Third Umpire: Misbah and the cult of hope.

There is a propensity within Pakistan cricket, administrators, players and fans alike, to always hinge the outcome of a game upon that one indispensable ingredient called 'hope'. Ever since Javed Miandad hit the last ball six against India in 1986 at Sharjah, the element of hope became an integral part of Pakistan's cricket psyche. We hoped the Akmal brothers will come through, and time after time at crucial moments they failed us. We hoped in most games that one of the many players who had under performed would suddenly become the Javed Miandad of the moment.

Yes there were periods where planning and developing a scientific approach to each game took front stage, but when the planning failed, be if better opposition or poor execution of the game plan we gravitated back to the 'hope'. At times players seem to have that belief that their cameo can save the game and they would abolish the game plan and go for that one slog that will change their fortunes more than that of Pakistan cricket.

The current tour of Australia suffers from two major set backs. A coach like Misbah who is steeped in being defensive, and the continuation of relying more on hope than planning. Yes Misbah has the distinction of being a successful test captain, compared to most others from Pakistan, but one cannot dispute that an aggressive strategy and mind set are not his forte. Most of the games he won were not from the implementation of a game plan but more from the individual brilliance of some of the players. Usually when two or three players clicked Misbah, as captain got the credit.

Hope, on the other hand, continues to be an integral part of the dressing room accessories that the Pakistan team carries in its kit bag. Sadly this cocktail has often been mixed with liberal doses of favoritism and inexplicable exclusions or inclusions of players that do not fit into any rationale of selection policy; like the inclusion of the tall Irfan on this tour of Australia. Someone must have said the Aussie pitches have a good deal of bounce and we have Irfan who is 7 foot 1 inch tall lets include him, forgetting that he is 37 years old, with highly questionable fielding and even more questionable fitness!

Well there was the hope that he would rattle the likes of Warner, and Steve Smith; none of that happened and much more capable bowlers were sidelined because someone, perhaps Misbah, introduced the element of hope and of course no one in the Pakistan selectors argues with hope. After all we have been hoping that Fakhar Zamman will find form, even though after a dozen consecutive failures someone would have woken up and said this is simply not working. We continue with the hope that Haris Sohail, who can be effective in the shorter format will somehow become a test player of class.

Yes we have reorganized Pakistan cricket, as indeed Imran Khan promised he would, and while the results of this may take time to show up, I personally do not believe replacing corporate owned teams by provincial teams (like in England as Australia) is the sole answer. We need to build a base to the game and the base is built at the school level. Create and effective school cricket system and the results will show in a few years. Take the example of New Zealand rugby. Why is it such a formidable force for over 50 years? Because the school rugby system in New Zealand is strong, well supported and encouraged. Any All Black players will proudly speak of his heritage of school rugby.  Pakistan cricket needs to concentrate on long term plans not just a quick fix glued together by hope.

Imran's Challenge of Governance.

Imran Khan, the Pakistan Prime Minister's,  integrity and sincerity towards making his country a better place economically, socially and in the eyes of the world is never in dispute. He has a clean record in terms of financial ethics and indeed what appeals to his many supporters, especially the younger generation is this sense of values and mission. Countries, however, cannot be run alone on intentions. Intentions have been be backed by actions and a sense of implementation which requires many aspect of the process and people to come together to give a result oriented system.

Imran, in my opinion has, in his zeal, taken on too much on his agenda of change, and this ever expanding menu creates its own challenges on delivery. Added to that has been a regional political scenario, especially Kashmir, which has created its own priority. In fairness Pakistan has never been an easy country to govern and added to years of economic mismanagement the task on the shoulders of Imran is far to heavy to carry in the current package of things he wants to tackle.

Yes education, health, social order, and ending corruption are all vital parts of the Imran agenda and need to be tackled. However, into this melee has been the ongoing investigations into corruption by former political leaders, most of who happen to be from the opposition parties, give a nasty twist to the perception of the process. Yes the accountability process is carried out by a supposedly independent government body and the higher courts in Pakistan have shown a remarkable independence from the government yet one would like to see government ministers and Imran himself not commenting on the cases against his political foes. The moment he or his ministers make a statement about the cases against former President Zardari or former Prime Minister Sharif, it erodes the independence of the accountability process.

Pakistan's democracy, which has had a stunted growth with interruptions of military rule, is far from mature. When a right wing religious party (JUI F) which fared abysmally in not only the last election but ever election in Pakistan, suddenly calls for a march on Islamabad and demands Imran Khan resign it harkens to the 1970's when street power was considered a means of political change. Indeed Imran Khan himself also employed the same tactics against the Sharif government, though in fairness he did not get the resignation he may have wanted, it did elevate him in political stature within the country. The JUIF ascertain that Imran is a 'selected' prime minister rather than elected one is a silly street slogan considering that while some merit will always be in the allegation of rigging in Pakistan elections, few would accept that the election that brought Imran to power was rigged to the point of him being considered 'selected'.

So what is the governance that should be expected of Imran Khan's government. My sincere opinion is that his first and foremost priority has to be the economy. He needs some seriously bright people to be heading up the economic policy formulation and implementation team. At the same time seeing things from abroad the oversight that some government agencies have been given into scrutinizing financial transactions even for foreign investments (individuals) needs to be toned down. Potential investors from abroad, including overseas Pakistanis are prone to ask that even if no more than normal questions are asked on their investments today, some years down the road who knows if the scrutiny will be more broad based and perhaps political too.

Creating an investment atmosphere is more than just announcing projects. In involves crucial confidence building steps, and for Pakistan shifting the economy towards and export oriented economy is a necessity given that it would boost foreign exchange reserves. Export orientation has to be towards value added goods, and for this base industrial sector incentives have to be put in place. Aligning the financial sector to boost not only exports but provide important financial support to export based industries is the need of the hour.

Imran's government has taken steps to tighten its spending and rationalize the government workforce. However these steps are just the beginning and to create a lighter more efficient government machinery also require higher levels of competence and expertise. Job creation has somehow been projected in Pakistan as the job of the government in power. In reality the government must create the conditions for job creation in the private sector and this means a rethink of the stimulus package that is needed for the private sector.

Pakistan has been plagued by what is known as 'circular debt' and its concerns years of mismanagement of the electricity sector in the country. Power theft and non payment of bills by a large segment of the population has meant that an endemic crisis in financing the power sector has resulted in circular debt which is simply rolled over with interest each year. There has to be reform of this sector and something bold has to be done about it. It weighs down the financial sector and also creates a very inefficient power supply system that cannot sustain itself in the long run.

Imran Khan's government must clearly understand that all the posturing in the public eye has its own place in terms of garnering support of their agenda. However, if they do not deliver on the economy then at the end of the day everything else is a wasted effort. I do believe that the agenda of reform has to be pared down to manageable levels and the priority on the economy should be foremost. Then within the economic plan various measures need to be taken to reform the system. Some contentious issues like sales tax and broadening the tax base, while very laudable, need to be implemented through a dialogue with the business community and to consider them the long term stakeholders of the benefits from reforms. Increasing taxes on the people who already pay the tax is not a solution as much as the IMF would prefer it, the solution is to broaden the tax base and for this the business community who pay taxes would certainly not object.

The passion for reform and transforming Pakistan has to be spearheaded by economic change and the social welfare that flows of this economic change is what would benefit the population at large. The government has to also seek to work in partnership with the business community rather than have a adversarial posture towards them. Once the economy starts to head in the right direction then the broader social agenda of the Khan government can be seen and will be more palatable to the people on the back of economic well being. The slogan has to be 'economy first'.

Brexit: A view from afar.

Brexit (or British Exit) has been the focal point of any discussion not only in the UK and Europe but elsewhere. In a sense, other than the seriously politically minded within us, most people are fed up with the whole discussion about Brexit. This is precisely what is wrong with the way our British friends are dealing with the Brexit issue. Boris Johnson, the British PM, seems to have stepped a few strides closer to the exit from the European Union, and even though there is no certainty that Parliament will go with the deal he has brokered, there is considerable merit in the thought that being tired of this issue the MP's who could sway this vote might just cave in.

Boris Johnson the other day commented that he is determined to get the deal done as that is what the majority of the voters wanted. He could not ignore, he said, the wishes of this majority and called it the will of the people. Most people focus on the 'will of the people' which was 17.4 million who voted to leave the EU, however, 16.2 million voted to remain in the European Union, and in all this 'will of the people' argument we forget the large segment who wanted to stay. It therefore makes sense that whatever deal is finally done should go to the people of the UK for final say in a referendum.

One understands the entire emotional appeal of leaving the EU and British people having their say in their own affairs. Yes in a sense no one likes to be told what to do within their own country. However there always was an alternative to leaving the EU and could have been moving the EU to roll back some of the powers that Brussels (the EU head quarters are there) have over domestic policies of member states. While a longer path to achieve this it would have been a less painful path for the British people.

Beyond the emotional hype of regained independence from Britain, the economic cost of leaving the EU has never really been put to the average British person. Just during the leaving process, (mind you the divorce has not been done) the inflationary pressures of Brexit have caused an average increase of expenses to each household in the UK of approximately £ 404 per annum.

In the long terms UK's GDP will slow down from between 1.2% to 2.9% (depending on the final divorce terms), unemployment is expected to rise by 1.9% and net foreign investments into British Industry will shrink. Already British export industries have moved some of their manufacturing jobs to Europe to avoid the new tariffs that would affect them post Brexit. In the same sequence European industries have cut back investments and job which were within the UK causing considerable strains to British industrial production and jobs.

The argument that the UK will benefit from new deals with USA and the Commonwealth countries is not based on any economic reasoning. The US remains, under President Trump, a highly mercurial and temperamental trading partner and the most of the Commonwealth nations have very favorable trading terms from China and Japan, which Britain, in its current state cannot match. some have suggested that since UK was a net contributor to the EU, that money saved will augment the effects of leaving the EU. Yes indeed the UK was a net contributor to the EU by about £ 9 billion a year. However when accounting for over all effect of jobs and investments in UK created by being in the EU  one can be sure that this £9 billion would have been more than offset by the job creation and investments and exports into the EU.

Brexit was sold to the UK people as an emotional deal, and the economic realities of its effects were glossed over to the point of suggesting that the average British citizen will be better off. NO free borders, hence less foreigners taking the jobs, not subsidizing the EU meaning more funds to the British people etc etc. The realities are that, as an example, many of the jobs that lower paid Polish workers were taking up in Britain are usually not taken by British people. The pros and cons of such policies will never be crystal clear but after decades of integration into system disengagement is not going to  be painless. The British economy will shrink and with it jobs and the common man will feel the pinch. EU workers came to Britain because the economy was doing well and expanding, much of this from being in the EU. Take the financial sector, where perhaps British employees will be hit the hardest as major financial institutions will find being in London is no more beneficial in a post Brexit environment.

The skeptics would argue that losing 10,000 jobs in the banking sector cannot do much harm but this is just one important segment. We must consider this is a high salaried sector so the knock on effect into the consumer spending side is larger than just 10,000 jobs. These higher salaried people spend more, buy houses, send kids to school, and of course pay taxes. So the trickle effect into the economy would be far greater than just losing 10,000 jobs to Europe. This story repeats itself into other sectors of the British economy and gradually the pinch of Brexit will be felt across a wider cross section of British society than we care to admit today.

In all honesty rather than just focusing in the people who wanted to leave the EU one should consider that a great deal has changed since the 2016 referendum and more realities have come to show that while the emotional euphoria of leaving EU is all fine, the economic pinch is going to be much worse. It would be appropriate therefore to have a new referendum on the issue of leaving the EU.

India and Dissent in Kashmir.

The Indian government and the right wing nationalist media in India has taken pains to pretend that all is well in Kashmir. Indeed in some parts of Indian administered Kashmir, where Hindus are a majority or at par with the Muslim population things seem to have a semblance of relative calm. However, the majority of Indian Kashmir is seething with dissent over India revoking the special status of the state. This dissent would normally show up in street protests but with curfews and internet and phone lockdown it would seem such protests cannot be organized with ease.

Indian military has been stating that 'terrorists' from across the border, i.e. from Pakistan, are trying to infiltrate across the Line of Control to cause trouble. Pakistan for its account has been urging the Kashmiris on its side and their Afghan and Pakistani sympathizers not to cross the border for fear that such a move would play into India's hands of blaming foreigners for its troubles in Kashmir. Given the emotion on the issue it will be a tough ask for Pakistan to contain the many on its side who want to go and fight for the Kashmiris.

In as much as there has been much attention on the organized militant groups within Pakistan these have been the focus of pressure from Pakistan to rein in their actions. What must worry India is really the disorganized tribal groups, some from Afghanistan, who are more difficult to control. As the study of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union shows that one of the reasons the Mujahideen were so successful was because they were a disorganized force without a clear and hefty command and control structure. Local leaders, usually the tribal chiefs, were free to decide on tactics and timing of attacks and selection of targets. While the Mujahideen may have lacked a coercive strategy to fighting the Soviets, it was precisely this element which always kept the element of surprise on their side and nearly impossible to defeat and disband such Mujahideen forces.

For Indian forces, to ignore that there is no element of armed resistance to their administration of Kashmir is naive. One can argue that who supports them and to what extent, but if the Afghan Mujahideen model of fighting is adopted by these Indian Kashmiri groups then history tells us that it will be virtually impossible for the Indian forces to defeat them. This is why so long as the Indian narrative insists that any armed resistance is not only foreign inspired but foreigners themselves are involved in it, (Pakistanis in their eyes) then they feel they have the moral advantage to carry out whatever tactics the Indian forces use and the extent of the force they use.

Numerous independent sources and Indian Kashmiri leaders have stated empathically that there have been human rights violations in Kashmir. Indian investigations, primarily by the army itself, have not been substantive or independent enough to lend any credibility to such show of transparency. Whenever New Delhi has been questioned about its human rights track record in Kashmir it has been quick to point out others, like Pakistan, on their human rights record. This is very Trumpian in approach as it seems pointing a finger is the best defense. The question is simply Indian human rights record especially in Kashmir and nothing else.

While New Delhi is eager to show it is restoring telephone and internet services in Jammu and Kashmir, albeit it after a 72 day black out, there is no denying that it will monitor the situation and any signs of public protests might well lead to another black out. Kashmiris may well be disheartened by the lack of immediate support on the international stage, but slowly but surely more voices from the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union and even within India are speaking out against India's handling of the situation. While its response has been that its a domestic matter, Indian decision makers can surely not assume that its a position the world will accept especially if India fails to bring calm to the Kashmir valley.

Pakistan could take the moral high ground and suggest a plebiscite (as per the UN Security Council resolutions of past decades) but add the option for Kashmiris to choose independence rather than only the choice of joining India or Pakistan! It is highly unlikely that India would accept such a proposal given it current stance but most certainly such a move would give the Kashmiri movement an impetus that would color the voice of dissent to one of true freedom.

We will see street agitation increase over the next few months, prior to the harsh winter setting in, and one must remember in the words of Martin Luther King 'the riot is the language of the unheard.' By locking up the Kashmiri leadership, even those who have worked within the concept of Indian Kashmir being a part of the Indian Union, the is no voice that can be heard. In this vacuum the direction of street protests without a leadership can turn ugly. Reason will surrender to passion and restraint will become absent in the face of violent blow back from the Indian armed forces.

I have a fair number of Indian friends and I ask them only one question "If the people of Indian Kashmir really are happy with this decision as the Modi government tells us then why do you need a lockdown and 900,000 armed personnel in Kashmir?' Their usual answer is to deal with terrorist threats. Fair enough, but I have always believed no terrorist even from abroad can operate in a country without some local support and encouragement. Secondly the nature of a terror threat is not mitigated by curfews and lockdowns and roadblocks, they choose their timing and place of attack.

I do believe that while support and encouragement from abroad may have been there for these militant groups, (much like India has supported such groups operating in its neighbors territory) the Kashmir dissent is home grown and for him to move from throwing stones to lobbing grenades is decided by how the Indian armed forces treat the people of Kashmir.

Bangladesh 1971- Kashmir 2019. Some thoughts

The 1971 Bangladesh crisis which emerged from political chaos into a civil war leading to Indian military intervention for the liberation of East Pakistan into the new country of Bangladesh was a monumental event in the history of the South Asian sub-continent. The 1970 elections in then united Pakistan clearly were a victory for Mujib ur Rehman's Awami League in East Pakistan, and rightfully he should have been invited by the then President, General Yahya Khan to form the government. Instead political pressures and the reluctance of both Yahya and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the People's Party who won in West Pakistan, (but not enough to form a majority government) led to a confrontation between the Bengali people of East Pakistan and the military, which was predominantly from West Pakistan.

The resulting civil war and the killings on both sides were barbarian to say the least. The resentment within the Bengali people of East Pakistan had been brewing for decades before as they considered themselves are second class citizens and were in a sense alienated from the mainstream of Pakistan political structure. This is all the more surprising as during the period of the struggle for an Independent Pakistan, in the 1940's, it was the more politically minded Bangalis of what became East Pakistan were were staunch supporters of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan.

India's intervention into East Pakistan was justified on the basis of helping the Bengali people achieve independence and put an end to the civil war. These were considered noble aims, and if one were to look at it independently, perhaps the right course for any neighboring country to take given the situation on the ground. As a Pakistani many of my fellow countrymen would consider me unpatriotic in admitting that the creation of Bangladesh was the result of the actions of not only the leadership of the time in West Pakistan, but also the result of years of policy, both political, social and economic, to treat East Pakistan differently to the rest of the country.


Today, in 2019, we look at the situation of Indian held Kashmir and while one cannot say there is an outright civil war, but there is no denying that there is widespread discontent with the Indian government and the presence of the Indian army. The argument that the curfews and detentions continue because there is a fear that 'miscreants' and 'terrorists' will take advantage of the lifting of the curfews to spread trouble is a false justification. With or without curfews the miscreants and terrorists will find a way to carry out what they wish. This does sound terribly close to what the Pakistan army would do in East Pakistan to justify the curfews and detentions in 1970.

It took Pakistanis time to realize that their policies and actions in what was former East Pakistan were wrong and those actions sowed the seeds of dissent upon which the independence of Bangladesh occurred. It was and is a lesson to countries that they must respect the wishes of its people from all ethnic and religious segments.

India has to accept that the executive suspension of an article of its constitution, which was done contrary to due process (see my older blog https://aqsher.blogspot.com/2019/08/modis-legal-pitfalls-on-art-370.html?m=1), does not swipe the problem away. This is a problem on which the UN has passed resolutions, its a problem on which both India and Pakistan have signed agreements, and in the end its a disputed territory. The Kashmiri leadership, which may not be the right leadership in the eyes of the ruling Indian BJP, is still the political voice of the people of Kashmir. Their detention is itself proof of India's own discomfort with their own position that the people of Kashmir have welcomed the decision that New Delhi has made.

India must learn from history; just as Pakistan thought decisions made in Islamabad would be welcomed Dhaka during the 1970's) similarly India must accept that it is the people of Kashmir themselves who have to make the determination of their own future. India has the assurance that even if the situation within Kashmir reached proportions of those akin to a civil war, Pakistan, having a smaller military would not intervene in a classical war type action. What India fears most is that as it loses it moral argument over its actions in Kashmir and the agitation against its military presence in Indian held Kashmir increases, Pakistan will have little option than to support groups within Indian Kashmir fighting to expel the Indian army. Today, unlike 1970, we have the word 'terrorist' in our political lexicon and this explains India's narrative against Pakistan that it supports terrorists. One could argue that any support from Pakistan to groups fighting the Indian army would be no different than India having supported the Mukhti Bahini who fought against the Pakistan army in Bangladesh!

There is growing international concern over India's human rights record in Kashmir and with the integration of Indian held Kashmir into India fears of a major resettlement of Hindus from India into Kashmir will be encouraged to change the demographics of Kashmir. Allegations abound that Indian forces have arrested close 6,000 people, while some sources suggest as much as 13,000 people in detention. The lock down of Indian Kashmir continues and there are genuine concerns of atrocities by the Indian army against Kashmiris. India's failure to allow human rights groups to visit the area, or indeed allow the international press free access within Indian Kashmir are all disturbing indicators that all is not well with the Indian action on Kashmir.

At the moment it would seem Pakistan is avoiding the more drastic steps it could take and concentrating on a diplomatic front to deal with the Kashmir issue. I suspect that Pakistan may also take a higher moral ground at some stage by suggesting that a referendum should be in both Indian held Kashmir and on the Pakistan side of Kashmir giving the people three choices, a) Join India, b) Join Pakistan and c) form and Independent Kashmir. While at the moment Pakistan may be less likely to consider this proposal, India would on the other hand oppose any referendum of any nature. In terms of creating a better position, albeit it politically and morally, even Pakistan proposing a three option referendum would really put the cat amongst the pigeons.

Pakistan: The legacy of 'Terrorism' and the Paradigm Shift.

Indian Prime Minister Modi, when speaking in Houston made a remark, without naming Pakistan, though everyone knew he meant them, about its history of supporting terrorism. This is strand of thinking that is often touted around whenever regional or geopolitics comes into the debate with the context of Pakistan. Its a narrative that is hard to wash not because there are no reasons to explain this history, but because its a label that is difficult to wash off. Sensible minds do not prevail in the propaganda war and Pakistan has never really been able to put its case to the international community.

When Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union and seven main Mujahideen groups emerged in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets, a proxy war ensued whereby the United States, some Arab states and of course Pakistan saw the need to support these seven groups. This support was based upon the premise that they were 'freedom fighters' and hailed even by the United States as the modern day champions of freedom and liberty. The seven groups all had their own peculiar motive and outlook to Afghan politics and Afghan society; yet in the over all scheme of things each was seen as an ally of Pakistan and the US as each had their own areas of influence.

The support that was provided to these groups was in weapons, supplies, and money. It is estimated that Gulbedin Hekmatyar's Hezb i Islami alone received as much as $600 million of funding, mostly from the United States funneled through the Pakistan military. Without going into the many twists and turns from1978 to1994 (the birth of the Taliban) it will suffice to say that while Ahmed Shah Massod's Northern Alliance was the only group to remain cohesive and clear in its mission, the rest were warlords with political ambitions. In varying degrees all other groups remain fragmented in their approach. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 while the US took no interest in the future of Afghanistan, Pakistan having largely backed Hekmatyar, (even though others were supported in a smaller sense) saw that Hekmatyar apart from not having grass root support was also prone to continuing the war but this time against the other factions.

By 1992 the communist regime in Kabul had collapsed as indeed had the Soviet Union met the same fate, and after much effort all the parties (initially barring Hekmatyar) agreed to the Peshawar Accord, brokered by Pakistan, installing an interim government with a power sharing formula and including three major factions including Hekmatyar (ar Prime Minister) Ahmed Shah Masood (as Defense Minister). No sooner had this agreement been reached Hekmatyar ignored Masood's insistence that none of the militias enter Kabul until the new government had become functional. The result was a civil war that destroyed much of Kabul and all the factions were to blame in this upheaval.

As Pakistan got increasingly frustrated with Hekmatyar a new group calling themselves Taliban was organized in the south of the country and many claim from support from Pakistan. While there is no denying that a majority of the initial 15,000 'talib' who formed the Taliban were Afghans from refugees camps in Pakistan and who had largely been educated in Islamic schools (madrassas). As the Taliban success grew the other groups either dissolved or merged into the Taliban ranks. With the Northern Alliance being the only group to oppose the Taliban its ][=success in 80% of the country was guaranteed.

Pakistan's role without a doubt started out as a country supporting freedom fighters, something that seemed to carry the moral and material support of some major Arab countries and indeed the United States of America too. As has been seen in history once an organized insurgency group is created on the mantle of being freedom fighters then once the threat is removed unless these groups are not politically channeled into the new political system they end up being rogue militias that make the task of any new government difficult to restore order. In supporting these groups, which Pakistan never felt it was in the wrong, (after all a superpower like the US was their partner) Gen Zia ul Haq politicized the Pakistan Army. His outlook to a Muslim form of governance (with him as head of course) saw the ISI (the military intelligence wing of the Pakistan Army) to wield enormous power so much so that at times the top brass of the military did not know what the ISI was doing.

It was felt by Zia that the ISI free from the constraints of a military structure and oversight by the main line commanders of the military would be able to achieve the goals of pushing the Soviets out of Afghanistan, an aim that endeared Zia to Washington . To the US using the ISI as a conduit to train and arm the Mujahideen was seen as perfectly plausible as the weapons were seen as going to the Pakistan military where as every one knew their destination was ultimately the Mujahideen groups. Where Pakistan ISI and the US failed miserably was any foresight about the political order they could have in Afghanistan once the Soviets left. No preparation was done in this respect, and because of the ethnic diversity within the Mujahideen groups and their politico religious allegiances so varied no cohesive approach to governance in a free Afghanistan was even seriously worked on.

In the melee of this Afghan melting pot were the large number of foreign fighters, mostly Arabs, who followed the Saudi firebrand Osama bin Laden.  He and his followers established themselves in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule and while they remained out of the internal fighting of the civil war their support for Sunni conservative groups was no hidden secret. In the Taliban they saw an ally who not only ideologically were closer to them but also were supportive allies in welcoming these foreign fighters to stay on in Afghanistan.

The 9/11 attacks on the US completely changed the scenario as US policy makers not only saw in Osama bin Laden being the main culprit of the attacks on US soil but also felt that so long as the Taliban remained in power other attacks from Afghan based groups would continue. It became imperative, rightly or wrongly, for the US to take military action in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, especially the ISI, this event became a major turning point as they saw 'freedom fighters' trained by them (including the Taliban) to suddenly be reframed as 'terrorists'. For Pakistan the situation became all the more difficult as US pressure was exerted to not only break the links with these groups (which the US had encouraged for over two decades) but to also share vital information with the US in helping the US hunt down these 'terrorists'.

It would not be incorrect to state that this caused a major schism within not only Pakistan political circles but also the ISI. There was a school of thought that felt that labelling all these groups as terrorists was wrong without the burden of proof as to which group and people actually carried out the attacks on 9/11. Another moderate group felt that the conduct of these groups during and after the Afghan civil war showed they were simply run by war lords with no concern for social good and them being labelled was terrorists was long overdue. This group also felt that joining the war on terror was perhaps the only course open to Pakistan and would correct the policy mistakes of the Zia era. A third school of thought, to which perhaps the current Prime Minister, Imran Khan, belongs was that Pakistan should not have joined the 'war on terror' and it should also have denied any support to the groups that were the target of the US war on terror

The result of the post 9/11 war on terror were perhaps worst for Pakistan. Since the government of General Musharraf had covertly sided with the US in it war on terror, Pakistani soil and air space was extensively used by the US forces in their war in Afghanistan. In many cases as Afghans hunted by US forces crossed the porous border into Pakistan they were hunted in drone and sniper attacks on Pakistan soil. As hard as it would be for Mr Modi to recognize this, but overnight the former allies (and freedom fighters) of Pakistan's ISI turned against Pakistan. In this 'war on terror' more than US forces it was Pakistani forces and Pakistani society that became the number one target for the 'freedom fighters turned terrorists.' 

Side by side for Pakistan there was a major problem within the ISI and select sections of society. These were people who for twenty years had trained and supported the very groups that were now declared terrorists by the US. These are links that cannot be severed so easily and it would be fair to say that these 'sympathizers' continued silent and covert support for these 'terror' groups much after the official policy of Pakistan had changed. In the scheme of things in the 1990's it was never thought that these groups were going to be the enemies of Pakistan and therefore when the paradigm shift happened with Pakistan supporting the US led war on terror counter intelligence assets within these groups were few.

On the flip side these Afghan groups had close alliances with radical groups within Pakistan and saw that with Pakistan changing its official policy towards them they could influence these radical groups to act against Pakistan. This explains the birth of groups like the Pakistan Taliban, a group most active in terror attacks against the Pakistan army and civilian targets. The war on terror, which Musharraf assumed would be confined to the territory of Afghanistan got internalized into Pakistan, especially within the tribal areas of Pakistan. To complicate matters the US policy of drone attacks was not limited to Afghan soil and extensive targeting of suspected terrorists took place within Pakistan. In most instances the collateral damage in such attacks were civilians and this furthered the anger within Pakistan's radical groups towards Pakistan.

This is not to say that all active militant groups within Pakistan were 'foreign' inspired. Home grown radical groups had sprung up within Pakistan during the 1980's, largely possible due to the proliferation of weapons and the creation of what was called the Kalashnikov culture. Pakistan's border with Afghanistan had always been a porous and rugged terrain and the flow of people and weapons (and drugs) was difficult to control. Side by side Pakistani intelligence services had seen the value of militant groups organized in expelling the Soviets in Afghanistan and there was tendency to encourage militant groups who would eventually be an asset in Indian occupied Kashmir. This was by no ways unheard of as the Indian intelligence service, RAW, had also encouraged militant groups to operate against Pakistan in Baluchistan. RAW had also been active in supporting Ahmed Shah Masood's Northern Alliance in Afghanistan as it was actively opposed by most of the groups that Pakistan supported during the civil war. RAW had actively engaged in operations against the Jamat i Islami in Bangladesh and operations in Sri Lanka and Maldives.

Much is said about ISI's role in creating these 'terrorist' groups and one should step back a realize that as a part of a counter intelligence strategy such measures have been taken by the CIA, the Indian RAW and many other countries. There is nothing new about this, though it would seem in Pakistan the groups emerged through the mass weaponization of society that happened during the Afghan war and then these groups gravitated towards the intelligence services. On the other hand there were groups who had an internal agenda such as the Sipah Sihaba, a militant Sunni group whose professed aim was the eradication of all sections of society who did not fall into their strict interpretation of Sunni Islam.

Sectarian violence against mostly Shia groups became the norm during the 1990's and none of these groups were in anyway connected or controlled by the Pakistan ISI. Sipah Sihaba tried to appeal to the masses through its political activity and in fact even had some members elected to the National Assembly. During the mid to late 1990's many of its radical followers left their ranks and joined splinter groups that grew out of the Sipah Sihaba. These groups were visibly more militant than the Sipah Sihaba and reached out to like minded people in Indian occupied Kashmir. Indeed most of the rank and file of groups like the Pakistan Taliban, the Lashker-i- Jhangvi, the Jaish e Muhammed, etc all came originally from the Sipah Sihaba.

For Pakistan the road to purge its establishments of sympathizers to these groups was relatively easy as most of these groups were carrying out attacks within Pakistan. (Shia Groups also had organized themselves to carry out counter attacks on the Sunni groups). However, the more difficult task was to purge the ISI from people who had worked with and sympathized with the foreign groups who till 2001 were touted as freedom fighters. These included the six groups active in Afghanistan, their successors, the Taliban and the group of foreign Arab fighters led by Osama bin Ladin.

While the state policy of Pakistan had changed it took almost another decade to break away from the covert unsanctioned support of these groups. However, given the past history of Pakistan as a state in the frontline of supporting groups fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, it would not be wrong to assume that they do not have some political influence on these groups. This is the reason that talks between the US and the Afghan Taliban have been through the aegis of Pakistan's contacts with the Taliban. However, it has been a more difficult task to rope in the militant organizations that were home grown.

It would seem the current political and military set up in Pakistan has seen the counter productive nature of these groups and a paradigm shift in Islamabad's thinking has taken place. The result is more concerted diplomatic efforts in relation to issue like Indian administered Kashmir and also a realization that with over 70,000 deaths during the 'war on terror', Pakistan cannot afford an internal militancy. The harder part for Pakistan will be to convince the world at large that the shift in policy has taken place. Indeed people have stigmatized Pakistan, perhaps partially correctly, but have ignored that there is  hardly a country of substance who has not supported violent means for political change. Traditionally the terrorists of yesterday become the freedom fighters of today; Ben Guerion in Israel, Castro in Cuba,  Mandela in South Africa and the list goes on, lending credence to the dictum that one mans terrorist in another mans freedom fighter. In the case of the Afghan groups, including the Taliban the transition has been reversed as a freedom fighter of yesteryears are now the terrorist of today.

As the situation in Indian Kashmir continues to be a stand off between Indian Kashmiris and Indian military forces, Pakistan has shown remarkable restraint in trying to avoid militant groups being active across the Line of Control between the two countries. Kashmir is a highly emotional issue and Imran Khan so far has presented himself as the ambassador to speak for the Kashmiri people he will need to convince the masses that violence supported by Pakistan sending militias across the border is not a solution. In a sense there is a recognition, missed by the international community, that there is enough resentment within Indian Kashmir against the Modi government to allow it to takes it own course in how they organize protest and resistance to New Delhi's 'integration' of Kashmir. India will sound the drumbeat that any violent protests against its presence in Kashmir is from militants sent by Pakistan, and herein lie the dangers of open conflict between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan might do well to take the moral high ground by inviting a larger presence of UN peacekeepers on its side of the line of control to prove to the world that it is not encouraging militants to cross the border. It will then be for India to invite a similar force and an international press corp into its side of Kashmir to make prove their claim that all is well in Kashmir. As much as the highly emotional passionate call within Pakistan would be one to take up arms to liberate Indian Kashmir, it is really  the time to outsmart India rather than outgun New Delhi.

India: From Secularism to Hindu Jingoism.

Many Pakistanis who embraced the view that Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, wanted an Islamic Pakistan with a secular society and secular form of governance (based on his speech to the Constituent Assembly) always looked at India's progress towards a secular path with envy. In the mid 1970's Pakistan, under General Zia, nosedived into his brand of Islamic polity which eroded any semblance of a secular will as may have been expressed by Jinnah. India, one always felt, had the entrenched secular back bone, we felt, that it would in the end resist the temptations of a Hindu jingoism the target of which would be India's minorities. Prime Minister Modi and his Home Minister Amit Shah in one stroke changed that.

Through decades of India's political and social journey communal and religious tensions were there, riots and hate crimes targeted against Muslims and to some extent Christians occurred and in one way or another India managed to absorb the effect of these incidents. While India was ruled for much of the period after Independence by the more inclusive and secular Congress Party, even the right wing Hindu party BJP's earlier governments did not forcefully try to change the secular narrative of India. While the discussion on how the militant Hindu RSS thinking over took the leadership of the BJP, mostly under the leadership of PM Modi is a different debate the fact remains that India's secularism is being over run by a Hindu jingoism that has to be troubling to the souls of Mahatama Gandhi, Nehru and Indira Gandhi.

We have seen through history when the intellectual repository of the country abandons independent thought, inquiry and argument and accepts conformity it gives fuel to the forces who seek a new narrative without question. While there are voices of dissent over India's new unspoken slogan of "Hindustan only for Hindu's", the counter narrative to these voices is not  of discussion but of introducing a binary option which entails that because one cannot accept this jingoism you must be labelled a traitor. The Congress Party is no more painted as a political party in opposition to the BJP but rather as an ally of India's enemy Pakistan and its leaders as traitors.

The nationalist argument and its dogma, in its basic essence, is a difficult creed to preach on the Indian sub-continent because given the demographics, the ethnicity and the religious complexion of the people of the sub-continent, (including both India and Pakistan) a nationalist label only lends itself to the people in a political sense. Thus its the political and perhaps economic needs that define India as one nation and Pakistan as another nation. While Pakistan, having been formed on the basis of a homeland for Muslims may have a more cohesive religious complexion, it still has different ethnic groups (Sindhi, Baluch, Punjabi, and Pashtun being the main ones), and the concept of nationhood is more a religious and political concept of nationalism.

For India, this becomes more complex because unlike Pakistan where religious minorities are very tiny the dominance of Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians within Indian society is quite significant. Based on ethnicity as a factor the differences in India are enormous and this translates into social and cultural barriers within India where it was always felt a secular complexion was the only way to give India an identity that can then lend itself to a common Indian nationalism. Over 20% of its people are not Hindus and the largest group being Muslims who are about 200 million people. Under the secular complexion India could appeal to Indian Muslims for a sense of patriotism towards an Indian nationalism and in a sense was the charm to the outside world of this coexistence being a symbol of India's success. Indeed this does not imply it was always rosy and smooth and communal violence was always on the landscape of India in one form or the other. But, by and large, one could state that the experiment of a secular nationalist slogan within India was carrying some weight.

It was this thinking that was behind the reasons that Nehru agreed to a special status to Indian Kashmir. It was a Muslim majority region, disputed with Pakistan and needed this treatment in a constitutional framework to ensure that Nehru could take the sting out of the independent minded Kashmiris. Whether the dispute with Pakistan would be ever resolved or not was then considered a matter of foreign policy in the eyes of Indian governments led by the Congress Party. Indeed tensions within Kashmir remained and still remain as from a Kashmiri standpoint they always felt the arrangements that India had put in place still did not deal with the promise that Kashmiris would decide their own fate.

India's push towards a Hindu dominated narrative, at times at the expense of other religious and ethnic minorities, is spearheaded under the One India slogan and a need to 'integrate' different sections of the Indian diaspora into a national identity. Prima facia this is the narrative that Modi's BJP would like to project, supported by a section of the nationalist media. However should such actions have been a part of the Congress Party under its secular badge then chances are the minorities would have had more faith in the intent and sincerity of the Congress Party intentions. For Modi and Amit Shah to brand such 'integration' slogans there is the problem of their Hindu nationalist past, especially Modi's RSS political parentage and is more than likely to cause shivers amongst the Muslim, Sikh and Christian minorities of India.

BJP is going to extra length to convince us that its move in Kashmir has nothing to do with religion, while at the same time it has declared over 1.9 million Indians as non citizens (a large percentage of them Muslims) under its new nationality rules. So long as Kashmiris, and other minorities remember that Indian Kashmir was the only Muslim majority state it is difficult not to agree that BJP's historical wish to not have a Muslim majority state in India is the driving force behind their current policy. In a larger context Modi has opened a can of worms with his move on Kashmir because it unsettles the debate about Indian nationalism, which without its secular bias is difficult to sell under the  "India for Hindu's only" dogma.

This Hindu jingoism is approaching disturbing dimensions when the Indian head of the army states that the army is only waiting for the government to tell them to 'liberate Pakistan occupied Kashmir'. In so far as passionate jingoism is concerned that is a good line to spew out, but in reality one would ask why liberate a land where there are no curfews, no occupation by a million troops, no lock down of internet and telephone services and certainly no arrests of over 4,000 political opponents. For the international community the stark reality of such comments is that perhaps as long as India cannot subdue its part of Kashmir the chances are that it will externalize the issue by attacking Pakistan side of Kashmir to 'liberate' it.

On a broader geo strategic front the Taliban, who have been flirting with peace talks with the US in Afghanistan, would be licking their chops at the prospect of internal strife within Indian held Kashmir. It is precisely this sort of situation which is the breeding ground for them to foster a home grown Indian Kashmiri Taliban. Pakistan, given its war with its own Pakistan Taliban would be cautious to support such an adventure by the larger Taliban groups in Afghanistan. India would never admit that many of the terror attacks within Indian Kashmir are from home grown terrorists who see themselves as freedom fighters.

In essence India's departure from a secular complexion to what Modi and his allies are pushing is more worrying for India itself than anyone else. Can India afford to play this domestic card which opens the can of worms in different parts of India and not just Kashmir? To what extent will the dogma of a Hindu nationalist movement go before a return to mass communal violence, like we saw in Gujarat riots of 2002, occur again. Longer the current disenfranchisement of India's secular foundation continues the chances of the powder keg of communal tensions being set alight increase. India's strength was its secular complexion and it was the harbinger of harmony in a diverse country and was the force of unity rather than religious divisions that are encouraged by the Modi government.  Sadly that secular India is dying at the hands of a Hindu jingoism that could become a monster difficult to tame.