These were signals to the rank and file that the US was willing to abandon them for the sake of securing a safe withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Taliban were better organised to exploit this gapping weakness of the Doha talks by sending messages into the many districts that the US was 'abandoning the Ghani government and its establishment'. This explains why the Taliban was able to take over many of the districts of Afghanistan without a bullet being fired as it pitched to local tribal chiefs that they would be better served with a Taliban government. 

Compromised Operational Readiness.

Due to massive corruption in the senior ranks of the Afghan armed forces and the ministry of defence in Kabul the Afghan army was in a pathetic state of operational readiness. While some of commando units were organised enough to fight even their resolve was being tested each month with no salaries, shortages of ammunition and most importantly the lack of any air support. When the US announced their pull out in Feb 2020, the many contractors hired to maintain and support Afghan army equipment including its small air force, also left Afghanistan. The Afghan army's fighting units suddenly found that they were not trained to fight without air support and with out over the horizon intelligence gathering they were in a sense fighting blind. 

On the ground the morale of these few fighting units was further eroded when they saw Taliban forces using American weapons and in many cases driving US Humvees and armoured vehicles. The Taliban tactics of hit and run had been effective through out the many years of them fighting US and NATO forces, and while the Afghan commandos were also picking  selective fights they lacked the air power to decisively defeat the Taliban in such encounters. As the tide turned in 2019 and most of 2020 the Ghani government insisted on holding on to small rural districts rather than withdraw to strategic highways and town centers. This depleted the effectiveness of the Afghan commandos who knew that most of the 180,000 plus Afghan army was just numbers of paper. 

In conclusion it was would be wrong to say that the Afghan army was not prepared to fight for their country. They had been built and trained by the US in a manner which required a broad based change in the mind set of military and political leadership. The US policy makers ignored that a military cannot function in a political and administrative vacuum. History has taught us that one cannot have military solutions to what are essentially political issues. The combination of all the elements mentioned above indicate that there was a systemic failure in Afghanistan and this principally rests upon the planning and direction of that plan from day one. Most damaging to the military's will to fight were the depth and extent of the  corruption in the country and the narrow self interest of the United States in negotiating their own withdrawal with little regard for the future of Afghanistan. The battle with the Taliban was being lost since a decade ago as the effort to win the hearts of the people in the countryside was failing. 

A "New" Afghanistan: Blessing or Anathema.

 In October 2001 those who saw American bombers drop tons of bombs on a Taliban controlled Afghanistan may have  felt it was a defining moment for the country. Almost two decades to the day we now have another defining moment for Afghanistan and the region with the Taliban's return to power. A 'new' Afghanistan is emerging not only because the Taliban are trying to impress upon us that they have changed, but because ground realities of Afghan society have changed. Gone are the war lords and private armies that helped the US and its allies. The new generation of Afghans, in the cities especially, may not be so submissive to the Taliban as they were in 1996. The West has pulled out with clarity that they do now wish to be involved in the country they tried to build back because the emotional, material and political cost was no more tenable. 

USA argues that if the purpose of the invasion in 2001 was to stop terrorist activity targeted against America then they see their Afghan war as a success. However, this is far from the truth because leaving Afghanistan in the manner they have and the Taliban's lack of cohesiveness on this issue means that countries fearing terrorist activity have to be more worried. There is a historical perspective to the Taliban's position on terrorism and its track record that influences its conduct in the future.

Since its inception the Taliban's central leadership has been firm only in terms of spiritual leadership. This central leadership has had some claims on spiritual and religious leadership and some of its senior leaders have either attended higher religious education or have studied under the tutelage of respected ulema (teachers) of Islam. However, local commanders of the Taliban, especially in far flung provinces, were lacking the knowledge and experience to be considered capable of even understanding the basics of Islamic traditions. This was true in the 1990's and even today holds true to a great extent. This explains the dichotomy in the way the Taliban have dealt with issues of women's rights, presence of foreign fighters and in general its conduct on social matters. 

Mullah Omar, who led the Taliban through the 1990's, relied heavily on the support of the local commanders and was surrounded by many who guided him on matters of policy. These local commanders used Pushtun codes of conduct in dealing with many issues. This explains why Mullah Omar refused to hand over Osama bun Laden to the Americans because under Pushtun code he was a guest and therefore under Pushtun code he was to be protected. The more modern minded 'mullahs' within Taliban felt that since bin Laden had continued to carry arms as a guest he had violated the code of protection and therefore could be handed over. In Mullah Omar's defence he did offer the US the option of trying Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan or sending him to Saudi Arabia to be tried under their laws, an offer Washington ignored.

This fractured leadership explains why the Taliban ended up having such contradictory policies where they banned prostitution and forced sexual slavery but still local commanders encouraged Arab and Pakistani fighters of Al Qadea to enslave women from the Uzbek and Tajik minorities. It seemed in many districts under Taliban control it was left to the local commander to decide if he thought foreign fighters were welcome or not. In most cases these commanders had little if any understanding of the issues of global terrorism and saw foreign fighters as allies who fought the Soviets alongside the Mujahideen and therefore were welcome. 

While the Taliban of today has presented a more understanding face when it comes to the issue of Afghanistan becoming a base for foreign fighters it does seem this is an assurance designed only for Western consumption. In 2021 when the Taliban swept through the country it released many prisoners which included about 2000 fighters of the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) including its leader Mullah Fazullah. Pakistans request to the Afghan Taliban to either hand over Mullah Fazullah to Pakistan or at least not to release him were ignored by Taliban. Interestingly there are a number of groups active in Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan who have some presence in Afghanistan and also receive tacit support from India. Some sources have claimed that the TTP is very much a terrorist group that has India's support even though India has, in the past, not been very warm to the Afghan Taliban. 

It is unlikely that the Taliban government will be able to curb existing militant groups from establishing some presence on their soil. There are already reports that some of the ultra conservative commanders within Taliban in provinces like Helmand, are not pleased with the 'concessions' the main leadership in Kabul is giving on issues of women's role in society. As these fissures grow it is highly likely that groups like ISIS-K (an off-shoot of ISIS) will draw these disgruntled Taliban to its ranks, as indeed it has done so in the past. On a more emotional perspective the Taliban take over of Afghanistan will be a boost to many militant groups in the region who may hope they can replicate the Taliban success elsewhere. 

In the years ahead the Taliban governments 'promise' of not allowing their country to be used as a base of any attack on another country will be put to test. However, there are subtle points to consider in the Taliban promise. While they may keep their 'promise' of not letting attacks be launched from their soil they cannot assure that attacks could be planned and supported from Afghanistan without any direct attacks from Afghan soil. It is highly likely that groups opposed to the US and its allies will slowly gravitate to Afghanistan and will set up shop in varying degrees. The groups may not need a 'friendly' government to make their presence felt, all they need is a government that is not actively seeking to shut them down and in this regard the Taliban may fit the bill. 

It is interesting to note that some elements within Pakistan have embraced and rejoiced at the Taliban victory in Afghanistan. The only positive one can see for Pakistan is that Kabul now has a government not hostile to Islamabad, however, this does not mean that the Taliban will reign in TTP. We have already seen a couple of attacks on the border areas of Pakistan carried out by TTP fighters operating from Afghanistan. Thus the notion that since Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the United States, had a major role in the creation of the Taliban in the 1990's it will continue to exert its influence today is not entirely correct. Without a doubt the relationship between Kabul and Islamabad will be a testing one, made all the more difficult with India wanting to not only mend fences with the Taliban but to counter act any influence that Pakistan (and perhaps China) might have in Kabul.

Western intelligence agencies are most certainly not comfortable with the changes that have happened within Afghanistan. First of all they these changes were too rapid for the agencies to develop new plans and relationships within Afghanistan that can give it the intelligence gathering capability to neutralise terrorist groups. Secondly, while at the district and village level the Taliban intelligence and knowledge may well be superior to that of the previous Afghan government, such intelligence is purely targeted towards elements who oppose the Taliban and may not necessarily be concerned about activities beyond the borders of Afghanistan. There are very deep questions to be answered about how the Taliban will develop an intelligence service capable of being useful to Western intelligence agencies. 

It is precisely these shortcomings which will attract the likes of ISIS, Al Qadea and dozens of other splinter groups to consider some sort of presence in Afghanistan. Such groups are assured that apart from the major cities, especially Kabul, they will have enough sympathisers within the far flung districts from amongst Afghans who have had a terrible experience of US and Western presence in the country. To the academics the biggest puzzle to solve is that how the United States went from being the country that helped the Mujahideen liberate Afghanistan from Soviet occupation to becoming the 'occupiers' who ended up being hated just as much as the Soviets?

Afghanistan Abandoned.

 As chaotic scenes of Afghanistan's fall to Taliban emerge we see a return of the Kalashnikov culture while the United States attempts to sugar coat what is essentially its defeat. Two decades ago few could have imagined that the ousted Taliban would ever return to power. In October 2001 US and its allies embarked on a war in Afghanistan with the ostensible reason to fight terrorism and rid the country of the Taliban who sheltered Al Qadea. In the two decades since then the US embarked on what it called 'nation building' with the aim to modernise Afghanistan and rebuild its armed forces as an eventual deterrent to the resurgence of the Taliban. 

Hamad Karazi was installed as the President who remained in power till 2014, winning re-election in controversial elections which were allegedly fraudulent. He was succeeded by Ashraf Ghani, who fled Kabul leaving it to the Taliban and thus bringing to the fore the current crisis. There is no denying that Afghans feel abandoned by the allies who not only propped these two Presidents over the past two decades but also promised a stronger country that could eventually stand on its own feet. 

There are many aspects to this debacle and is a text book case of how not to conduct such foreign adventures. The fall of Kabul is a failure of the United States and its allies as much as it is the failure of progressive Afghans and most of all the two governments of Karazai and Ghani. If the American current stance is that the purpose of their presence was to hold Al Qadea responsible for the attack on the US, then one has to ask when that was achieved ten years ago why was their presence still so overwhelming in the country? The usual answer is that US priorities were to help the Afghan government rebuild itself. However, it was well know that corruption was so rampant that all the money that poured into the country ended up lining the pockets of a highly corrupt group of people.

It would be wise to examine the implications of the current events and what led to this situation from the perspective of different actors and stakeholders. 

The United States of America.

Irrespective of how Washington paints the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fall of Kabul, the imagery vividly reminds us of the fall of Saigon in April 1975.

There are indeed distinctive differences between the political imperatives in 1975 as compared to 2021, yet many, even within the US, will see the withdrawal as abandoning allies. In so far as US involvement in Vietnam was to fight communism, their presence in Afghanistan was to fight Jihadism as professed by both the Taliban and Al Qadea. In 2001 the Taliban government in Kabul were hesitant to hand over Osama bin Laden which then led to a US invasion of the country. In a fragmented and divided Afghanistan forging an effective central government was a challenge well beyond the comprehension of American policy makers. $143 billion were poured into the Afghan government, of which $88 billion went towards arming and training a new Afghan army. 

American's were aware of the rampant corruption in Kabul and did little to create a governance to ensure that these funds were used effectively. Analysts suggest that as much as 35% of these funds went into private coffers and at no time were the people in Kabul held accountable. Much like the 1970's American policy makers were ignorant to the fact that one cannot find military solutions to what are essentially political problems. 

While the Taliban were defeated in 2001, they did not surrender but simply dissolved into the general population. Their fighters for most of the time were either farmers or ordinary citizens to then emerge from time to time to carry out attacks and then dissolve back into the population. The US and the newly formed Afghan army may well have controlled the major cities and strategic points in the country, yet there was a general feeling that large tracts of the countryside were the domain of the Taliban. 

Successive US administrations talked of leaving Afghanistan but the ground realities indicated that the Taliban threat was always nascent and ever present. When the administration of President Trump began to negotiate with the Taliban the writing on the wall was clear. More importantly, for the Taliban these negotiations gave them a legitimacy that they had lacked for most of the past twenty years. US allies in Kabul were largely ignored in this rapprochement with the Taliban and political watchers felt that perhaps a comprehensive agreement for a 'new Afghan' administration was bring forged with the Taliban. Events have since shown this was not the case and as President Biden plugged the plug announcing a full pullout Ashraf Ghani and his government were pretty much on their own. 

While the Taliban have been emphasising that they are not the same as 20 years ago, talking of forgiveness and women's rights it is obvious they seek, principally from Washington, a recognition of their government which is vital to them. Interestingly Western commentators are wary of believing that we have a Taliban 2.0, (a new version) and are talking of 'holding them accountable to their word'. While this may well be the need one wonders why they commentators do not hold Ashraf Ghani and Hama Karazai accountable for the billions of dollars that were stolen from the aid and assistance provided to the Afghan government over the past twenty years?

US and Afghanistan's neighbours will be keen to see the Taliban keep their word on not letting foreign fighters make the country a base for operations. Somehow it seems there is a veiled message that if the Taliban are not recognised and supported then all bets are off. Indeed remnants of Al Qadea and ISIS will be keen to view Afghan territory as a possible friendly soil to plant their seeds in. If in the future Afghanistan were to become a hub for terrorist activity it will pose some unique challenges for the US. Unlike 2001 when there were numerous anti-Taliban factions, namely the Northern Alliance, to ally with the US, given their withdrawal in 2021, will be hard pressed to find allies within Afghanistan who would trust them. 

The Taliban.

As we are flooded with images of the Taliban having taken Kabul, there is a postscript that the Taliban likes to attach that his is a 'new' Taliban unlike that from twenty years ago. Their initial messages  are of guaranteeing the rights of women (under their definition of the Sharia law) and seeking to form an inclusive government all designed to show this new face of the Taliban. They are keen to gain legitimacy more so from the international community and one could give them the benefit of the doubt in so far as they may well have changed from the Taliban of old. 

The Taliban are aware that in the past two decades the dynamics of Afghan society, mostly within the cities has changed. The role of women as a potent and effective force within society has been visible. While the Taliban will try and roll back some of these social changes it is more than likely that their acceptance of women to work is influenced by a realisation that some of the freedoms of the past two decades cannot simply be bottled up again. 

However, the Taliban are not a monolithic organisation with an effective internal structure of command and control. While they have tried to portray an image of a unified central leadership in reality across the 35 plus provinces of Afghanistan there will be local commanders with their own agenda of leadership. Further, the emphasis that the Taliban have placed on following Sharia law, while simplistic in rhetoric, means that interpretations of Sharia law may well vary amongst local leaders. 

In addition if there is a fall out between the international community, especially the leading Western nations, and the Taliban over their acceptance within the international community of nations then the Taliban may well abandon this new image they have been pushing forward. Already the news that Afghanistans reserves of nearly $10 billion will not be made available to the Taliban till clarity of the form of the new government has emerged sows the seeds of such conflicts. 

Internally the Taliban have to contend with the minorities who do not confirm to the Taliban shade of ideology like the Hazara (many of whom are Shia muslims) or the Uzbeks and Tajiks. Two decades ago when the Taliban were in power these minorities bore the brunt of Taliban angst and anger with the extent of persecution reaching executions. Further these minorities were also the rank and file of the North Alliance that fiercely opposed Taliban rule. For the current leadership of the Taliban the biggest challenge will be how they will show inclusiveness with regards to these minorities. 

For the Taliban foreign relations will be vital in the current climate. Unlike 1996 when they formed their first government this time they are more dependent on foreign aid and assistance. Also in 1996 there was no backdrop of an attack on US by Al Qadea thus their actions within Afghanistan were not of much consequence to Washington. The task of building the economy of the country cannot be done in isolation and while Washington may not be as generous in dishing out money the Americans do understand that an   impoverished Afghanistan will be the hotbed for anti American groups to operate from. 

In a regional context the Taliban will have to ensure that groups such as the Tehrik i Taliban Pakistan, (TTP) who have been carrying out attacks within Pakistan are reined in. While the Pakistan Taliban are an entirely different group they will draw inspiration of the Afghan Taliban's success to test their ability within Pakistan. The Taliban, while formed in Kandahar, were at a crucial time of its history supported by Pakistan and while they may not be controlled by Pakistan they certainly are conscious of ensuring good relations with Pakistan. 

Establishing credibility will be a major issue for the Taliban as they have been making promises which are dramatically different from their previous stated position on women's rights and treatment of its opponents. Additionally they have stated that they wish to form an inclusive government and it will most certainly be a challenge in bringing in groups who have opposed the Taliban. It is highly unlikely that such a government will uphold a true power sharing mechanism and Taliban will most certainly hold key positions in such a government. For the moment the Taliban are holding all the cards and it remains to be seen what will be the trade offs for them to gain international legitimacy. 

The Afghan Public.

Afghan society is unbearably complex where segmentation follows religious, tribal, ethnic and urban considerations. While the country is predominantly Sunni Muslim (90%) there are around 10% Shia Muslims, many of whom are well educated and occupy important positions in government and society. Pushtuns make up 42% of the population from whose ranks the Taliban are formed. Tajiks (who speak Dari a language very closely assimilated to Persian) are 27%, Hazaras and Uzbeks are 9% each and then there are other smaller ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Hazaras have suffered the worst under Taliban rule and it is reported that in July 2021 the Taliban carried out some executions of Hazaras. 

The ethnic minorities, mainly the Tajik and Hazara have been the bulk of the forces that have opposed the Taliban. There is no denying that these ethnic minorities view Taliban promises of forgiveness and inclusiveness with great suspicion. On the  flip side a majority of the Pushtun population welcome the Taliban not necessarily for ideological reasons but for the fact that the Taliban seemingly can bring the security situation under control. In general for a population that has seen war and strife for over four decades they see safety and security is paramount concern. The US and its Afghan allies failed in many respects to provide the security and peace which in the end determines the success of an administrations efforts to govern. 

The Taliban must also be aware that in Afghanistan the younger generation has not only grown in the past twenty years but is also nurtured in the free social structure of the past two decades. This generation within cities like Kabul have been brought up with images of Taliban's brutal rule of the mid 1990's and thus form the bulk of the public opinion that feels the Taliban in 2021 cannot be trusted. It is not surprising that the majority of Afghans who worked with the US and its allies will feel vulnerable and fear reprisals from the Taliban.

In the more far flung regions of the country while there may not be feverish support for the Taliban take over it would be fair to say the people there have lost the will to resist. There are reports that in areas like Panjshir former Afghan army soldiers are organising a resistance. It would seem in the absence of US and NATO forces willing to continue the fight in Afghanistan such resistance will not be meaningful. At best it would position the Tajik and Uzbek leaders to negotiate a better participation in any coalition government.  

More importantly for Afghanistan it remains to be seen how the Taliban will deal with the major tribes and the ethnic minorities. While there is a the Loye Jirga (an assembly of all tribal leaders) the Taliban have in the past ignored the Jirga when it felt they were not siding with them. Yet at the micro level Taliban commanders in various districts of the country know that they cannot ignore the tribal chiefs and thus the jirga and its many tribal chiefs may well have some sway in the direction of Afghan society. The Taliban creed on social norms, as they see being religiously correct, have some commonality with traditional Pushtun tribal social norms regarding women and explains why for tribal Afghans (in rural areas) their dictums on 'burqa' are not seen as restrictive. 

This clearly does not gel well with the younger emerging educated women in cities like Kabul. If anything good came from the past 20 years of US and NATO involvement in Afghanistan it is the sense of empowerment they created amongst the younger generation. This is a key factor in the way the Taliban have portrayed themselves as a 'different' Taliban to the one from 1996. In the months ahead actions of the Taliban will determine how inclusive will they actually be in wake of a total pull out of foreign forces. The challenge of bringing trust back to a society that remembers Taliban actions of 20 years ago and from the recent past will be enormous for the Taliban leadership. The Taliban has, essentially, always been a movement and not a cohesive well administered body. While at the moment there seems some cohesiveness between the political leadership and local commanders within the Taliban, this will be put to test in the months and years ahead. 

Afghanistans Neighbours. 

There is a common misconception that Pakistan created the Taliban. The reality is that the Taliban were initially a home grown movement with the aim to creating law and order in two districts of Kandahar. As their popularity grew in Kandahar, Saudi, US and Pakistan intelligence agencies saw in them the potential of being the only group that could end the civil war in Afghanistan. US weapons, Saudi money and Pakistan logistic support backed the group as they swept across the country in 1995-96. 

In 2021 Pakistani intelligence agencies influence on the Taliban is peripheral and limited to issues of Pakistan's security and ensuring that relations are cordial enough for Pakistan not to close its borders to a landlocked Afghanistan. The emergence of a Taliban faction composed of mainly Pakistani militants operating out of Afghanistan but with an agenda to attack Pakistan changed the security perspective for Islamabad. While the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is not in any way related to the Afghan Taliban there is no doubt that Pakistan's main aim is to eliminate this group. This would also explain the fencing of the border with Afghanistan and high level border patrols being installed on the Pakistan side of the border.

A large measure of Pakistans efforts in Afghanistan are to counter India's activities within Afghanistan. Many in Pakistan intelligence agencies are aware of India's support to anti Pakistan groups based in Afghanistan. India's closer ties with the fallen government of Ashraf Ghani were in part predicated by Delhi's desire to deny Pakistan any influence in Afghanistan. One of the major aims of Pakistan will be to push the new Taliban government to act against all the groups who have been operating against Pakistan interests from within Afghan territory. 

While Pakistan's influence over the Afghan Taliban may be limited in terms of internal affairs, there is no denying that it remains the only neighbour who could have some leverage over Kabul on regional matters. Even though the Taliban have taken pains to emphasise that Afghanistan will not host any group that operates against other countries, many splinter groups of ISIS, and Al Qadea will attempt to operate from Afghan soil. This is largely because the Taliban administration may not have the resources to commit to anti terrorist intelligence gathering. Pakistan has lost close to 40,000 military and civilian souls to the US sponsored war on terror and therefore will be very keen to help the Taliban create enough intelligence infrastructure to prevent a resurgence of both the TTP and the ISIL-K. 

It is also very likely that China will build its relations with a Taliban controlled Kabul not because of any affinity with the new forces in Afghanistan but because of realpolitik to protect its interests in the region. In addition China's thirst for minerals may mean it will work hard to get commercial contracts to exploit these mineral resources which are estimated to be over $1 trillion. It would therefore seem that given the China and Pakistan relationship is very close that these two countries could well be very important in the shaping of a new Afghanistan. 

Prospects of Civil War.

It is highly likely that civil and military strife will continue in various parts of Afghanistan given that there are segments within Afghan society that may choose to continue to resist the Taliban. In the north the Panjshir valley, which was the base of Ahmed Shah Masood's Northern Alliance, has already become a rallying base for the former vive President Amrullah Saleh and he has called for armed resistance to the Taliban to continue. It is unsure who, from the international powers, would support such a move, but many hawks in Washington and other Western capitals will not unwelcome the creation of some counter weight to the Taliban. 

Whether the brewing trouble in the Panjshir valley will become a full blown war with the Taliban depends upon how Kabul's new rulers deal with the many tribes of the Hazara, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Political forces within the Taliban would welcome some form of inclusive government if only to blunt any attempt to fuel a movement against the Taliban. Given that many of Talibans military commanders in the field do not completely share the views of its political leadership there is a chance that localised military operations against the ethnic minorities may continue sporadically. 

The Taliban are also conscious of the ISIL-K's presence within the country and they have already carried out a devastating bomb attack on evacuating Afghans killing scores of Afghans and over a dozen US  troops. While this group does not have widespread support its rank and file is composed of former Taliban fighters who are too hardline to accept any of the changes the Taliban professes. It remains to be seen if ISIL K will be able to recruit more Taliban fighters to its cause and if it can become a large enough force to be a serious military threat to the Taliban. 

Final Words.

As Western presence in Afghanistan crumbles to the quick exit we have seen of their military and the government they propped up one has to wonder what this two decade war was all about. If the task of remaining in Afghanistan for twenty years was about nation building then the US and its allies have failed miserably. Yes on the social front progress was achieved and a freer Afghan society was emerging in Kabul. Much has been said about women's rights and fears that Taliban will force women into the burqa and time after time we are reminded of this. However beyond the city of Kabul we must also acknowledge that Afghanistan is a tribal society where for centuries before the Taliban the culture of the Pushtun and Hazara always was steeped in traditions of keeping women covered and subservient to men. All the Taliban did was put a religious spin onto this and thus faced less criticism for their action in much of rural Afghanistan. Over the past sixty odd years this was changing in the rural areas where the strict burqa was being replaced with the chador (a shawl covering the hair). 

The issues of stability to Afghanistan is more than just dealing with the issue of the burqa, and in this respect the West failed to understand that Afghanistan has only been stable when there has been a strong central government. However a strong central government that is not corrupt and is willing to bring progress through the tribal system to the common people. The West knowingly ignored the corruption of the governments that were installed in Kabul and did not realise that the war against the Soviets and the civil war had left no single force capable to unify the country and also be a clean government. This is where the Taliban held the cards with an image of fighting corruption and ensuring security of the people. (after all the movement started to bring security to two districts in Kandahar). 

The only institution that US and its allies could have built as a stable force was the Afghan armed forces. However, the training and development of the Afghan army was shaped to be a support force to whatever the US and NATO did. Corruption was allowed into the military and it is estimated at over 35% of its operational budget was pocketed by corrupt generals and politicians. The lack of morale that followed indicated that even the best of times desertion rates were as high as 20% in the army. Given that the Afghan army needed constant air support for operations and logistic support very little was done to develop the Afghan airforce. Thus when the US decided to pull out Afghan units on the ground were left stranded not only operationally but also for supplies. 

Afghanistan's economic recovery will be a major concern. In addition to the damage of four decades of war there is little confidence in the Taliban leadership to have the capabilities to manage a modern states economic system. The mammoth task of creating an effective governmental administration has fallen on the Taliban who have never really managed their own affairs in a cohesive manner when it comes to economic matters. This will be the main challenge for Afghanistan as may see that while the Taliban may well provide security will they be able to do national building, something the US and its allies failed to do.

Afghanistan after the US withdrawal.

 Based on current announcements and actions it would seem the US and its NATO allies will soon be withdrawing all their troops from Afghanistan. This will be the end, as many hope, of the long US involvement in a war in a foreign country. One may question what did the US achieve in these two decades other than dislodging Osama bin Laden and the removal of the Taliban regime. Back in 2001 when the US invaded Afghanistan, it was safely assumed that majority of Afghans welcome the removal of the Taliban regime.

The adoption of a new Constitution in 2004 and general elections accompanied with economic and social reforms were seen by many as heralding a new era of peace and well being. Today as the US and NATO troops pack up to leave Afghanistan's future is more uncertain then ever. The fact that after the invasion of the country in 2001 the Taliban were never really militarily defeated negates the very purpose of the invasion and does not abode well for the future. In fact in most of the 38 provinces of Afghanistan, where the Taliban had major influence in the rural areas of the country, a war of attrition by the Taliban continues with occasional bomb attacks on both civilian and military targets.  The inability of the Afghan government and its Western Allies to bring peace and security to the Afghan populace highlights the incompetence of the current government and the failure of the policies of its Allies. Added to the incompetence is the large scale corruption within the government which is not only rampant but also blatantly visible to the common Afghan. 

The much touted economic recovery of the country and the rebuilding of government institutions including the armed forces was indeed a failure. These efforts by the US and its allies to help the Afghan government stand on its feet were an exercise prone to massive corruption. One report suggested that every single contract had an element of either bribery embedded in it or the whole contract award was fixed. This malaise of corruption effected the military too where it has been common to hear of theft of fuel, equipment and ammunition accompanied by a desertion rate in excess of 25%. 

While the Taliban have been engaging in a dialogue of sorts with the various stakeholders and suggesting a working arrangement with the current Afghan government, the reality is that once the Western forces are out of the country all bets will be off. Within the Taliban there are various factions and while the moderate ones have been speaking in reassuring tones, the more militant sections of the Taliban are unlikely to be reined in with ease. Securing the key assets after the departure of Western forces is the first priority and suggests that securing the Kabul and Bargham airports will be a major test of the new be t Afghan order. 

The US has been talking of a military presence in the region close enough to intervene if necessary. Such a role is more likely to be air support to Afghan troops. However, the Taliban will be flexing their political and military strength on the ground and through the local administration in the 38 provinces where air power is of limited influence. The US has tried to engage the principal stakeholders outside Afghanistan with little success. Indeed Pakistan, especially through its historical ties with the Taliban could play a constructive role but its leadership is aware of the instability this can produce within Pakistan too. India, while not a neighbor to Afghanistan will claim its stake for political influence more so to counter Pakistan than anything else.

Sadly the idea of a peaceful transition from the present to a new scenario without Western military presence in Afghanistan is only going to work during the transition process thereafter the risks of Afghanistan spinning into a civil war are high. There is no denying that the majority of Afghans would not a return to Taliban rule but the twin problems of corruption and incompetence within the current government have eroded the will of people. A civil war will not be good for Afghanistan's neighbors and countries like Pakistan, Iran and Turkey will try to influence the various parties to avoid a civil war but the dynamics are too complex to be assured of this. 

Ideally it must be the Afghans themselves who decide on the future course for their country. The Taliban are also aware that Western forces can return to the country just as easily as they left, even though one may doubt if the political will to stabilize Afghanistan will exist in Washington once all the troops are out. It is possible in the current situation China might be the country who may, directly, or indirectly through Pakistan, try and bring some element of order to Afghan society. A civil war in Afghanistan will not suit Chinese economic and political ambitions in the region and while Chinese troops in Kabul is not going to happen, it can create enough proxy power within Afghanistan to influence outcomes.

Key to Peace in Afghanistan: A solution

After 17 years of a dead end military involvement in Afghanistan, the United States of America is learning, like the Russians and British before them, that taming Afghanistan is next to an impossibility. In their drive to defeat the Russians, the US with its Pakistani and Arab allies created the means to arm the seven groups fighting them, being short sighted that after the defeat of the Russians, these seven groups would turn on each other, as indeed they did. A divided war torn country was then introduced to the emergence of the Taliban, initially supported by Pakistan, the US and some of the Arab countries. The introduction of this new military force turned the tide of the seven groups leaving only Ahmed Shah Masood's North Alliance to oppose them.

What then followed in a country still bereft with civil war was a Taliban government with a social and religious agenda that was archaic and brutal in all respects. However, for the average Afghan it was a respite from the civil war and the death and destruction they had faced for over two decades. Events of 9/11, the harboring of Osama bin Laden by the Taliban suddenly changed the situation as the US bombed and then intervened militarily into Afghanistan under the label of the War on Terror. Pakistan, not nimble enough to distance itself from the Taliban were caught between pressure from the US on the one side and their own security fears that Kabul in the hands of anti Pakistan elements would mean unrest in its own northern borders.

Once the retaliation attacks from the Taliban spilled into Pakistan cities and with each bomb blast the consensus emerged that Pakistan had to deal with this terrorism because from an Afghan and US problem there emerged a Pakistan Taliban which was even more militant that their cousins in Afghanistan. However as these militants were targeting both Afghan assets and Pakistani targets, a new dimension came on the scene with the US using drone strikes in both Afghanistan (where they had said they were at war) and Pakistan (where they said they worked with an ally being Pakistan). These drone strikes were limited in their success but more importantly caused collateral civilian casualties; in one case a school being targeted where no militant elements were present.

While the Pakistani government in public condemned the drone strikes, privately they did nothing to ask the US to stop them. One of the major turning points in Imran Khan's political journey was his opposition to these drone strikes with his now famous words, 'we are the first ally in history to be consistently bombed by the US'. His early stance of speaking to the Taliban to arrive at a peace settlement was seen as him being pro militants, and today we forget that both the Afghan government and even the US are speaking directly to the Taliban.

As history has worked out today Imran Khan is the Prime Minister of Pakistan having been elected in a remarkable turn around for his party. While an exhaustive strategy of Afghanistan has not emerged there are enough indications in these first few days to suggest that for one he wants peace in Afghanistan, and secondly he is strong enough now to create the conditions to bring this about.

To achieve any modicum of progress some key stakeholders in this process will need to have a major rethink of their own approach. For one the Afghan assertion that every terrorist attack in their country is guided from Islamabad has to change; after all the Pakistan Taliban are harbored in Afghanistan also. Secondly, the United States will have to realize that Pakistan will be an ally but not one to be dictated too. Thirdly, India's peripheral role in supporting the anti Pakistan rhetoric on the argument of terrorism will need to be toned down and focus shifted to a peace process between India and Pakistan independent of the Afghan policy. Finally, the Taliban must choose whether a strategy of terror will succeed given that now ISIS has become one their enemies within the Afghan landscape.

This last element is interesting as most of the Taliban in Afghanistan are Pushtun's and they see the ISIS as foreign fighters, and thus in a sense is a departure from the thinking of the Taliban in the pre 9/11 era were foreign fighters were seen as brothers in arms. Whether the Taliban and the Kabul government can work out an arrangement of coexistence is up to the Afghans themselves. However, it has to be recognized by the new government in Islamabad that a step towards peace must include the expulsion of all Afghan militant elements from Pakistan and to then work with Afghanistan, and the US for a better policing of the border. The US will have to learn to trust the Pakistan government to deal with terrorist elements within their country rather than taking matters into their own hands with drone strikes.

The US position has been that they had to conduct drone strikes unilaterally because they could not trust the Pakistan intelligence services to do the job! While there may be truth that a decade ago the intelligence service would have had militant sympathetic elements within their ranks, the past three heads of the military have been judicious in cleaning up the image and the rank and file of the intelligence service. With 50,000 Pakistanis having died in this War on Terror there is a sentiment within the military of Pakistan, 'enough is enough', and they would wisely follow the lead of Imran Khan to bring about a peaceful era with Afghanistan.

The biggest problem for the US is that leaving Afghanistan on its own will result in a sudden collapse of the current central government, an creation of conditions of 17 years back and a decade before that when each time Kabul's government collapsed a civil war followed. We also have to consider that with China's investment in CPEC in Pakistan it is natural that they will begin to take a more active interest in peace in Afghanistan. I guess we stand at the unique crossroads where all parties, including the Taliban realize that peace is the only way forward. I do believe that an initiative between Pakistan and Afghanistan under the new government in Islamabad is the best opportunity for the US to exit Afghanistan and do it with grace and leave some framework which both Afghans and Pakistanis would welcome and support in the region.

In terms of specifics the following must be done, not in any particular order;

• A bilateral meeting between Afghanistan and Pakistan followed by a meeting between the two of them and USA. 
• The Taliban be convinced to start bilateral talks with the government in Kabul with a precondition of a ceasefire first. 
• An agreement be reached that none of the parties will arm or support elements in each others country. 
• The creation of a joint intelligence task force which will be mandated to deal with all common threats to the parties. 
• An economic uplift plan in the areas where the war on terror caused the most damage, on both sides of the border. 
• Constant reviews of the peace plan and to take steps early enough to avoid any divergence from the agreed agenda. 

The first step can be taken by Pakistan and it would seem some positive comments have come from the new government. The US and Afghan side should not ignore these initial exploratory forays by Islamabad because they must understand that while Pakistan cannot decide the outcome of events in Afghanistan it can play a key role to achieve peace in the region. Yes it may sound to Kabul that this is the usual rhetoric for peace from any new government in Pakistan, but this is a government that seems to have a better pulse of the nation and taking a step towards them is a good way to put that sincerity to test. For their part Imran Khan and his government should consider a comprehensive strategy towards this peace effort or they will, in terms of their Afghan policy be left on the way side of history. 

Trumps Afghan Policy.

President Trump's time in office was conspicuous thus far by the absence of a cogent and clear statement on foreign policy. He seemed to tweet his foreign policy feelings and yet his campaign promise of a new policy of NATO, Afghanistan etc were realms of international affairs he could ignore for long. I would also suspect that barricaded by the Russian probe and the chaos in the White House Trump needed to do something dramatic. The Afghan policy can best be received with mixed emotions. While, from an American perspective, Afghanistan seems to be a thorn on the side of a super power like USA, history would tell us that this barren harsh land has been irksome to both the British and the Soviet Union in the past.

Insofar as the intent to have a surge of US forces in Afghanistan is driven by America's strategic objectives, which are murky in terms of Afghanistan, has its own merits. One can argue if the original aim was to rid the world of Osama bin Laden, and that since done during the Obama administration remaining there is in a sense strategically futile. The argument runs that the area is the home for both radical groups like the Taliban and recently the ISIS, so there is a strategic aim to rid them of a home base. One cannot argue against that, however to assert the US is not into nation building but fighting terror is all fine, and something even Obama asserted, a weak nation is more prone to be fragmented by terror groups.

The core of the policy seems to be a military solution. However, we all know from Vietnam to Lebanon that one cannot have a military solution to what is essentially a political problem. In the case of Afghanistan it is the political vacuums that has existed now for over four decades. Trumps open invitation to India to help fill the gap is in a sense short sighted because while India can provide economic and trade based interaction the core of Afghan society is deeply Islamic and staunchly tribal which would be at odds with a Hindu dominate India. Yes India has a role to play but with Pakistan in between the two countries the solution would have been more for both Pakistan and India to be jointly encouraged to stabilise the region.

This leads Trump and his host of sycophants to make statements about Pakistan being the 'safe haven' for the Taliban and the Haqqani network. Such an argument ignores that all shades of the current terrorist groups were created and supported by virtually all the current powers that are fighting them. They were created with the aim of fighting the Russians and Pakistan was the conduit to fund and train them. Yes indeed Pakistan had its own motives in this and when Afghanistan slipped into civil war after the Soviet defeat, they with other allies promoted and created the current Taliban with the idea of replacing the crumbling power structure in Kabul.

The fact remains from 2001 most countries including Pakistan, somewhat reluctantly, took to curbing these terrorist groups and both Afghanistan and Pakistan suffered a series of terrorist attacks. Few understand that Pakistan has suffered over 7000 military deaths and over 65,000 civilians killed and 3.4 million people displaced. Afghanistan during the same period has suffered 61,000 military deaths and 20,000 civilian deaths. It is obvious that Pakistan has borne the brunt of the war on terror no less than Afghanistan and thus to go on talking of the country as a safe haven is incorrect. The TTP (the Taliban faction that attacks Pakistani targets) is based in Afghanistan, just as the Haqqani network which attacks into Afghanistan is based in Miranshah, the tribal north of Pakistan. In 2014 Pakistan launched an offensive against the Haqqani Network and other groups and in November 2014 Gen J Anderson of the US command said that the Pakistan offensive had seriously reduced the ability of the Taliban to conduct offensive operations in Afghanistan.

There is no denying that both Afghanistan and Pakistan want to curb terrorism but in an environment of accusing each other this will not work. The porous border between the two countries is next to impossible to control even though Pakistan has three times as many border check posts on their side compared to the Afghans. I would have felt that Trump should encourage Pakistan and Afghanistan to work together rather than signal Pakistan as partially responsible for the situation in Afghanistan.

On a strategic note such a policy of isolating Pakistan in this vital region will only drive them closer to China, who has been Pakistan's closest ally and China has a long standing border dispute with India too. Many may think that US aid to Pakistan is a leverage but with $750 million is not enough of a tool to change policy alone. Indeed Pakistan needs to do more to fight terrorism and by the same token the world needs to understand that as many people have died to terrorism in Pakistan as any of the countries in the front line of this war. Excluding Pakistan and making it insecure with overtures to India may not really be the best policy.

The single objective of fighting terrorism in Afghanistan is noble in its own context but we have to be realistic that such a war will also bring destruction and suffering to more people. Indeed the balance will be whether this escalation brings more suffering to the people on the ground or the continued attacks by the likes of Taliban do the same. There has to be a plan to bring administrative order, district by district, all across Afghanistan as the Taliban and terror groups are ousted. Merely wining the war and not creating a politically and socially workable system will only remove a threat today but will create the fertile ground for someone equally terrible like the Taliban, to replace it.

Pakistan: A Million Mother March.

Teleport yourself to Pakistan in March of 1962; Jackie Kennedy wife of US President  in an open car on the streets of Karachi and cheered by the crowd, or Queen Elizabeth’s visit in 1961 welcomed by the people. Back in the present day either of these two events would be impossible to conceive for a western public figure in the same manner as it was back then. Sadly even Pakistan’s own political leadership would think twice of being driving down a main city’s streets in an open car. While security may have become a global issue, in Pakistan it has become a daily occurrence.

Every scene of violence is ugly, the only difference in Pakistan is that it grotesque in it ugliness and the justification for the act is even more animalistic than the previous act of terror. The Taliban splinter group which claimed responsibility for the Lahore attack in a children’s park made the point that as the army continues Pakistan’s own ‘war on terror’ with venom they will choose ‘soft targets”. The implication of terror is straight forward now; a message to every mother in Pakistan that ‘your child will not be safe any more and is now fair game in this war’.

Ironically the same day that children were being blown up in Lahore, a large contingent of protestors were in the capital, Islamabad, making their point that they opposed any change in the controversial blasphemy law and chose to make the killer of the Governor of Punjab their hero for the occasion. Was this a neat diversion by the radical elements to allow their even more radical cousins to put ball bearings with explosives and walk into to the children’s park and wreck a havoc that was brutal and barbaric?

Commons sense would suggest that attacking women and children will alienate the masses from the Taliban cause. Clearly this is not a concern to the Taliban because they do not plan to come to power through the ballot box; their vote is through the force of the barrel of the gun. After all in a country that has an elected parliament and Prime Minister the process of change of law, or the protest to change it, is done through street power.  The more people you can mobilize on the streets, the more bricks you can throw, the more buildings you can burn the more the chance that the government will negotiate on changing the law, as we see with the Qadri protests in Islamabad, will grow.

How does one deal with this subversion of the democratic process? We know the religious radical groups do not have the numbers in the elected Parliament to even initiate a bill of change to the existing laws they protest about. The fact remains that in a country were religious sentiment is exploited for political gain the use of street power is considered ‘normal.’ The way to deal with this wanton subversion of the will of the people is for the silent majority to come out also on the streets. Why not a 10 million March of the Mothers to protest against the killing of women and children? Why doesn’t the silent majority speak up rather than sit in their drawing rooms and watch TV soap operas and tell their cousins abroad about how bad things are in Pakistan.

This is not the Pakistan that Quaid e Azam, the founder of the nation wanted, this is not the Pakistan that millions of decent God fearing people in Pakistan wanted. Indeed Pakistan literally means the ‘land of the pure,” but it does not imply and religious cleansing of the population by a small minority whose only way of cleansing is to eliminate the ones  they do not consider pure. Yes it is time we consider it the land of pure; the people who want it pure and cleansed from violence, intolerance, religious fanaticism and more of all the mentality that a handful decide what is good for 180 million people. Its time for the mothers to be heard, it time for the armchair opposition to violence to now come out and condemn the actions that result in ball bearings embedded into the bodies of our children. It is time to say ENOUGH OF YOUR VIOLENCE.

Winning the peace

The Pakistan military has been scoring some much needed military victories against the Pakistan Taliban in the region of Swat. Indeed the ferocity of the Pakistan army has been boosted by discovering bodies of Pakistani soldiers with their throats slit bringing about an attitude to yield no quarter to the Taliban. In a sense this does mean that the Taliban and the Pakistan army have now started to carry grudges and there are reports of Taliban being meted out a bit of their own medicine in terms of the harshness with which they are being dealt.

However, the Pakistan military is being asked to reverse the tide of the Taliban given that the Taliban gained control not because of the military failure but due to the spineless of the current government in Islamabad. The tricky question is that winning ground from the Taliban is one thing but winning the peace is another. I feel there are two major threats to the current series of victories of the army.

Firstly, the Taliban may well be giving up strategic towns like Mingora and others in the Swat valley, but lets not forget some of these Taliban are fading into the country side in smaller bands and mingling with the population. While this is not that easy its never the less an army of zealots who can feed of the population without necessarily having the contraptions of a standing army.

Secondly, the Internally Displaced Persons, or IDP, as they are being labeled, are more restless than before as they seek to go back but to their destroyed homes and start to rebuild their lives. A failure of the Government and the international donors to Pakistan to deal with the pressing issues of these people will result in a back lash that the country can ill afford to witness at this stage.

The military is not equipped with the mindset to seek the quick rehabilitation of the IDP's and the government is woefully inexperienced to gather the resources to rebuild the infrastructure and the homes destroyed during the fighting. Historically the government machinery is not geared up for the quick response that the situation demands.

If long lasting goodwill is not created with the displaced people of the Swat valley then clearly the battle for the hearts and minds of the people will suffer an irreparable setback. The Taliban's tactics of revenge attacks in the cities of Peshawar and Lahore have not won them any friends in the country and the government should not consider this as enough reason to be winning the war against the Pakistan Taliban. On the contrary it is a matter of urgency that the Swat Valley towns should be rebuilt and essential services restored showing that defeating the Taliban is only the first step to building the confidence of the people in the government.

However, in terms of the Taliban roll back one has to not rejoice too much considering that the Taliban tactic is that after a major defeat they lie low and regroup, usually taking two to three years before they come back into the forefront. Thus to say a military victory will have rid the country of the Taliban menace would be too optimistic. The strategy has to be clear that while the Taliban burrow down over the next couple of years, the government and all other positive segments of society should accelerate education, economic reforms aimed at the grass root level and widespread engagement of the people in the areas at risk to the next Taliban encroachment so that the Taliban cannot feed of the dissatisfaction of the people.